C.F.R. homeSearch C.F.R.
C.F.R.Title 21Chapter I—Food and Drug Administration, Department of Health and Human ServicesSubchapter H—Medical DevicesPart 814—Premarket Approval of Medical DevicesSubpart E—Postapproval Requirements

21 C.F.R. § 814.82 (2026)

Postapproval requirements

Edition and currency
eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTeCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026 cited 1994–2026 37citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 37 opinions since 1994, 5 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (1 case).

(a) FDA may impose postapproval requirements in a PMA approval order or by regulation at the time of approval of the PMA or by regulation subsequent to approval. Postapproval requirements may include as a condition to approval of the device:

(1) Restriction of the sale, distribution, or use of the device as provided by section 515(d)(1)(B)(ii) or 520(e) of the act.

(2) Continuing evaluation and periodic reporting on the safety, effectiveness, and reliability of the device for its intended use. FDA will state in the PMA approval order the reason or purpose for such requirement and the number of patients to be evaluated and the reports required to be submitted.

(3) Prominent display in the labeling of a device and in the advertising of any restricted device of warnings, hazards, or precautions important for the device's safe and effective use, including patient information, e.g., information provided to the patient on alternative modes of therapy and on risks and benefits associated with the use of the device.

(4) Inclusion of identification codes on the device or its labeling, or in the case of an implant, on cards given to patients if necessary to protect the public health.

(5) Maintenance of records that will enable the applicant to submit to FDA information needed to trace patients if such information is necessary to protect the public health. Under section 519(a)(4) of the act, FDA will require that the identity of any patient be disclosed in records maintained under this paragraph only to the extent required for the medical welfare of the individual, to determine the safety or effectiveness of the device, or to verify a record, report, or information submitted to the agency.

(6) Maintenance of records for specified periods of time and organization and indexing of records into identifiable files to enable FDA to determine whether there is reasonable assurance of the continued safety and effectiveness of the device.

(7) Submission to FDA at intervals specified in the approval order of periodic reports containing the information required by § 814.84(b).

(8) Batch testing of the device.

(9) Such other requirements as FDA determines are necessary to provide reasonable assurance, or continued reasonable assurance, of the safety and effectiveness of the device.

(b) An applicant shall grant to FDA access to any records and reports required under the provisions of this part, and shall permit authorized FDA employees to copy and verify such records and reports and to inspect at a reasonable time and in a reasonable manner all manufacturing facilities to verify that the device is being manufactured, stored, labeled, and shipped under approved conditions.

(c) Failure to comply with any postapproval requirement constitutes a ground for withdrawal of approval of a PMA.

