restriction rule in Illinois

1979While defendant cites no authority for this restriction on the rule referred to in Kravis, we note an earlier supreme court case wherein, affirming judgment for the appellee who was the plaintiff in the trial court, the court held ° ° where a litigant obtains the relief he has sought, he may rely upon any ground appearing in the record to support his judgment. [Citations.]” (La Salle National Bank v. Village of Grayslake (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 489, 492 , 194 N.E.2d 250, 252 .) Similarly, and after Kravis, the appellate court in Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Joanna-Western Mills (1977), 53 Ill.

1979App. 3d 542 , 368 N.E.2d 629 , held that the plaintiff-appellee could urge any point on appeal in support of its judgment though not raised in the trial court, but where the facts to support the point were before the trial court. ( 53 Ill.

1979While defendant cites no authority for this restriction on the rule referred to in Kravis, we note an earlier supreme court case wherein, affirming judgment for the appellee who was the plaintiff in the trial court, the court held ° ° where a litigant obtains the relief he has sought, he may rely upon any ground appearing in the record to support his judgment. [Citations.]” (La Salle National Bank v. Village of Grayslake (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 489, 492 , 194 N.E.2d 250, 252 .) Similarly, and after Kravis, the appellate court in Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Joanna-Western Mills (1977), 53 Ill.

1979While defendant cites no authority for this restriction on the rule referred to in Kravis, we note an earlier supreme court case wherein, affirming judgment for the appellee who was the plaintiff in the trial court, the court held ° ° where a litigant obtains the relief he has sought, he may rely upon any ground appearing in the record to support his judgment. [Citations.]” (La Salle National Bank v. Village of Grayslake (1963), 29 Ill. 2d 489, 492 , 194 N.E.2d 250, 252 .) Similarly, and after Kravis, the appellate court in Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Joanna-Western Mills (1977), 53 Ill.

1979App. 3d 837 , 354 N.E.2d 448 , we held that although an initial restriction of defense counsel’s cross-examination of the witnesses’ ability to observe was improper, the restriction was not prejudicial error when the record showed that defense counsel did examine the witnesses on that point.

1979The Appellate Court, First District, reversed both convictions on the grounds that the trial court’s restriction of inquiry into the alleged bias of the chief prosecution witness violated the defendants’ right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against them. ( 55 Ill.

1898(City of Cairo v. Bross, 101 Ill. 475 .) Section 1 of article 9 of the constitution of 1870 expressly authorizes the General Assembly to tax various occupations, including brokers, the only restriction being the requirement that such tax should be uniform as to the class upon which it operates.