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11 canonical passages across 8 cases, quoted by 51 opinions in total. These passages cluster together because the same opinions keep quoting them side by side: they state parts of one doctrine. The anchor passage is from Robert C. White v. Fraternal Order of Police.
| # | Case | Flag | Canonical passage | Citers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Robert C. White v. Fraternal Order of Police Anchor | green | “it is only when the court can say that the publication is not reasonably capable of any defamatory meaning and cannot be reasonably understood in any defamatory sense that it can rule as a matter of law, that it was not libelous.” | 11 |
| 2 | Joseph Farah v. Esquire Magazine | green | “(1) that he was the subject of a false and defamatory statement; (2) that the statement was published to a third party; (3) that publishing the statement was at least negligent; and (4) that the plaintiff suffered either actual or legal harm.” | 9 |
| 3 | Robert C. McFarlane v. Esquire Magazine | green | “the standard of actual malice is a daunting one.” | 7 |
| 4 | Robert C. White v. Fraternal Order of Police | green | “defamatory meaning and falsity are distinct elements of the tort of defamation and are considered separately.” | 5 |
| 5 | Weyrich, Paul v. New Repub Inc | green | “though invasion of privacy false light is distinct from the tort of defamation, the same first amendment protections apply.” | 4 |
| 6 | Jankovic v. International Crisis Group | green | “when confronted with a motion to dismiss a defamation claim, a court must evaluate 'whether a statement is capable of defamatory meaning,” | 4 |
| 7 | Dan E. Moldea v. New York Times Company | green | “(a) whether a communication is capable of bearing a particular meaning, and (b) whether that meaning is defamatory.' the jury then determines whether the communication was in fact so understood by its recipient.” | 3 |
| 8 | Abbas v. Foreign Policy Group, LLC | green | “is not reported as fact, and is instead put in context, making it clear to the reader that the statement is merely the latest in an ongoing exchange of charge and countercharge.” | 2 |
| 9 | JANE DOE v. BERNABEI & WACHTEL, PLLC | green | “(1) publicity; (2) about a false statement, representation or imputation; (3) understood to be of and concerning the plaintiff; and (4) which places the plaintiff in a false light that would be offensive to a reasonable person.” | 2 |
| 10 | JANE DOE v. BERNABEI & WACHTEL, PLLC | green | “light that would be offensive to a reasonable person.” | 2 |
| 11 | JANE DOE v. BERNABEI & WACHTEL, PLLC | green | “places the plaintiff in a false light that would be offensive to a reasonable person.” | 2 |
A red or yellow flag on a member means the underlying case has negative treatment: for those, check the case page before relying on the passage.