(Approved by the Office of Management and Budget under control number 0910-0231) [51 FR 26364, July 22, 1986, as amended at 51 FR 43344, Dec. 2, 1986]
The 20 cases that cite 21 C.F.R. § 814.82 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENRichard Stengel v. Medtronic Inc., 704 F.3d 1224 (9th Cir. 2013).
cites § 814.82 2×cited by 153 cases
The case’s holding
The Medical Device Amendments do not preempt a state-law claim for damages if the state-law duty of care parallels a federal-law duty under the Amendments.
Later courts cite it for
“the mda does not preempt a state-law claim for violating a state-law duty that parallels a federal-law duty under the mda.” · 18 citing courts
2
GREENBrooks v. Mentor Worldwide, 985 F.3d 1272 (10th Cir. 2021).
cites § 814.82 1×cited by 232 cases
Where it cites § 814.82
“Similarly, the government retains the exclusive right to enforce post-approval requirements for continued testing, including the right to revoke approval for noncompliance.”
The case’s holding
A complaint must contain specific factual allegations that nudge claims from speculative to plausible, as courts disregard conclusory statements when determining the plausibility of a claim.
Later courts cite it for
“must nudge the claim across the line from conceivable or speculative to plausible.” · 48 citing courts
3
GREENRiegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 451 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2006).
cites § 814.82 2×cited by 104 cases
Where it cites § 814.82
“” 21 C.F.R. § 814.82 (a). The FDA can impose such requirements either in the initial PMA approval order, by regulation at the time of PMA approval, or by regulation subsequent to approval.”
The case’s holding
State common law tort claims alleging liability based on a medical device's adherence to FDA premarket approval standards are preempted by the Medical Device Amendments.
Later courts cite it for
“an expert opinion requires some explanation as to how the expert came to his conclusion and what methodologies or evidence substantiate that conclusion.” · 26 citing courts
4
GREENJoseph Mink v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 860 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2017).
cites § 814.82 1×cited by 68 cases
Where it cites § 814.82
“See 21 C.F.R. § 814.82 (a)(2). It says the BHR study was therefore a federal requirement, and Mr.”
The case’s holding
A state law claim is not preempted if the plaintiff alleges a breach of a well-recognized duty that parallels federal requirements.
Later courts cite it for
“to make it through, a plaintiff has to sue for conduct that violates a federal requirement (avoiding express preemption), but cannot sue only because the conduct violated that federal requirement (avoiding implied preemption).” · 11 citing courts
5
GREEND'Agostino v. EV3, Inc., 845 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2016).
cites § 814.82 1×cited by 64 cases
Where it cites § 814.82
“In the six years since D’Agostino surfaced the alleged fraud, the FDA has apparently demanded neither recall nor relabeling of Onyx — this notwithstanding the agency’s option to impose postapproval requirements, 21 C.F.R. § 814.82 (a), its clear prerogative to suspend approval…”
The case’s holding
A fraudulent inducement claim under the False Claims Act requires alleging that the defendant's conduct caused the government to make a payment or forfeit money owed.
Later courts cite it for
“to rule otherwise would be to turn the fca into a tool with which a jury of six people could retroactively eliminate the value of fda approval and effectively require that a product largely be withdrawn from the market even when the fda itself sees no reason to do so.” · 5 citing courts
6
GREENA.F. v. Sorin Grp. USA, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 3d 534 (S.D. Ill. 2018).
cites § 814.82 2×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 814.82
“¶¶ 10, 89 (alleging that Defendants delayed production of adverse event reports to the FDA, failed to follow up on many adverse event reports that they received, erroneously blamed most adverse events on other causes, and submitted insufficiently detailed annual reports that…”
7
GREENGravitt v. Mentor Worldwide, LLC, 289 F. Supp. 3d 877 (E.D. Ill. 2018).
cites § 814.82 2×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 814.82
“"); 21 C.F.R. § 814.82 (a) ("FDA may impose postapproval requirements in a PMA approval order or by regulation at the time of approval of the PMA or by regulation subsequent to approval.”
8
GREENMcLaughlin v. Bayer Corp., 172 F. Supp. 3d 804 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
cites § 814.82 1×cited by 33 cases
Where it cites § 814.82
“§ 360e(d), and 21 C.F.R. §§ 814.82 , 861.1(b)(3)). “Once a device has received premarket approval, the MDA forbids the manufacturer to make, without FDA permission, changes in design specification, manufacturing processes, labeling, or any other attribute, that would affect…”
The case’s holding
A negligence claim against a medical device manufacturer is not preempted if it parallels federal requirements and plausibly alleges duty, breach, causation, and actual damages.
Later courts cite it for
“(1) a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the breach and resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damages.” · 3 citing courts
9
GREENFreed v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 364 F. Supp. 3d 343 (D. Del. 2019).
cites § 814.82 2×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 814.82
“39 ) to submit a PMA supplement for any proposed labeling changes that affect the safety of the device, and its duty to submit an Adverse Reaction Report or Device Defect Report to the FDA (pursuant to 21 C.F.R. § 814.82 (a)(9) ) soon after it receives knowledge of an adverse…”
10
GREENGlennen v. Allergan, Inc., 247 Cal. App. 4th 1 (Ct. App. 2016).
cites § 814.82 2×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 814.82
“” ( 21 C.F.R. § 814.82 (a)(9) (2016).) These postapproval requirements can include restrictions on the sale, distribution, or use of the device, continuing reporting and recordkeeping requirements, and requirements related to labeling and advertising of the restricted device.”
