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C.F.R.Title 21Chapter I—Food and Drug Administration, Department of Health and Human ServicesSubchapter H—Medical DevicesPart 808—Exemptions From Federal Preemption of State and Local Medical Device RequirementsSubpart A—General Provisions

21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (2026)

Scope

Edition and currency
eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTeCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026 cited 1978–2025 227citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 227 opinions since 1978, 6 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (d) (15 cases).

(a) Introduction. This part prescribes procedures for the submission, review, and approval of applications for exemption from Federal preemption of State and local requirements applicable to medical devices under section 521 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.

(b) General rule for State and local requirements respecting devices. Section 521(a) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act contains special provisions governing the regulation of devices by States and localities. That section prescribes a general rule that after May 28, 1976, no State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect any requirement with respect to a medical device intended for human use having the force and effect of law (whether established by statute, ordinance, regulation, or court decision), which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable to such device under any provision of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.

(c) Exempting from preemption certain State or local requirements respecting devices. Section 521(b) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act contains a provision whereby the Commissioner of Food and Drugs may, upon application by a State or political subdivision, allow imposition of a requirement which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to the device (and which is thereby preempted) by promulgating a regulation in accordance with this part exempting the State or local requirement from preemption. The granting of an exemption does not affect the applicability to the device of any requirements under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The Commissioner may promulgate an exemption regulation for the preempted requirement if he makes either of the following findings:

(1) That the requirement is more stringent than a requirement under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act applicable to the device; or

(2) That the requirement is required by compelling local conditions and compliance with the requirement would not cause the device to be in violation of any applicable requirement under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.

(d) Meaning of “requirements applicable to a device.” State or local requirements are preempted only when the Food and Drug Administration has established specific counterpart regulations or there are other specific requirements applicable to a particular device under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, thereby making any existing divergent State or local requirements applicable to the device different from, or in addition to, the specific Food and Drug Administration requirements. There are other State or local requirements that affect devices that are not preempted by section 521(a) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act because they are not “requirements applicable to a device” within the meaning of section 521(a) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The following are examples of State or local requirements that are not regarded as preempted by section 521 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act:

(1) Section 521(a) does not preempt State or local requirements of general applicability where the purpose of the requirement relates either to other products in addition to devices (e.g., requirements such as general electrical codes, and the Uniform Commercial Code (warranty of fitness)), or to unfair trade practices in which the requirements are not limited to devices.

(2) Section 521(a) does not preempt State or local requirements that are equal to, or substantially identical to, requirements imposed by or under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.

(3) Section 521(a) does not preempt State or local permits, licensing, registration, certification, or other requirements relating to the approval or sanction of the practice of medicine, dentistry, optometry, pharmacy, nursing, podiatry, or any other of the healing arts or allied medical sciences or related professions or occupations that administer, dispense, or sell devices. However, regulations issued under section 520(e) or (g) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act may impose restrictions on the sale, distribution, or use of a device beyond those prescribed in State or local requirements. If there is a conflict between such restrictions and State or local requirements, the Federal regulations shall prevail.

(4) Section 521(a) does not preempt specifications in contracts entered into by States or localities for procurement of devices.

(5) Section 521(a) does not preempt criteria for payment of State or local obligations under Medicaid and similar Federal, State or local health-care programs.

(6)(i) Section 521(a) does not preempt State or local requirements respecting general enforcement, e.g., requirements that State inspection be permitted of factory records concerning all devices, registration, and licensing requirements for manufacturers and others, and prohibition of manufacture of devices in unlicensed establishments. However, Federal regulations issued under sections 519 and 520(f) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act may impose requirements for records and reports and good manufacturing practices beyond those prescribed in State or local requirements. If there is a conflict between such regulations and State or local requirements, the Federal regulations shall prevail.

(ii) Generally, section 521(a) does not preempt a State or local requirement prohibiting the manufacture of adulterated or misbranded devices. Where, however, such a prohibition has the effect of establishing a substantive requirement for a specific device, e.g., a specific labeling requirement, then the prohibition will be preempted if the requirement is different from, or in addition to, a Federal requirement established under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. In determining whether such a requirement is preempted, the determinative factor is how the requirement is interpreted and enforced by the State or local government and not the literal language of the statute, which may be identical to a provision in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.

