132 Texas opinions name it 4 courts 1948–2026 37 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chamberlain v. Stategreen2 sentences2026“The cumulative-error doctrine does not apply unless the complained- of errors have been preserved for appeal and are actually errors.” Schmidt v. State, 612 S.W.3d 359 , 372 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d) (citing Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 238 (Tex. Crim. 2024“The cumulative-error doctrine does not apply unless the complained- of errors have been preserved for appeal and are actually errors.” Schmidt v. State, 612 S.W.3d 359 , 372 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. ref’d) (citing Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 238 (Tex. Crim. | 46 | 46 |
Sproles Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Longgreen2 sentences2022Specifically, Wyatt complains of (1) the trial court’s granting of Turbo’s protective order denying Wyatt the “right to show the jury the instrumentality that was the basis of the lawsuit”; (2) the introduction of two superseded petitions but the refusal of Wyatt’s request to introduce a superseded answer describing the dangerous condition as “open and obvious”; (3) the refusal to include a res ipsa loquitur definition in the jury charge; and (4) the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury to disregard Turbo’s counsel’s representation that Turbo is a single restaurant and admonishment to Wy 2022Specifically, Wyatt complains of (1) the trial court’s granting of Turbo’s protective order denying Wyatt the “right to show the jury the instrumentality that was the basis of the lawsuit”; (2) the introduction of two superseded petitions but the refusal of Wyatt’s request to introduce a superseded answer describing the dangerous condition as “open and obvious”; (3) the refusal to include a res ipsa loquitur definition in the jury charge; and (4) the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury to disregard Turbo’s counsel’s representation that Turbo is a single restaurant and admonishment to Wy | 15 | 15 |
United States v. Bellgreen2 sentences2024However, the cumulative-error doctrine affords relief only when constitutional errors so “fatally infect the trial” that they violate the trial’s “fundamental fairness.” United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452, 471 (5th Cir. 2004). 2024App. 2010) (quoting United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452, 471 (5th Cir. 2004) (“The cumulative error doctrine provides relief only when constitutional errors so ‘fatally infect the trial’ that they violated the trial’s ‘fundamental fairness.’”)). | 14 | 14 |
University of Texas at Austin v. Hintongreen2 sentences2017Page 16 “A reviewing court may reverse a lower-court judgment under the cumulative- error doctrine when the record shows a number of instances or error, no one instance being sufficient to call for reversal, yet all instances taken together may do so.” Rhey v. Redic, 408 S.W.3d 440, 462 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.) (citing Sproles Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Long, 140 Tex. 494 , 168 S.W.2d 642, 645 (1943); Univ. of Tex. at Austin v. Hinton, 822 S.W.2d 197, 205 (Tex. App.— Austin 1991 , no writ)). 2017Page 16 “A reviewing court may reverse a lower-court judgment under the cumulative- error doctrine when the record shows a number of instances or error, no one instance being sufficient to call for reversal, yet all instances taken together may do so.” Rhey v. Redic, 408 S.W.3d 440, 462 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.) (citing Sproles Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Long, 140 Tex. 494 , 168 S.W.2d 642, 645 (1943); Univ. of Tex. at Austin v. Hinton, 822 S.W.2d 197, 205 (Tex. App.— Austin 1991 , no writ)). | 11 | 11 |
Gamboa v. Stategreen2 sentences2019App. 2009)); Gamboa, 296 S.W.3d at 585 (“Though it is possible for a number of errors to cumulatively rise to the point where they become harmful, we have never found that ‘non-errors may in their cumulative effect cause error.’”(footnotes omitted)); Priddy v. State, No. 02-13-00586-CR, 2014 WL 5307180 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 16, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Gamboa for the proposition that for the doctrine of cumulative error to apply, the alleged errors of which an appellant complains must actually constitute error). 2018See Gamboa, 296 S.W.3d at 585 ; see also Priddy v. State, No. 02-13-00586-CR, 2014 WL 5307180 , at *1 (Tex. App. — Fort Worth Oct. 16, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“The doctrine of cumulative error provides that the cumulative effect of several errors can, in the aggregate, constitute reversible error, even though no single instance of error would.”) (citing Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 238 (Tex. Crim. | 10 | 10 |
