(a) The Secretary shall consider the criteria in this section when evaluating requests for the acquisition of land in trust status when the land is located contiguous to an Indian reservation:
(1) The existence of statutory authority for the acquisition and any limitations contained in such authority;
(2) If the applicant is an individual Indian, the need for additional land, the amount of trust or restricted land already owned by or for that individual, and the degree to which the individual needs assistance in handling their affairs;
(3) The purposes for which the land will be used; and
(4) If the land to be acquired is in fee status, whether the Bureau of Indian Affairs is equipped to discharge the additional responsibilities resulting from the acquisition of the land in trust status.
(b) The Secretary shall give great weight to acquiring land that serves any of the following purposes, in accordance with § 151.3:
(1) Furthers Tribal interests by establishing a Tribal land base or protects Tribal homelands;
(2) Protects sacred sites or cultural resources and practices;
(3) Establishes or maintains conservation or environmental mitigation areas;
(4) Consolidates land ownership;
(5) Reduces checkerboarding;
(6) Acquires land lost through allotment;
(7) Protects treaty or subsistence rights; or
(8) Facilitates Tribal self-determination, economic development, or Indian housing.
(c) When reviewing a Tribe's request for land contiguous to an Indian reservation, the Secretary presumes that the acquisition will further the Tribal interests described in paragraph (b) of this section, and adverse impacts to local governments' regulatory jurisdiction, real property taxes, and special assessments will be minimal, therefore the application should be approved.
(d) Upon receipt of a written request to have land contiguous to an Indian reservation acquired in trust status, the Secretary shall notify the State and local governments with regulatory jurisdiction over the land to be acquired. The notice will inform the State or local government that each will be given 30 calendar days in which to provide written comments to rebut the presumption of minimal adverse impacts to regulatory jurisdiction, real property taxes, and special assessments. If the State or local government responds within 30 calendar days, a copy of the comments will be provided to the applicant, who will be given a reasonable time in which to reply, if they choose to do so in their discretion, or request that the Secretary issue a decision. In considering such comments, the Secretary presumes that the Tribal community will benefit from the acquisition.
Notes of Decisions
Johnnie Louis McAlpine v. United States of Am. & Bureau of Indian Affairs, 112 F.3d 1429 (10th Cir. 1997).
· cites it 9× “25 C.F.R. § 151.10 . In the event that the Secretary determines that a request should be denied, the regulations require the Secretary to inform the applicant as to the reasons in writing and notify him or her of the right to appeal this decision to the IBIA.”
Carcieri v. Norton, 398 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 2005).
· cites it 6× “10 for evaluating a fee-to-trust transfer, (3) the Native American Housing and Self Determination Act (“NAHASDA”) cooperation agreement waiver violated due process, (4) the BIA failed to consider environmental impacts of the housing project planned for the Parcel, and (5) the…”
Carcieri v. Kempthorne, 497 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2005).
· cites it 7× “10 for evaluating a fee-to-trust transfer; (3) the Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determina *44 tion Act cooperation agreement waiver violated due process; (4) the BIA failed to consider the environmental impact of the housing project planned for the Parcel and the…”
Stand up for California v. State of Cal., 6 Cal. App. 5th 686 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 6× “11 (a)-(c) [incorporating 25 C.F.R. § 151.10 (a)-(c) & (e)-(f)].) Comparatively, the primary purpose of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) is “to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development,…”
City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation of NY, 544 U.S. 197 (2005).
· cites it 2× “" 25 CFR § 151.10 (f) (2004). Section 465 provides the proper avenue for OIN to reestablish sovereign authority over territory last held by the Oneidas 200 years ago.”
Cnty. of Charles Mix v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (D.S.D. 2011).
· cites it 14× “Specifically, in its brief, Plaintiff takes issue with: 1) the BIA’s analysis of the Tribe’s need for the land under 25 C.F.R. § 151.10 (b); and 2) the BIA’s consideration of the impact on local governments from removing the Travel Plaza from the tax base under 25 C.”
South Dakota v. United States Dep't of Interior, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (D.S.D. 2005).
· cites it 10× “25 C.F.R. § 151.10 . Plaintiffs contend that the Director’s decision is arbitrary and capricious because she erroneously interpreted and applied several of the regulatory factors.”
South Dakota v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 775 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (D.S.D. 2011).
· cites it 13× “Specifically, *1142 Plaintiffs take issue with: 1) The BIA’s analysis of the Tribe’s need for the land under 25 C.F.R. § 151.10 (b); 2) The BIA’s consideration of the impact on local governments from removing the four parcels of land from the tax base under 25 C.”
Butte Cnty., Cal. v. Hogen, 613 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
· cites it 2× “See 25 C.F.R. § 151.10 . On July 23, 2004 the County wrote the Tribe that, in view of its discussions with the Tribe about mitigation measures, the County "withdraws any formal concerns regarding the proposed location of the casino and the placement of the 650 acres of land [i.”
South Dakota v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 314 F. Supp. 2d 935 (D.S.D. 2004).
· cites it 8× “These objections include: (1) the analysis of the criteria listed in 25 C.F.R. §§ 151.10 and 151.11 was flawed because it failed to address relevant evidence and failed to explain how the facts found supported the choice made, (Pis.”
— 25 C.F.R. § 151.10(b) — 2 cases
South Dakota v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 314 F. Supp. 2d 935 (D.S.D. 2004).
“These objections include: (1) the analysis of the criteria listed in 25 C.F.R. §§ 151.10 and 151.11 was flawed because it failed to address relevant evidence and failed to explain how the facts found supported the choice made, (Pis.”
South Dakota v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 775 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (D.S.D. 2011).
“Specifically, *1142 Plaintiffs take issue with: 1) The BIA’s analysis of the Tribe’s need for the land under 25 C.F.R. § 151.10 (b); 2) The BIA’s consideration of the impact on local governments from removing the four parcels of land from the tax base under 25 C.”
— 25 C.F.R. § 151.10(c) — 2 cases
— 25 C.F.R. § 151.10(d) — 1 case
— 25 C.F.R. § 151.10(f) — 2 cases
Cnty. of Charles Mix v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 799 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (D.S.D. 2011).
“Specifically, in its brief, Plaintiff takes issue with: 1) the BIA’s analysis of the Tribe’s need for the land under 25 C.F.R. § 151.10 (b); and 2) the BIA’s consideration of the impact on local governments from removing the Travel Plaza from the tax base under 25 C.”
South Dakota v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 775 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (D.S.D. 2011).
“Specifically, *1142 Plaintiffs take issue with: 1) The BIA’s analysis of the Tribe’s need for the land under 25 C.F.R. § 151.10 (b); 2) The BIA’s consideration of the impact on local governments from removing the four parcels of land from the tax base under 25 C.”
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