(a) Since the enactment of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, the views of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division as to the scope and applicability of the exemption provided by section 13(b)(1) of the act have been expressed in interpretations issued from time to time in various forms. This part, as of the date of its publication in the Federal Register, supersedes and replaces such prior interpretations. Its purpose is to make available in one place general interpretations of the Administrator which will provide “a practical guide to employers and employees as to how the office representing the public interest in enforcement of the law will seek to apply it.” (Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134)
(b) The interpretations contained in this part indicate, with respect to the scope and applicability of the exemption provided by section 13(b)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, the construction of the law which the Secretary of Labor and the Administrator believe to be correct in the light of the decisions of the courts, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and since October 15, 1966, its successor, the Secretary of Transportation, and which will guide them in the performance of their administrative duties under the act unless and until they are otherwise directed by authoritative decisions of the courts or conclude upon reexamination of an interpretation that it is incorrect.
(c) Public Law 89-670 (80 Stat. 931) transferred to and vested in the Secretary of Transportation all functions, powers, and duties of the Interstate Commerce Commission: (1) Under section 204 (a)(1) and (a)(2) to the extent they relate to qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees and safety of operations and equipment, and (2) under section 204(a)(5) of the Motor Carrier Act. The interpretations contained in this part are interpretations on which reliance may be placed as provided in section 10 of the Portal-to-Portal Act (Pub. L. 49, 80th Cong., first sess. (61 Stat. 84), discussed in part 790, statement on effect of Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947), so long as they remain effective and are not modified, amended, rescinded, or determined by judicial authority to be incorrect.
Notes of Decisions
Donald Allen v. Coil Tubing Servs., L.L.C, 755 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2014).
· cites it 2× “” 29 C.F.R. § 782.0 . The regulations state, “[t]he [MCA exemption] depends both on the class to which his 13 As an initial matter, the district court should have recognized that the DOL does not have authority to define the scope of MCA jurisdiction, as the DOL’s regulations…”
Webb v. Athens Newspapers, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 1464 (M.D. Ga. 1998).
· cites it 2× “to make available in one place general interpretations of the Administrator which will provide ‘a practical guide to employers and employees as to how the office representing the public interest in enforcement of the law will seek to apply it.”
Peraro Ex Rel. Castro v. Chemlawn Servs. Corp., 692 F. Supp. 109 (D. Conn. 1988).
“29 C.F.R. Section 782.0(b). Though the DOT official’s opinion carries some persuasive influence, it is not necessary for the court to ascertain how much because the court has independently concluded that the section 213(b)(1) exemption is applicable to Chemlawn.”
— 29 C.F.R. § 782.0(b) — 1 case
Peraro Ex Rel. Castro v. Chemlawn Servs. Corp., 692 F. Supp. 109 (D. Conn. 1988).
“29 C.F.R. Section 782.0(b). Though the DOT official’s opinion carries some persuasive influence, it is not necessary for the court to ascertain how much because the court has independently concluded that the section 213(b)(1) exemption is applicable to Chemlawn.”
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