(7) Section 521(a) does not preempt State or local provisions respecting delegations of authority and related administrative matters relating to devices.

(8) Section 521(a) does not preempt a State or local requirement whose sole purpose is raising revenue or charging fees for services, registration, or regulatory programs.

(9) Section 521(a) does not preempt State or local requirements of the types that have been developed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 note), as amended, Subchapter C—Electronic Product Radiation Control of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (formerly the Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act of 1968), and other Federal statutes, until such time as the Food and Drug Administration issues specific requirements under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act applicable to these types of devices.

(10) Part 820 of this chapter (21 CFR part 820) (CGMP requirements) does not preempt remedies created by States or Territories of the United States, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

(e) Determination of equivalence or difference of requirements applicable to a device. It is the responsibility of the Food and Drug Administration, subject to review by Federal courts, to determine whether a State or local requirement is equal to, or substantially identical to, requirements imposed by or under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, or is different from, or in addition to, such requirements, in accordance with the procedures provided by this part. However, it is the responsibility of States and political subdivisions to determine initially whether to seek exemptions from preemption. Any State or political subdivision whose requirements relating to devices are preempted by section 521(a) may petition the Commissioner of Food and Drugs for exemption from preemption, in accordance with the procedures provided by this part.

(f) Applicability of Federal requirements respecting devices. The Federal requirement with respect to a device applies whether or not a corresponding State or local requirement is preempted or exempted from preemption. As a result, if a State or local requirement that the Food and Drug Administration has exempted from preemption is not as broad in its application as the Federal requirement, the Federal requirement applies to all circumstances not covered by the State or local requirement.

(g) Exemptions not applicable to certain State or local government requirements specifically related to hearing products. An exemption under this part shall not apply to any State or local government law, regulation, order, or other requirement specifically related to hearing products, including any requirement for the supervision, prescription, or other order, involvement, or intervention of a licensed person for consumers to access over-the-counter hearing aids, that:

(1) Would restrict or interfere with the servicing, marketing, sale, dispensing, use, customer support, or distribution of over-the-counter hearing aids, as defined under section 520(q) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, through in-person transactions, by mail, or online; and

(2) Is different from, in addition to, or otherwise not identical to, the regulations issued under section 709(b) of the FDA Reauthorization Act of 2017.