Estrada v. Stategreen2 sentences2021“The cumulative error doctrine provides relief only when constitutional errors so fatally infect the trial that they violated the trial’s fundamental fairness.” Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 311 (Tex. Crim. 2016He argues that the admission of F.G.J.’s testimony “involved matters of constitutional law and state law which so infected the entire trial that Appellant’s conviction violates due process and a fair jury trial in violation of the 14th Amendment.” Analysis “The cumulative error doctrine provides relief only when constitutional errors so ‘fatally infect the trial’ that they violated the trial’s ‘fundamental fairness.’” United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452, 471 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Derden v. McNeel, 978 F.2d 1453, 1457 (5th Cir.1992)); see Estrada v. State, 313 S.W.3d 274, 311 (Tex. Crim. | 8 | 10 |
United States v. Martin Gonzalez Munozgreen2 sentences2013See United States v. Munoz, 150 F.3d 401, 418 (5th Cir. 1998); Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 238 (Tex. Crim. 2013See United States v. Munoz, 150 F.3d 401, 418 (5th Cir. 1998); Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 238 (Tex. Crim. | 5 | 5 |
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malonegreen2 sentences2024See Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 916 S.W.2d 551, 570 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996), aff’d, 972 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1998) (“Multiple errors, even if considered harmless taken separately, may result in reversal and remand for a new trial if the cumulative effect of such errors is harmful.”). 44 a reasonable investigation with respect to the claim,” or (iii) “Denying coverage for a claim in part or in full if TWIA’s liability has become reasonably clear as a result of its investigation with respect to the denied claim,” and (b) included an improper instruction implying that “TWIA i 2024See Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 916 S.W.2d 551, 570 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996), aff’d, 972 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1998) (“Multiple errors, even if considered harmless taken separately, may result in reversal and remand for a new trial if the cumulative effect of such errors is harmful.”). 44 a reasonable investigation with respect to the claim,” or (iii) “Denying coverage for a claim in part or in full if TWIA’s liability has become reasonably clear as a result of its investigation with respect to the denied claim,” and (b) included an improper instruction implying that “TWIA i | 4 | 4 |
Rhey v. Redicgreen2 sentences2022See, e.g., Rhey, 408 S.W.3d at 462 (recognizing that a reviewing court may reverse a lower-court judgment under the cumulative-error doctrine when the record shows many instances of error, no one instance being sufficient to call for reversal, yet all the instances taken together may do so); see also Lakeside Vill. 2020The cumulative error doctrine allows an appellate court to reverse a judgment if the trial court committed numerous errors that individually do not support reversal but “taken together may do so.” Rhey v. Redic, 408 S.W.3d 440, 462 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.). | 4 | 4 |
United States v. Tolesgreen2 sentences2009Ed. 2d 705 (1967).” United States v. Toles, 297 F.3d 959, 972 (10th Cir. 2002). 2009Ed. 2d 705 (1967).” United States v. Toles, 297 F.3d 959, 972 (10th Cir. 2002). | 4 | 4 |
Raymond Lumsden v. Stategreen2 sentences2024See Washington v. State, No. 05-22-00479-CR, 2023 WL 8733057 , at *6 (Tex. App.— Dallas Dec. 18, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); see also Lumsden v. State, 564 S.W.3d 858, 899 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. ref’d). 2023See Bleimeyer v. State, 616 S.W.3d 234 , 258–59 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.); Lumsden v. State, 564 S.W.3d 858, 899 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. ref’d). | 3 | 3 |
George Guy Derden, III v. Sheriff Sammie McNeel and Attorney General--State of Mississippigreen2 sentences2019“The cumulative error doctrine provides relief only when constitutional errors so ‘fatally infect the trial’ that they violated the trial’s ‘fundamental fairness.’” United States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452, 471 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Derden v. McNeel, 978 F.2d 1453, 1457 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc)). 2019“The cumulative error doctrine provides relief only when constitutional errors so ‘fatally infect the trial’ that they violated the trial’s ‘fundamental fairness.’” United States 23 v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452, 471 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Derden v. McNeel, 978 F.2d 1453, 1457 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc)). | 3 | 3 |
In re BCH Development, LLCgreen2 sentences2025In re BCH Dev., LLC, 525 S.W.3d 920, 930 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2017, orig. proceeding) (when no errors exist, the appellate court can reject cumulative error arguments). 14 While it is true that pro se pleadings and briefs are generally construed liberally, a pro se litigant is still required to comply with the law and rules of procedure. 2024See In re BCH Dev., 525 S.W.3d at 930 . | 2 | 2 |
Pitman v. Lightfootgreen2 sentences2024See Pitman v. Lightfoot, 937 S.W.2d 496, 537 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied). 2020Reversal on this basis is not appropriate unless the record as a whole demonstrates that “but for the alleged errors, the jury would have rendered a verdict favorable to [the appellant].” Pitman v. Lightfoot, 937 S.W.2d 496, 537 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied). | 2 | 2 |
