C.F.R. » Title 29 » CHAPTER XIV—EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION › PART 1601—PROCEDURAL REGULATIONS › Subpart B—Procedure for the Prevention of Unlawful Employment Practices

29 C.F.R. § 1601.19

No cause determinations: Procedure and authority

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(a) Where the Commission completes its investigation of a charge and finds that there is not reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred or is occurring as to all issues addressed in the determination, the Commission shall issue a determination to all parties to the charge indicating the finding. This determination does not mean the claims in the charge have no merit. The Commission's determination shall be the final determination of the Commission, unless a final determination of no reasonable cause is vacated pursuant to § 1601.19(b). The determination shall inform the person claiming to be aggrieved or the person on whose behalf a charge was filed of the right to sue in Federal district court within 90 days of receipt of the determination. The Commission hereby delegates authority to the Director of the Office of Field Programs, or upon delegation to the Director of Field Management Programs, and District Directors or upon delegation to Field Directors, Area Directors, or Local Directors, or their designees, except in those cases involving issues currently designated by the Commission for priority review, to issue no cause determinations.

(b) The Commission may on its own initiative reconsider a final determination of no reasonable cause and a director of the issuing office may, on his or her own initiative, reconsider a final determination of no reasonable cause. If the Commission or the director of the issuing office decides to reconsider a final no cause determination, a notice of intent to reconsider shall promptly issue to all parties to the charge. If such notice of intent to reconsider is issued within 90 days of receipt of the final no cause determination, and the person claiming to be aggrieved or the person on whose behalf a charge was filed has not filed suit and did not request and receive a notice of right to sue pursuant to § 1601.28(a)(1) or (2), the notice of intent to reconsider shall vacate the determination and shall revoke the charging party's right to bring suit within 90 days. If the 90-day suit period has expired, the charging party has filed suit, or the charging party has requested a notice of right to sue pursuant to § 1601.28(a)(1) or (2), the notice of intent to reconsider shall vacate the determination but shall not revoke the charging party's right to sue within 90 days. After reconsideration, the Commission or a director of the issuing office shall issue a new determination. In those circumstances where the charging party's right to bring suit within 90 days was revoked, the determination shall include notice that a new 90-day suit period shall begin upon the charging party's receipt of the determination. Where a member of the Commission has filed a Commissioner charge, he or she shall abstain from making a determination in that case.

[85 FR 65218, Oct. 15, 2020]
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 63 cases (15 in the last 5 years), 1968–2026 · leading case: Martin v. Alamo Cmty. Coll. Dist., 353 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2003).
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Martin v. Alamo Cmty. Coll. Dist., 353 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2003). · cites it 4× “II A As all who are familiar with this field of law know, if the EEOC determines that there is no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred, the EEOC issues a letter informing the aggrieved party that it has the right to sue in federal…”
Cynthia A. Ebbert v. Daimlerchrysler Corp., 319 F.3d 103 (3rd Cir. 2003). · cites it 5× “The most relevant regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19 (2002), the one addressing “no cause” dismissals by the EEOC, provides only that the EEOC “shall issue a letter,” which “shall inform the person claiming to be aggrieved or the person on whose behalf a charge was filed of the…”
Tyquisha M. Stamper v. Duval Cnty. Sch. Bd., 863 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2017). · cites it 2× “See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19 (b). Stamper then filed a second charge against the Board based on the same allegations in her first charge, and she requested another notice of her right to sue, which the Department of Justice sent her on November 5, 2012.”
Herman GONZALEZ, Etc., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. FIRESTONE TIRE & RUBBER CO. Et Al., Defendants-Appellees, 610 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1980). · cites it 2× “19b(d) (1977) (amended version at 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.19 (g), —.21(d) (1978)).”
Barbrie Logan v. MGM Grand Detroit Casino, 939 F.3d 824 (6th Cir. 2019). “29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.19 (a), 1601.28(b). Once the EEOC issues a right-to-sue letter, the employee has ninety days to sue the employer.”
Mayers v. Laborers' Health & Saf. Fund of North Am., 478 F.3d 364 (D.C. Cir. 2007). “The EEOC issued a “Dismissal and Notice of Rights” letter in September, see 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19 (a) (setting forth EEOC procedure for issuing letters of determination), and Mayers filed suit in the district court soon thereafter, see 42 U.”
Stonehill Coll. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 808 N.E.2d 205 (Mass. 2004). “§ 2000e-5(b), (c), (e) (2000); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.19 , 1601.28(b) (2003).”
Mary McKee v. McDonnell Douglas Technical Servs. Co., Inc., a Corp., Defendant, 700 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1983). · cites it 2× “5 Nowhere is the Commission given discretion to refuse a valid allegation of a Title VII violation except that “[a] charge which raises a claim exclusively under section 717 of Title VII [42 U.”
Vollinger v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). · cites it 3× “See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.19 (b), 1614.407 (2000).”
Susie J. Jackson v. Richards Med. Co., 961 F.2d 575 (6th Cir. 1992). “7 See also 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19 (g). Subsection (d) also elaborates upon the consequences of a District Director’s decision to reconsider a dismissal or reasonable cause determination.”
Helen McCray v. Corry Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 224 (3rd Cir. 1995). · cites it 2× “29 C.F.R. § 1601.19 (b) (1993). There is no counterpart regulation governing reconsideration of claims under the ADEA.”
Cephia Hayes v. New Jersey Dep't of Human Servs., 108 F.4th 219 (3rd Cir. 2024). “” 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19 (a); see also id. § 1601.”
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— 29 C.F.R. § 1601.19(b) — 2 cases
Grimm v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 300 F. Supp. 984 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
King v. Hyundai Motor Mfg. Alabama, LLC (M.D. Ala. 2025).
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