[43 FR 18665, May 2, 1978, as amended at 45 FR 67336, Oct. 10, 1980; 61 FR 52654, Oct. 7, 1996; 73 FR 34859, June 19, 2008; 87 FR 50761, Aug. 17, 2022]
The 20 cases that cite 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENMedtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
cites § 808.1 16×cited by 2,268 cases
Where it cites § 808.1
“, at 1344 (citing 21 CFR § 808.1 (d) (1995)). Under these regulations, the court concluded, it was not necessary that the federal regulation specifically deal with pacemakers, but only that the federal requirement "should, in some way, be `restricted by nature' to a particular…”
The case’s holding
Federal medical device regulations do not preempt state common-law claims based on general duties of care that do not impose specific, device-specific requirements.
Later courts cite it for
“because the states are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.” · 96 citing courts
2
GREENRiegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
cites § 808.1 8×cited by 725 cases
Where it cites § 808.1
“If so, we must then determine whether the Riegels' common-law claims are based upon New York requirements with respect to the device that are "different from, or in addition to" the federal ones, and that relate to safety and effectiveness. § 360k(a). We turn to the first…”
The case’s holding
The Medical Device Amendments preclude state law claims that impose requirements different from, or in addition to, federal requirements regarding a device that received premarket approval.
Later courts cite it for
“360k does not prevent a state from providing a damages remedy for claims premised on a violation of fda regulations; the state duties in such a case 'parallel,' rather than add to, federal requirements.” · 102 citing courts
3
GREENBarbara Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1268 (7th Cir. 1995).
cites § 808.1 22×subsections: (d)cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 808.1
“” 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (b). Relying upon the statutory preemption provision, the court reasoned that Congress intended the MDA amendments to have a broad preemptive effect— one that encompassed common law causes of action.”
4
GREENBarbara E. Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2004).
cites § 808.1 7×cited by 101 cases
Where it cites § 808.1
“§ 360k(a); 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (b) (see p. 174, infra, for text of regulation); Kemp v.”
The case’s holding
State law failure-to-warn claims are preempted when they require a manufacturer to provide different warnings or instructions than those approved through the FDA pre-market approval process.
Later courts cite it for
“an agency may change its course so long as it can justify its change with a 'reasoned analysis.” · 3 citing courts
5
GREENCharlotte Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453 (9th Cir. 1995).
cites § 808.1 14×cited by 50 cases
Where it cites § 808.1
“1(d) provides: State or local requirements are preempted only when the Food and Drug Administration has established specific counterpart regulations or there are other specific requirements applicable to a particular device under the act, thereby making any existing divergent…”
The case’s holding
State common law claims of general applicability are not preempted by the Medical Device Amendments because they do not constitute specific requirements applicable to a particular device.
Later courts cite it for
“pre-market approval is supposed to benefit consumers, not create a rose garden, free from liability, for manufacturers.” · 2 citing courts
6
GREENWalker v. Johnson & Johnson Vision Prods., Inc, 552 N.W.2d 679 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
cites § 808.1 18×subsections: (d) 6× (d)(1) 6× (b) 4× (d)(2) 2×cited by 26 cases
Where it cites § 808.1
“Defendant also contends that 21 CFR 808.1(b) supports its argument that plaintiff's *687 claims are preempted.”
The case’s holding
Federal premarket approval of a Class III medical device does not expressly preempt state products liability claims against the manufacturer for negligent design, failure to warn, or breach of implied warranty.
Later courts cite it for
“should defer to a federal agency's construction of the statute unless the agency's interpretation is unreasonable.” · 3 citing courts
7
GREENSherr-Una Booker v. C. R. Bard, Inc., 969 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2020).
cites § 808.1 7×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 808.1
“Our interpretation of that provision is “‘substantially informed’ by the FDA regulation set forth” at 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (d), which addresses the statute’s preemptive scope.”
8
GREENSteele v. Collagen Corp., 54 Cal. App. 4th 1474 (Ct. App. 1997).
cites § 808.1 16×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 808.1
“, requirements such as general electrical codes, and the Uniform Commercial Code (warranty of fitness)), or to unfair trade practices in which the requirements are not limited to devices. [¶] (2) Section 521(a) does not preempt State or local requirements that are equal to, or…”
The case’s holding
State law claims regarding device safety and effectiveness are preempted when they impose requirements different from or in addition to federal requirements resulting from the PMA process.
Later courts cite it for
“while the design or labeling of a device may be changed to enhance the safety without prior approval from the fda, the manufacturer must submit to the fda a pma supplement and obtain acknowledgment from the fda of receipt of the supplement. ( 21 c.f.r. 814.39 (1996).) the device is still subject to withdrawal from the market if the fda determines any changes have rendered it unsafe or the labeling inadequate.” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENRichard Stengel v. Medtronic Inc., 704 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2013).
cites § 808.1 4×cited by 153 cases
Where it cites § 808.1
“21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (d). The Supreme Court has decided three preemption cases under the MDA.”
The case’s holding
The Medical Device Amendments do not preempt a state-law claim for damages if the state-law duty of care parallels a federal-law duty under the Amendments.
Later courts cite it for
“the mda does not preempt a state-law claim for violating a state-law duty that parallels a federal-law duty under the mda.” · 18 citing courts
10
GREENMcLaughlin v. Bayer Corp., 172 F. Supp. 3d 804 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
cites § 808.1 4×subsections: (d)(1)cited by 33 cases
Where it cites § 808.1
“21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (d)(1). However, Riegel considered the effect of 21 C.”
The case’s holding
A negligence claim against a medical device manufacturer is not preempted if it parallels federal requirements and plausibly alleges duty, breach, causation, and actual damages.
Later courts cite it for
“(1) a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the breach and resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damages.” · 3 citing courts
11
GREENJane King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130 (1st Cir. 1993).
cites § 808.1 6×subsections: (b) 2×cited by 125 cases
Where it cites § 808.1