Later courts cite it for
“to survive preemption, a claim 'must be premised on conduct that both (1) violates the mda and (2) would give rise to a recovery under state law even in the absence of the mda.” · 1 citing court
11
REDNina Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316 (3d Cir. 1995).
cites § 814.82 1×cited by 111 cases
Overruled by Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr on other grounds: 2 citing opinions limit it to other grounds.
Where it cites § 814.82
“21 C.F.R. § 814.82 . Finally, the FDA regulates the manufacture of the devices through the imposition of good manufacturing processes.”
The case’s holding
An express warranty claim is not pre-empted by federal medical device regulations because the obligations arise from the manufacturer's voluntary undertaking rather than the independent operation of state law.
Later courts cite it for
“do not result from the independent operation of state law.” · 2 citing courts
12
GREENWaltenburg v. St. Jude Med., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d 818 (W.D. Ky. 2014).
cites § 814.82 1×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 814.82
“After completing its review, the FDA may grant or deny pre-market approval, and may condition approval on adherence to performance standards, restrictions on sale and distribution, and/or compliance with other requirements.”
13
GREENMink v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 3d 1321 (S.D. Fla. 2016).
cites § 814.82 3×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 814.82
“Specifically, Mink discloses a slew of alleged violations of 21 C.F.R. §§ 814.82 , 814.84, 820.30, 820.”
14
GREENIn re Medtronic, Inc., Implantable Defibrillators, 465 F. Supp. 2d 886 (D. Minn. 2006).
cites § 814.82 1×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 814.82
“See 21 C.F.R. § 814.82 (c) (“Failure to comply with any post approval requirement constitutes a ground for withdrawal of approval of a PMA.”
Later courts cite it for
“to the extent plaintiffs' breach of express warranty claim is predicated on medtronic's failure to adhere to fda labeling or packaging requirements, the claim is not preempted,” · 2 citing courts
15
GREENHughes v. Boston Sci. Corp., 669 F. Supp. 2d 701 (S.D. Miss. 2009).
cites § 814.82 2×subsections: (a)(9)cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 814.82
“50 and 21 C.F.R. § 814.82 . The plaintiff also alleges that the defendant failed to make full disclosure in its labeling regarding the extent and severity of burns in patients pursuant to 21 C.”
16
GREENWilliams v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 123 F. Supp. 3d 733 (D. Md. 2015).
cites § 814.82 1×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 814.82
“1, Conditions of Approval, at 2 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 814.82 (a)(9))), and the duty under the *743 Medical Device Reporting Regulation to “report to the' FDA whenever [manufacturers] receive or otherwise become aware of information .”
The case’s holding
Failure-to-warn and manufacturing-defect claims against a premarket-approved medical device maker are not preempted, because they parallel federal requirements and rest on independent state tort duties.
Later courts cite it for
“the loss of consortium claim survives alongside those claims on which it depends.” · 2 citing courts
17
GREENWhite v. Stryker Corp., 818 F. Supp. 2d 1032 (W.D. Ky. 2011).
cites § 814.82 1×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 814.82
“” 21 C.F.R. § 814.82 (a). It is not exactly clear when Stryker initiated the PMA process for the Trident System.”
Later courts cite it for
“a plausible cause of action requires, among other things, a showing that the alleged violation of state law parallels a violation of federal law.” · 2 citing courts
18
GREENMears v. Marshall, 944 P.2d 984 (Or. Ct. App. 1997).
cites § 814.82 2×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 814.82
“at § 360e(e); 21 CFR § 814.82 (a). The manufacturer must maintain certain records and make reports to the FDA, 21 USC § 360i; 21 CFR § 814.”
Later courts cite it for
“without question, the pma process completed by zyderm established requirements that governed nearly every aspect of zyderm's commercial existence.” · 1 citing court
19
GREENHawkins v. Medtronic, Inc., 909 F. Supp. 2d 901 (S.D. Ohio 2012).
cites § 814.82 1×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 814.82
“21 C.F.R. § 814.82 , which describes allowable post-PMA requirements.”
Later courts cite it for
“it was clear from the allegations that the plaintiff's claim is in fact prem ised upon the theory that defendant violated federal law.” · 2 citing courts
20
GREENOtis-Wisher v. Fletcher Allen Health Care, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d 592 (D. Vt. 2013).
cites § 814.82 1×cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 814.82
“§ 360e(d)(1)(A), and a grant of PMA may include restrictions upon the sale or distribution of the device or compliance with other requirements, 21 C.F.R. § 814.82 . After approval, the MDA forbids the manufacturer from making any changes in design specifications, manufacturing…”

Show all 37 citing cases (list view) →

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
199420102026

One bar per year. Tallest: 4 cases in 1995. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
D. Md.33rd Cir.2S.D. Fla.2W.D. Ky.2D. Minn.2S.D. Miss.2D.N.M.2S.D. Ohio2

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 27 courts in all.

By subsection
(a)1 case
Mears v. Marshall, 905 P.2d 1154 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
(a)(9)1 case
Hughes v. Boston Sci. Corp., 669 F. Supp. 2d 701 (S.D. Miss. 2009).“50 and 21 C.F.R. § 814.82 . The plaintiff also alleges that the defendant failed to make full disclosure in its labeling regarding the extent and severity of burns in patients pursuant to 21 C.”

Show all 37 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: eCFR text as of Sept. 29, 2026. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

C.F.R. Home  |  Search C.F.R.  |  Search cases for this section  |  syfert.com