(a) The Act means the Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C. 2301, et seq.
(b) Consumer product means any tangible personal property which is distributed in commerce and which is normally used for personal, family, or household purposes (including any such property intended to be attached to or installed in any real property without regard to whether it is so attached or installed).
(c) Written warranty means:
(1) Any written affirmation of fact or written promise made in connection with the sale of a consumer product by a supplier to a buyer which relates to the nature of the material or workmanship and affirms or promises that such material or workmanship is defect free or will meet a specified level of performance over a specified period of time, or
(2) Any undertaking in writing in connection with the sale by a supplier of a consumer product to refund, repair, replace, or take other remedial action with respect to such product in the event that such product fails to meet the specifications set forth in the undertaking, which written affirmation, promise or undertaking becomes part of the basis of the bargain between a supplier and a buyer for purposes other than resale of such product.
(d) Warrantor means any person who gives or offers to give a written warranty which incorporates an informal dispute settlement mechanism.
(e) Mechanism means an informal dispute settlement procedure which is incorporated into the terms of a written warranty to which any provision of Title I of the Act applies, as provided in section 110 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. 2310.
(f) Members means the person or persons within a Mechanism actually deciding disputes.
(g) Consumer means a buyer (other than for purposes of resale) of any consumer product, any person to whom such product is transferred during the duration of a written warranty applicable to the product, and any other person who is entitled by the terms of such warranty or under applicable state law to enforce against the warrantor the obligations of the warranty.
(h) On the face of the warranty means:
(1) If the warranty is a single sheet with printing on both sides of the sheet, or if the warranty is comprised of more than one sheet, the page on which the warranty text begins;
(2) If the warranty is included as part of a longer document, such as a use and care manual, the page in such document on which the warranty text begins.
[40 FR 60215, Dec. 31, 1975, as amended at 80 FR 42722, July 20, 2015]
Notes of Decisions
Borowiec v. GATEWAY 2000, INC., 808 N.E.2d 957 (Ill. 2004).
· cites it 2× “16 C.F.R. § 703.1 et seq. (2002). Those regulations provide that the decisions of any informal dispute resolution procedure incorporated into the terms of a written warranty "shall not be legally binding on any person.”
Koons Ford of Baltimore, Inc. v. Lobach, 919 A.2d 722 (Md. 2007).
· cites it 2× “In 16 C.F.R. § 703.1 , the FTC defines "Mechanism" as "an informal dispute settlement procedure which is incorporated into the terms of a written warranty.”
Kolev v. Euromotors West/The Auto Gallery, 658 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2011).
· cites it 4× “1 (e) ("Mechanism means an informal dispute settlement procedure which is incorporated into the terms of a written warranty to which any provision of Title I of the Act applies, as provided in Section 110 [2] of the Act."); 64 Fed.Reg. 19700, 19701 (Apr. 22, 1999).”
Michael Shane Davis v. S. Energy, 305 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2002).
“” 16 C.F.R. § 703.1 (e) (2002). The FTC has clearly stated that the mechanism is only a precursor to litigation and never binding.”
Fred F. Wolf v. Ford Motor Co., 829 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir. 1987).
· cites it 2× “16 C.F.R. § 703.1 et seq. Wolf’s claim under the “Lemon Law” proceeded to trial, and the jury returned a verdict in his favor.”
Browne v. Kline Tysons Imports, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 827 (E.D. Va. 2002).
“See 16 C.F.R. § 703.1 (c). Nonetheless, any informal dispute mechanism for resolving a written warranty dispute “shall not be legally binding on any person.”
Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (D. Ariz. 2009).
“” 16 C.F.R. § 703.1 (e). 8 . Plaintiff also argues that "[j]ust as the arbitration clause limits Plaintiff's remedies respecting fees, it also would eliminate Plaintiff's non-waivable statutory right to statutory damages, and arguably limit the statute of limitations to a term…”
Borowiec v. GATEWAY 2000, INC., 772 N.E.2d 256 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
“16 C.F.R. § 703.1 (e) (2001). The regulations require that a “mechanism” comply with the requirements prescribed by the FTC and contained in 16 C.”
Krusch v. Tamko Bldg. Prods., Inc., 34 F. Supp. 3d 584 (M.D.N.C. 2014).
“3d at 633 -34 (citing 16 C.F.R. § 703.1 et seq.). As the Fourth Circuit explained, the FTC regulations distinguish between so-called “pre-dis-pute” and “post-dispute” binding arbitration.”
Christine Seney v. Rent-a-Ctr., Inc., 738 F.3d 631 (4th Cir. 2013).
“16 C.F.R. § 703.1 et seq. Pursuant to those regulations, a “mechanism” is an “informal dispute settlement procedure which is incorporated into the *634 terms of a written warranty.”
— 16 C.F.R. § 703.1(e) — 2 cases
— 16 C.F.R. § 703.1(h) — 1 case
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