“21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (d). In this case, it is clear that the FDA has imposed requirements on Zyderm related to labeling, design, manufacturing and other aspects of the device pursuant to the MDA scheme.”
The case’s holding
State law failure-to-warn claims regarding class III medical devices are preempted when the premarket approval process includes the FDA's approval of the device's labeling.
Later courts cite it for
“where the fda was authorized to render the expert decision ..., it, and not some jury or judge, is best suited to determine the factual issues and what their effect could have been on its original conclusions.” · 5 citing courts
12
GREENTalbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1994).
cites § 808.1 11×subsections: (d)(1)cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 808.1
“2d at 1420 ; 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (b). “Congress’s intent in enacting this [preemption] provision was to prevent state requirements from unduly burdening interstate commerce.”
The case’s holding
Express preemption under 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) bars state-law tort claims concerning a Class III medical device that received FDA premarket approval, even if the manufacturer allegedly defrauded the FDA.
Later courts cite it for
“suggestion that cipollone indicates that his express warranty claims are not .preempted has been injected by the court of appeals for the first circuit.” · 2 citing courts
13
REDNina Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316 (3d Cir. 1995).
cites § 808.1 6×cited by 111 cases
Overruled by Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr on other grounds: 2 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 808.1
“” 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (d). The absence of regulations relating specifically to heart valves is not dispositive as long as the Shiley valve was subject to “any requirement applicable under [the MDA] to the device.”
The case’s holding
An express warranty claim is not pre-empted by federal medical device regulations because the obligations arise from the manufacturer's voluntary undertaking rather than the independent operation of state law.
Later courts cite it for
“do not result from the independent operation of state law.” · 2 citing courts
14
GREENJessen v. Mentor Corp., 158 Cal. App. 4th 1480 (Ct. App. 2008).
cites § 808.1 5×cited by 57 cases
Where it cites § 808.1
“" ( 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (d).) A state law requirement may be "established by statute, ordinance, regulation, or court decision" ( 21 C.”
15
GREENBarbara MITCHELL & Gregory Mitchell v. COLLAGEN Corp., 126 F.3d 902 (7th Cir. 1997).
cites § 808.1 6×cited by 95 cases
Where it cites § 808.1
“See 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (b). The district court concluded that Congress intended the MDA preemption provision to be read to preempt common law causes of action.”
The case’s holding
The FDA premarket approval process constitutes a specific federal regulation that preempts state law claims imposing requirements different from or in addition to federal standards.
Later courts cite it for
“constitutes approval of the product's design, testing, intended use, manufacturing methods, performance standards and labeling.” · 5 citing courts
16
GREENArmstrong v. Optical Radiation Corp., 50 Cal. App. 4th 580 (Ct. App. 1996).
cites § 808.1 10×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 808.1
“First, the regulations recognize that a state law requirement may take the form of a “statute, ordinance, regulation, or court decision( 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (b) (1996), italics added.”
The case’s holding
State law requirements for negligence and strict liability are based on general principles of state tort law rather than rules specifically developed for medical devices.
Later courts cite it for
“based on general principles of state tort law which were not specifically developed with respect to medical devices” · 1 citing court
17
GREENGelber v. Stryker Corp., 788 F. Supp. 2d 145 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
cites § 808.1 5×cited by 40 cases
Where it cites § 808.1
“See 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (d). The regulations state, “[generally, section 521(a) does not preempt a State or local requirement prohibiting the manufacture of adulterated or misbranded devices.”
The case’s holding
A state law manufacturing defect claim is not preempted if the complaint provides adequate notice by describing the conduct that violates federal current good manufacturing practice requirements.
Later courts cite it for
“a statute of limitations defense, based exclusively on dates contained within the complaint or appended materials, may be properly asserted by a defendant in a rule 12(b)(6) motion.” · 3 citing courts
18
REDLora Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 1995).
cites § 808.1 7×cited by 44 cases
Reversed in part by Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr (1996): the U.S. Supreme Court's own opinion in this case ("VII Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed insofar as it held that any of the claims were preempted an…
Where it cites § 808.1
“21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (d) (emphasis added). We believe that this narrowing of the meaning of “requirement[s]” applicable .”
The case’s holding
The Medical Device Amendments do not preempt state law negligent design or strict liability claims for devices cleared through the 510(k) substantial equivalence process.
Later courts cite it for
“preemption under the mda cannot be defeated by a common lawsuit alleging a violation of the statutory standards” · 2 citing courts
19
GREENKandis L. Papike v. Tambrands Inc., 107 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 1997).
cites § 808.1 5×cited by 97 cases
Where it cites § 808.1
“The FDA interprets this preemption provision in 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (d), which provides that: State or local requirements are preempted only when the Food and Drug Administration has established specific counterpart regulations or there are other specific requirements applicable…”
The case’s holding
Federal preemption applies to state failure-to-warn claims when the FDA establishes specific labeling requirements for a particular device.
Later courts cite it for
“to rule otherwise would allow the anomalous circumstance that a consumer is entitled to expect a product to perform more safely than its government-mandated warnings indicate.” · 3 citing courts
20
GREENBravman v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 842 F. Supp. 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
cites § 808.1 8×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 808.1
“Nowhere in the report, or in any of the legislative history, does Congress state an intent to limit state tort actions.”
The case’s holding
Federal regulations that merely identify a device category do not constitute specific requirements that preempt state common law duty to warn claims.
Later courts cite it for
“an 'identification provision' in the federal regulations does not act as a specific requirement which would preempt state common law.” · 2 citing courts