Buntion v. Stategreen2 sentences2024See Buntion v. State, 482 S.W.3d 58, 79 (Tex. Crim. 2024See Buntion v. State, 482 S.W.3d 58, 79 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Reesegreen2 sentences2007Co. v. Reese , 584 S.W.2d 835, 840 (Tex.1979); Smerke v. Office Equip. 2007Co. v. Reese , 584 S.W.2d 835, 840 (Tex.1979); Smerke v. Office Equip. | 2 | 2 |
Wright v. Stategreen2 sentences2001See Wright v. State, 28 S.W.3d 526, 537 (Tex. Crim. 2001See Wright v. State , 28 S.W.3d 526, 537 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Town East Ford Sales, Inc. v. Graygreen2 sentences1993Town East Ford Sales, Inc. v. Gray, 730 S.W.2d 796, 810 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, no writ). 1992Town East Ford Sales, Inc. v. Gray, 730 S.W.2d 796, 809-10 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, no writ). | 2 | 2 |
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malonegreen2 sentences2024See Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 916 S.W.2d 551, 570 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996), aff’d, 972 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1998) (“Multiple errors, even if considered harmless taken separately, may result in reversal and remand for a new trial if the cumulative effect of such errors is harmful.”). 44 a reasonable investigation with respect to the claim,” or (iii) “Denying coverage for a claim in part or in full if TWIA’s liability has become reasonably clear as a result of its investigation with respect to the denied claim,” and (b) included an improper instruction implying that “TWIA i 2024See Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 916 S.W.2d 551, 570 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996), aff’d, 972 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. 1998) (“Multiple errors, even if considered harmless taken separately, may result in reversal and remand for a new trial if the cumulative effect of such errors is harmful.”). 44 a reasonable investigation with respect to the claim,” or (iii) “Denying coverage for a claim in part or in full if TWIA’s liability has become reasonably clear as a result of its investigation with respect to the denied claim,” and (b) included an improper instruction implying that “TWIA i | 1 | 4 |
Linney, Timothy Garrettgreen2 sentences2023To prevail on this ground, an appellant must establish that multiple errors “synergistically achieve the critical mass necessary to cast a shadow upon the integrity of the verdict.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 17 Appellant, relying in essence on the same arguments raised in his briefing on his first two issues, has failed to establish his entitlement to relief based on the cumulative-error doctrine. 2023To prevail on this ground, an appellant must establish that multiple errors “synergistically achieve the critical mass necessary to cast a shadow upon the integrity of the verdict.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 17 Appellant, relying in essence on the same arguments raised in his briefing on his first two issues, has failed to establish his entitlement to relief based on the cumulative-error doctrine. | 1 | 4 |
Crescendo Investments, Inc. v. Bricegreen2 sentences2003Crescendo Inves., Inc. v. Brice , 61 S.W.3d 465, 481 , 481 n.16 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 2001, pet. denied). 2003Crescendo Inves., Inc. v. Brice, 61 S.W.3d 465, 481 , 481 n.16 (Tex. App.CSan Antonio 2001, pet. denied). | 1 | 4 |
Ramirez v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2016Ed. 2d 678 , 120 S. Ct. 805 (2000) (recognizing the doctrine of cumulative error but finding no authority for the proposition that non-errors can in their cumulative effect cause error). 2014See Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 238 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1082 , 120 S.Ct. 805 , 145 L.Ed.2d 678 (2000). | 1 | 2 |
Smerke v. Office Equipment Companygreen2 sentences2015Under this doctrine, “[a] reviewing court may reverse a lower-court judgment under the cumulative-error doctrine when the record shows a number of instances of error, no one instance being sufficient to call for a reversal, yet all the instances taken together may do so.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). 45 In this case, even if the Court determines that some of the errors discussed above were harmless, their combined effect requires reversal. 1957Smerke v. Office Equipment Co., 138 Tex. 236 , 158 S.W.2d 302 , dealing with the cumulative error doctrine, to the contrary notwithstanding. | 1 | 2 |
Sendejar v. Alice Physicians & Surgeons Hospital, Inc.green2 sentences1993Sendejar v. Alice Physicians and Surgeons Hospital, 555 S.W.2d 879, 888 . 1987Sendejar v. Alice Physicians and Surgeons Hospital, Inc., 555 S.W.2d 879, 888 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1977, writ ref’d n.r. e.). | 1 | 2 |
