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5 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1915–1987 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. | ||
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Griffith v. Kentucky
green
2 sentences1987Ed. 2d 649 , 107 S. Ct. 708 .) In Griffith, the court abandoned the three-part test and held that new principles of constitutional law must be applied retroactively to all cases still pending on direct review, even if the new rule is a “clear break with the past.” The majority’s effort to salvage the wreck of the three-part Laws analysis in the context of cases on direct review is inconsistent with Griffith. 1987Ed. 2d 649 , 107 S. Ct. 708 .) In Griffith, the court abandoned the three-part test and held that new principles of constitutional law must be applied retroactively to all cases still pending on direct review, even if the new rule is a “clear break with the past.” The majority’s effort to salvage the wreck of the three-part Laws analysis in the context of cases on direct review is inconsistent with Griffith. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Fashing v. Moore
green
1 sentence1980Tex. 1980), 489 F. Supp. 471, 475 .) We conclude plaintiff has been denied equal protection of the laws in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Strauder v. West Virginia
red
2 sentences1975The defendant states that “the systematic exclusion of blacks from a jury is a denial of equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” (Strauder v. West Virginia (1879), 100 U.S. 303 , 25 L.Ed. 664 ; Eubanks v. Louisiana (1958), 356 U.S. 584 , 2 L.Ed.2d 991 , 78 S.Ct. 970 .) But neither Strauder or Eubanks touches the precise question raised here. 1975The defendant states that “the systematic exclusion of blacks from a jury is a denial of equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” (Strauder v. West Virginia (1879), 100 U.S. 303 , 25 L.Ed. 664 ; Eubanks v. Louisiana (1958), 356 U.S. 584 , 2 L.Ed.2d 991 , 78 S.Ct. 970 .) But neither Strauder or Eubanks touches the precise question raised here. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Eubanks v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences1975The defendant states that “the systematic exclusion of blacks from a jury is a denial of equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” (Strauder v. West Virginia (1879), 100 U.S. 303 , 25 L.Ed. 664 ; Eubanks v. Louisiana (1958), 356 U.S. 584 , 2 L.Ed.2d 991 , 78 S.Ct. 970 .) But neither Strauder or Eubanks touches the precise question raised here. 1975The defendant states that “the systematic exclusion of blacks from a jury is a denial of equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” (Strauder v. West Virginia (1879), 100 U.S. 303 , 25 L.Ed. 664 ; Eubanks v. Louisiana (1958), 356 U.S. 584 , 2 L.Ed.2d 991 , 78 S.Ct. 970 .) But neither Strauder or Eubanks touches the precise question raised here. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
The PEOPLE v. Harris
neutral
2 sentences1975The supreme court considered this issue in People v. Harris (1959), 17 Ill.2d 446, 451 , 161 N.E.2d 809, 811-12 , and there concluded that: “The fact that the State’s exercise of peremptory challenges resulted in excluding [blacks] from the petit jury did not deprive defendant of any constitutional right. [Citation.] The right of peremptory challenge is a substantial one which should not be abridged or denied. 1975The supreme court considered this issue in People v. Harris (1959), 17 Ill.2d 446, 451 , 161 N.E.2d 809, 811-12 , and there concluded that: “The fact that the State’s exercise of peremptory challenges resulted in excluding [blacks] from the petit jury did not deprive defendant of any constitutional right. [Citation.] The right of peremptory challenge is a substantial one which should not be abridged or denied. | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Lipman v. Goebel
neutral
1 sentence1935This same contention met an adverse decision in Lipman v. Goebel, supra, where we expressly held that section 5 of chapter 77 did not violate either the equal protection of the laws clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal constitution or section 12 of article 2 of the State constitution. | 1 | 1935–1935 |
People ex rel. Sellers v. Brady
green
1 sentence1915(People v. Brady, 262 Ill. 578 , and cases cited; People v. Henning Co. 260 id. 554; Home Ins. | 1 | 1915–1915 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.