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197820012025

One bar per year. Tallest: 41 cases in 1995. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
3rd Cir.119th Cir.115th Cir.10S.D.N.Y.9Cal. Ct. App.8Ill. App. Ct.6S.D. Ind.611th Cir.5

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 97 courts in all.

By subsection
(b)9 cases
Walker v. Johnson & Johnson Vision Prods., Inc, 552 N.W.2d 679 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).“Defendant also contends that 21 CFR 808.1(b) supports its argument that plaintiff's *687 claims are preempted.”
Jane King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130 (1st Cir. 1993).“21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (d). In this case, it is clear that the FDA has imposed requirements on Zyderm related to labeling, design, manufacturing and other aspects of the device pursuant to the MDA scheme.”
Kemp v. Pfizer, Inc., 835 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
Rosci v. AcroMed, Inc., 669 A.2d 959 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
Stewart v. Int'l Playtex, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 907 (D.S.C. 1987).
Showing the top 5 of 9. More in the list view →
(c)1 case
Stewart v. Int'l Playtex, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 907 (D.S.C. 1987).
(d)15 cases
Walker v. Johnson & Johnson Vision Prods., Inc, 552 N.W.2d 679 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
Joyce A. Moore v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 867 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1989).
Alton v. Medtronic, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 2d 1069 (D. Or. 2013).
Brooks v. Howmedica, 236 F.3d 956 (8th Cir. 2001).
Showing the top 5 of 15. More in the list view →
(d)(1)5 cases
Walker v. Johnson & Johnson Vision Prods., Inc, 552 N.W.2d 679 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
McLaughlin v. Bayer Corp., 172 F. Supp. 3d 804 (E.D. Pa. 2016).“21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (d)(1). However, Riegel considered the effect of 21 C.”
Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1994).“2d at 1420 ; 21 C.F.R. § 808.1 (b). “Congress’s intent in enacting this [preemption] provision was to prevent state requirements from unduly burdening interstate commerce.”
Worthy v. Collagen Corp., 921 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1996).
State ex rel. Miller v. New Womyn, Inc., 679 N.W.2d 593 (Iowa 2004).
(d)(2)2 cases
Walker v. Johnson & Johnson Vision Prods., Inc, 552 N.W.2d 679 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
Brooks v. Howmedica, 236 F.3d 956 (8th Cir. 2001).
(d)(6)(ii)1 case
Weiland v. Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 704 N.E.2d 854 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1998).

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Enactment and amendments

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Versions

Edition shown: eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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