Ryland Shane Absalon v. Stategreen1 sentence2025See Baugus v. State, No. 02-22-00015-CR, 2023 WL 3370718 , at *16 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 11, 2023, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“Baugus’s cumulative- error complaint lacks merit because there is no error to cumulate.”); Abel v. State, No. 02-18-00051-CR, 2020 WL 5048078 , at *36 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 27, 2020, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that because the court had overruled appellant’s other appellate issues, his “cumulative- error complaint lack[ed] merit because there [was] no error to cumulate”); Absalon, 33 47 | 1 | 1 |
Cosio v. Stategreen1 sentence2025See Carr v. State, No. 14-09-00322-CR, 2010 WL 2835663 , at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 20, 2010, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that erroneous charge instruction that “a public servant means a police officer” did not cause egregious harm because, inter alia, the appellant did not dispute the officer’s status as a public servant and “the fact that a police officer is a public servant was not controverted” at trial); Marshall v. State, No. 06-03-00215-CR, 2006 WL 1996400 at *2 (Tex. App.— Texarkana July 19, 2006, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated | 1 | 1 |
Phillips v. Bramlettgreen1 sentence2024Although “[a] complaint of incurable argument may be asserted and preserved in a motion for new trial, even without a complaint and ruling during the trial,” see Phillips v. Bramlett, 288 S.W.3d 876, 883 (Tex. 2009), by raising this issue only in conjunction with a cumulative error argument, Rios effectively concedes that the harm from Nissan’s presentation of this evidence during closing argument was not incurable. | 1 | 1 |
| Stahl v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Woodgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lakeside Vill. Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Belangergreen | 1 | 1 |
| in the Interest of A.M., a Childgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Colburn v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jenkins v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| David Wayne Spence v. Gary L. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Divisiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Archie v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| D. Stephen Menzies v. Raymond K. Procunier, Director, Texas Department of Correctionsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Valle v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Simpson v. Matesanzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Davis v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Santellan v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Texas Health Enterprises, Inc. v. Krellred2 sentences1996Tex. R.App.P. 81(b)(1); Texas Health Enter., 828 S.W.2d at 210 . 1994See Texas Health Enters, v. Krell, 828 S.W.2d 192, 210 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi), vacated by agr., 830 S.W.2d 922 (Tex.1992) (cumulative error doctrine applies in cases where the harm from multiple errors may entitle appellant to greater relief than would result from separate consideration of each individual error). | 1 | 2 |
| Texas Health Enterprises, Inc. v. Krellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Chapman v. California
red
2 sentences2009“If any of the errors being aggregated are constitutional in nature, the cumulative error must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, in accordance with Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S. Ct. 824 , 17 L. 2009“If any of the errors being aggregated are constitutional in nature, the cumulative error must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, in accordance with Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S. Ct. 824 , 17 L. | 4 | 2003–2009 |
Olivas v. State
green
1 sentence2025See Carr v. State, No. 14-09-00322-CR, 2010 WL 2835663 , at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 20, 2010, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding that erroneous charge instruction that “a public servant means a police officer” did not cause egregious harm because, inter alia, the appellant did not dispute the officer’s status as a public servant and “the fact that a police officer is a public servant was not controverted” at trial); Marshall v. State, No. 06-03-00215-CR, 2006 WL 1996400 at *2 (Tex. App.— Texarkana July 19, 2006, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| 4front Engineered Solutions, Inc. v. Carlos Rosales, Individually, and Rosa Mejia, as Next Friend of Carlos Rosales, Jr. green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| in the Interest of E.R.C., a Minor Child green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Fletcher v. Edwards green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Parle v. Runnels green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Almanza v. State green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| United States v. Aurora Canales and Elia Garcia green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Barrera v. State green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Strickland v. Washington green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Read v. State green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Harrison v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Brown v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Ex Parte Wilson green | 1 | 1948–1948 |
| Ex parte Cox neutral | 1 | 1948–1948 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.