(a) It is an unlawful employment practice to classify a job as “male” or “female” or to maintain separate lines of progression or separate seniority lists based on sex where this would adversely affect any employee unless sex is a bona fide occupational qualification for that job. Accordingly, employment practices are unlawful which arbitrarily classify jobs so that:
(1) A female is prohibited from applying for a job labeled “male,” or for a job in a “male” line of progression; and vice versa.
(2) A male scheduled for layoff is prohibited from displacing a less senior female on a “female” seniority list; and vice versa.
(b) A Seniority system or line of progression which distinguishes between “light” and “heavy” jobs constitutes an unlawful employment practice if it operates as a disguised form of classification by sex, or creates unreasonable obstacles to the advancement by members of either sex into jobs which members of that sex would reasonably be expected to perform.
Notes of Decisions
Mary Burke Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971).
· cites it 4× “It does not seem to us relevant that the rule is not directed against all females, but only against married females, for so long as sex is a factor in the application of the rule, such application involves a discrimination based on sex.”
Etta Ruth Stroud v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 544 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1977).
“The court referred to the following passage in 29 C.F.R. § 1604.3 (b): “It may be that under certain circumstances, such a rule [against married females] could be justified within the meaning of Section 703(e)(1) of Title VII.”
Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
“§ 2000e-2(a) and 29 C.F.R. § 1604.3 . On November 18, 1982, Norwood filed an Amended Complaint.”
Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976).
“’ 29 CFR § 1604.3 (a).” 444 F.2d at 1198 . 6 .”
Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
“29 C. F.R. § 1604.3(a). Faced with the exact question now before this court, the Commission determined that the application of a long-hair policy to males only was discrimination on the basis of sex.”
Kohne v. Imco Container Co., 480 F. Supp. 1015 (W.D. Va. 1979).
“Consequently, the questions presented are whether plaintiffs’ evidence establishes a prima facie case of “disparate treatment” 18 in job assignments on account of sex and if it does whether defendant has proved that its job assignment decisions were based on legitimate…”
Cisneros v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 660 P.2d 1228 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982).
“” 29 C.F.R. § 1604.3 (b). Again, appellant had the burden of proving that “light-duty” operated as a disguised form of classification by sex, and this she failed to do.”
Palmer v. Shultz, 662 F. Supp. 1551 (D.D.C. 1987).
“29 C.F.R. § 1604.3 (a); Thompson v. Sawyer, 678 F.”
— 29 C.F.R. § 1604.3(a) — 2 cases
Aros v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 661 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
“29 C. F.R. § 1604.3(a). Faced with the exact question now before this court, the Commission determined that the application of a long-hair policy to males only was discrimination on the basis of sex.”
— 29 C.F.R. § 1604.3(b) — 1 case
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