joint sentencing hearing in Illinois

2001The issues on appeal are (1) whether defendant was deprived of due process by the court’s use of closed circuit television at arraignment, (2) whether the trial court mistakenly believed that consecutive sentences were statutorily mandated for all three offenses, and (3) whether the consecutive sentence imposed for home invasion violated the rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 147 L.

2001The issues on appeal are (1) whether defendant was deprived of due process by the court’s use of closed circuit television at arraignment, (2) whether the trial court mistakenly believed that consecutive sentences were statutorily mandated for all three offenses, and (3) whether the consecutive sentence imposed for home invasion violated the rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 147 L.

2022“Defense counsel is not required to make futile motions or objections in order to provide effective assistance.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Mister, 2016 IL App (4th) 130180-B, ¶ 95 , 58 N.E.3d 1242 (quoting People v. Smith, 2014 IL App (1st) 103436, ¶ 64 , 16 N.E.3d 129 ). ¶ 54 Defendant concedes, “without the agreement, [he] could show neither deficiency nor prejudice from Rumley’s failure to object to joint sentencing.” But even if it could be said that Rumley’s failure to object to joint sentencing was objectively unreasonable, it caused no prejudice.

2022“Defense counsel is not required to make futile motions or objections in order to provide effective assistance.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Mister, 2016 IL App (4th) 130180-B, ¶ 95 , 58 N.E.3d 1242 (quoting People v. Smith, 2014 IL App (1st) 103436, ¶ 64 , 16 N.E.3d 129 ). ¶ 54 Defendant concedes, “without the agreement, [he] could show neither deficiency nor prejudice from Rumley’s failure to object to joint sentencing.” But even if it could be said that Rumley’s failure to object to joint sentencing was objectively unreasonable, it caused no prejudice.

2022“Defense counsel is not required to make futile motions or objections in order to provide effective assistance.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Mister, 2016 IL App (4th) 130180-B, ¶ 95 , 58 N.E.3d 1242 (quoting People v. Smith, 2014 IL App (1st) 103436, ¶ 64 , 16 N.E.3d 129 ). ¶ 54 Defendant concedes, “without the agreement, [he] could show neither deficiency nor prejudice from Rumley’s failure to object to joint sentencing.” But even if it could be said that Rumley’s failure to object to joint sentencing was objectively unreasonable, it caused no prejudice.

1990Jordan, however, does not prohibit multiple extended-term sentences under certain circumstances, such as where a defendant has been sentenced to death for murder and to an extended term for armed robbery (People v. Neal (1985), 111 Ill. 2d 180, 203-05 , 489 N.E.2d 845 ), or where a defendant has been sentenced to life imprisonment for murder and to an extended term for armed robbery (People v. Young (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 147, 166 , 529 N.E.2d 497 ), or where defendant had a joint sentencing hearing after separate trials resulting in separate convictions arising out of distinct factual situations

1990Jordan, however, does not prohibit multiple extended-term sentences under certain circumstances, such as where a defendant has been sentenced to death for murder and to an extended term for armed robbery (People v. Neal (1985), 111 Ill. 2d 180, 203-05 , 489 N.E.2d 845 ), or where a defendant has been sentenced to life imprisonment for murder and to an extended term for armed robbery (People v. Young (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 147, 166 , 529 N.E.2d 497 ), or where defendant had a joint sentencing hearing after separate trials resulting in separate convictions arising out of distinct factual situations

1990App. 3d 420, 430 , 529 N.E.2d 1001 ; People v. Whitson (1984), 127 Ill.

1990App. 3d 420, 430 , 529 N.E.2d 1001 ; People v. Whitson (1984), 127 Ill.

1990Jordan, however, does not prohibit multiple extended-term sentences under certain circumstances, such as where a defendant has been sentenced to death for murder and to an extended term for armed robbery (People v. Neal (1985), 111 Ill. 2d 180, 203-05 , 489 N.E.2d 845 ), or where a defendant has been sentenced to life imprisonment for murder and to an extended term for armed robbery (People v. Young (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 147, 166 , 529 N.E.2d 497 ), or where defendant had a joint sentencing hearing after separate trials resulting in separate convictions arising out of distinct factual situations

1990Jordan, however, does not prohibit multiple extended-term sentences under certain circumstances, such as where a defendant has been sentenced to death for murder and to an extended term for armed robbery (People v. Neal (1985), 111 Ill. 2d 180, 203-05 , 489 N.E.2d 845 ), or where a defendant has been sentenced to life imprisonment for murder and to an extended term for armed robbery (People v. Young (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 147, 166 , 529 N.E.2d 497 ), or where defendant had a joint sentencing hearing after separate trials resulting in separate convictions arising out of distinct factual situations

1990Jordan, however, does not prohibit multiple extended-term sentences under certain circumstances, such as where a defendant has been sentenced to death for murder and to an extended term for armed robbery (People v. Neal (1985), 111 Ill. 2d 180, 203-05 , 489 N.E.2d 845 ), or where a defendant has been sentenced to life imprisonment for murder and to an extended term for armed robbery (People v. Young (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 147, 166 , 529 N.E.2d 497 ), or where defendant had a joint sentencing hearing after separate trials resulting in separate convictions arising out of distinct factual situations

1983(See People v. Amerman (1971), 50 Ill. 2d 196 , 279 N.E.2d 353 .) The record, however, reflects that counsel for defendant’s husband challenged the constitutionality of section 5 — 9—1.1 at the joint sentencing hearing.

1983(See People v. Amerman (1971), 50 Ill. 2d 196 , 279 N.E.2d 353 .) The record, however, reflects that counsel for defendant’s husband challenged the constitutionality of section 5 — 9—1.1 at the joint sentencing hearing.

1978A joint sentencing hearing was held on the convictions in this case and also on the convictions entered in People v. Short (1978), 60 Ill.

1978A joint sentencing hearing was held on the convictions in this case and also on the convictions entered in People v. Short (1978), 60 Ill.