(a) Purpose. The purpose of this part is to implement title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), as amended by the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA or Amendments Act), 42 U.S.C. 12101, et seq., requiring equal employment opportunities for individuals with disabilities. The ADA as amended, and these regulations, are intended to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities, and to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination.
(b) Applicability. This part applies to “covered entities” as defined at § 1630.2(b).
(c) Construction—(1) In general. Except as otherwise provided in this part, this part does not apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 790-794a, as amended), or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to that title.
(2) Relationship to other laws. This part does not invalidate or limit the remedies, rights, and procedures of any Federal law or law of any State or political subdivision of any State or jurisdiction that provides greater or equal protection for the rights of individuals with disabilities than is afforded by this part.
(3) State workers' compensation laws and disability benefit programs. Nothing in this part alters the standards for determining eligibility for benefits under State workers' compensation laws or under State and Federal disability benefit programs.
(4) Broad coverage. The primary purpose of the ADAAA is to make it easier for people with disabilities to obtain protection under the ADA. Consistent with the Amendments Act's purpose of reinstating a broad scope of protection under the ADA, the definition of “disability” in this part shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA. The primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether covered entities have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not whether the individual meets the definition of disability. The question of whether an individual meets the definition of disability under this part should not demand extensive analysis.
[76 FR 16999, Mar. 25, 2011]
Notes of Decisions
Christina Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Courts, 780 F.3d 562 (4th Cir. 2015).
“” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1 (c)(4). The regulation clarifies that “[t]he primary object of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether covered entities have complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not whether the individual meets the…”
Kesha Williams v. Stacey Kincaid, 45 F.4th 759 (4th Cir. 2022).
“2015) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1 (c)(4)), courts must construe the ADA’s exclusions narrowly.”
Wilkerson v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1256 (10th Cir. 2010).
“See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1 -.16. We give these regulations “a great deal of deference.”
Weed v. Sidewinder Drilling, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 3d 826 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
· cites it 3× “DiLorenzo, The Intersection of the FMLA and ADA— As Modified by NDAA, ADAAA and *834 GINA, 860 PLI/Lit 47, 83-84 (June 23, 2011); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1 (c)(4)(“reinstating a broad scope of protection under the ADA”; “the definition of ‘disability* shall be construed broadly in…”
McDonald v. Dep't of Env't Quality, 2009 MT 209 (Mont. 2009).
· cites it 2× “§ 12116 ; 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1 (a), while the Attorney General has authority to issue regulations to carry out the provisions of Title III (except the provisions relating to transportation), see 42 U.”
BNSF Ry. Co. v. Feit, 2012 MT 147 (Mont. 2012).
· cites it 2× “at 3554-55; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1 (c)(4) (2011). The ADAAA provides: “Congress finds that [federal cases] have narrowed the broad scope of protection intended to be afforded by the ADA, thus eliminating protection for many individuals whom Congress intended to protect.”
Garner v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., 834 F. Supp. 2d 528 (S.D. Tex. 2011).
· cites it 2× “DiLorenzo, The Intersection of the FMLA and ADA-As Modified by NDAA, ADAAA and GINA 860 PLI/ Lit 47, 83-84 (June 23, 2011); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1 (c)(4) (“reinstating a broad scope of protection under the ADA”; “the definition of ‘disability’ shall be construed broadly in favor of…”
Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999).
“If the ADA merely requires the employer to give the disabled employee "consideration” for that vacancy on an equal basis with other applicants, the ADA would supply disabled employees with lesser protection than that provided by the regulations implementing the Rehabilitation…”
Jarvis v. Potter, 500 F.3d 1113 (10th Cir. 2007).
“Of particular significance in this case, the following subsection provides that “qualification standards may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.”
Badwal v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of the Dist. of Columbia, 139 F. Supp. 3d 295 (D.D.C. 2015).
“29 C.F.R. § 1630.1 (c)(4). Per the EEOC’s regulations, an “impairment” refers to “[a]ny physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems .”
Hill v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 264 F. Supp. 3d 1247 (N.D. Ala. 2017).
“§ 12102 (4)(A) (emphasis added); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1 (c)(4) (“The primary purpose of the ADAAA is to make it easier for people with disabilities to obtain protection under the ADA.”
— 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c) — 4 cases
— 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4) — 1 case
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