28 C.F.R. § 9.1

Purpose, authority, and scope

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(a) Purpose. This part sets forth the procedures for agency officials to follow when considering remission or mitigation of administrative forfeitures under the jurisdiction of the agency, and civil judicial and criminal judicial forfeitures under the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice's Criminal Division. The purpose of this part is to provide a basis for the partial or total remission of forfeiture for individuals who have an interest in the forfeited property but who did not participate in, or have knowledge of, the conduct that resulted in the property being subject to forfeiture and, where required, took all reasonable steps under the circumstances to ensure that such property would not be used, acquired, or disposed of contrary to law. Additionally, the regulations provide for partial or total mitigation of the forfeiture and imposition of alternative conditions in appropriate circumstances.

(b) Authority to grant remission and mitigation. (1) Remission and mitigation functions in administrative forfeitures are performed by the agency seizing the property. Within the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), authority to grant remission and mitigation is delegated to the Forfeiture Counsel, who is the Unit Chief, Legal Forfeiture Unit, Office of the General Counsel; within the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), authority to grant remission and mitigation is delegated to the Forfeiture Counsel, Office of Chief Counsel; and within the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF), authority to grant remission and mitigation is delegated to the Associate Chief Counsel, Office of Chief Counsel.

(2) Remission and mitigation functions in judicial cases are performed by the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. Within the Criminal Division, authority to grant remission and mitigation is delegated to the Chief, Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section.

(3) The powers and responsibilities delegated by this part may be redelegated to attorneys or managers working under the supervision of the designated officials.

(c) Scope. This part governs any petition for remission filed with the Attorney General and supersedes any Department of Justice regulation governing petitions for remission, to the extent such regulation is inconsistent with this part.

(d) The time periods and internal requirements established in this part are designed to guide the orderly administration of the remission and mitigation process and are not intended to create rights or entitlements in favor of individuals seeking remission or mitigation. This part applies to all forfeiture actions commenced on or after October 12, 2012.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 27 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1980–2023 · leading case: United States v. Macinnes, 223 F. App'x 549 (9th Cir. 2007).
United States v. Macinnes, 223 F. App'x 549 (9th Cir. 2007). · cites it 3× “In its place it establishes an alternative remedy, § 853(n), the administrative remedies in 28 C.F.R. § 9.1 et seq., and the benefit of having that most desirable of creditors, the federal government of the United States.”
United States v. Olusola A. Alalade, A/K/A George Alalade, 204 F.3d 536 (4th Cir. 2000). “” 2 28 C.F.R. § 9.1 (a) (1999). Furthermore, the record does not establish that the Victim Financial Institutions received any compensation for their respective losses from any other source either prior to or subsequent to the district court’s sentencing of Alalade.”
LaChance v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 127 (Ct. Cl. 1988). “71-81 (1985) and 28 C.F.R. § 9.1 -.7 (1985). Copies of these statutes and regulations, which explained the limitations on plaintiff’s ability to obtain either judicial or *129 administrative relief, were provided to plaintiff and accompanied defendant’s letter.”
United States v. $2,350,000.00 in Lieu of One Parcel of Prop. Located at 895 Lake Avenue Greenwich, 718 F. Supp. 2d 215 (D. Conn. 2010). “§ 981 and 28 C.F.R. § 9.1 et seq., the Receiver-Claimants filed a petition for remission with the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”).”
United States v. Emor, 850 F. Supp. 2d 176 (D.D.C. 2012). “§ 853 (i); 28 C.F.R. § 9.1 et seq.; United States v.”
Eur. Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 783 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2015). · cites it 2× “§§ 3663 , 3663A; 28 C.F.R. § 9.1 et seq. But the listed extraterritorial statutes—and specifically the money laundering and material support statutes here at issue—themselves afford private persons no civil causes of action.”
United States v. $7,599,358.09, 953 F. Supp. 2d 549 (D.N.J. 2013). “See 28 C.F.R. §§ 9.1 , 9.4 & 9.8. The remission process would permit the equitable distribution of the Defendant property to victims of both fraudulent schemes underlying this forfeiture, including the various AEG and ECI clients which have sustained losses as a result the…”
United States v. One 1978 Cadillac Sedan De Ville, New York License Plate No. 533 JPY, 490 F. Supp. 725 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). “By letter dated October 16, 1978, a representative of the IRS informed Levine’s counsel that his letter of October 13 would be considered by the Department of Justice as a Petition for Remission or Mitigation, see 28 C.F.R. § 9.1 et seq. Hearing nothing further from the…”
United States v. Prop. Titled in the Names of Ponce, 751 F. Supp. 1436 (D. Haw. 1990). · cites it 2× “Ponce should petition for Remission or Mitigation of Forfeiture under the procedures provided by 28 C.F.R. § 9.1 et seq. However, those regulations "are designed to reflect the intent of Congress relative to the remission or mitigation of forfeiture of certain property as set…”
Albajon v. Gugliotta, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (S.D. Fla. 1999). · cites it 2× “It stated that Albajon could petition the DEA for return of the property or his interest in it (remission or mitigation), pursuant to 28 C.F.R. §§ 9.1 -9.7 within 30 days of receipt of this notice, and outlined the procedure to be followed.”
United States v. Certain Real Prop. Known as Gulfstream West, 2600 Harden Blvd., Lakeland, Polk Cnty., 710 F. Supp. 792 (S.D. Fla. 1989). “The applicable section, 28 C.F.R. § 9.1 (h), explicitly disallows recovery for attorney fees and there is no support in the regulation for granting late charges, collection and court costs, or a penalty rate of interest.”
United States v. Terry Lee Wood, United States of Am. v. David Lee Hippen, United States of Am. v. Charles Kent Wood, 851 F.2d 185 (8th Cir. 1988). “§§ 1607-18 and 28 C.F.R. §§ 9.1 -.7 and 1316, the magistrate, in his Report and Recommendation, properly concluded that when property is seized pursuant to 21 U.”
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