38 C.F.R. § 9.1

Definitions

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The following definitions are in addition to those definitions in 38 U.S.C. 101 and 1965:

(a) The term policy means Group Policy No. G-32000, which was effective September 29, 1965, purchased from the insurer pursuant to 38 U.S.C. 1966, executed and attested on December 30, 1965, and amended thereafter.

(b) The term administrative office means the Office of Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance.

(c) The term insurer means the commercial life insurance company or companies selected under 38 U.S.C. 1966 to provide insurance coverage specified in the policy.

(d) The term reinsurer means any life insurance company meeting all the criteria set forth in § 9.10 which reinsures a portion of the total amount of insurance covered by the policy and issues individual life insurance policies to members under the provisions of 38 U.S.C. 1968(b) and 1977(e).

(e) The term converter means any life insurance company meeting all the criteria set forth in § 9.10 which issues individual life insurance policies to members under the provisions of 38 U.S.C. 1968(b) and 1977(e).

(f) The term coverage means Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance or Veterans' Group Life Insurance payable while the member is insured under the policy.

(g) The term termination of duty means (1) In the case of active duty or active duty for training being performed under a call or order that does not specify a period of less than 31 days-discharge, release or separation from such duty.

(2) In the case of other duty—the member's release from his or her obligation to perform any duty in his or her uniformed service (active duty, or active duty for training or inactive duty training) whether arising from limitations included in a contract of enlistment or similar form of obligation or arising from resignation, retirement or other voluntary action by which the obligation to perform such duty ceases.

(h) The term break in service means the situation(s) in which: (1) A member terminates duty or obligation to perform duty in one service and enters on duty or assumes the obligation to perform duty in another uniformed service, regardless of the length of time intervening.

(2) A member reenters on duty or resumes an obligation to perform duty as a Reserve in the same uniformed service and 1 calendar day or more has elapsed following termination of the prior period of duty or obligation to perform duty.

(i) The term disability means any type of injury or disease whether mental or physical.

(j) The term total disability means any impairment of mind or body which continuously renders it impossible for the insured to follow any substantially gainful occupation. Without prejudice to any other cause of disability, the permanent loss of the use of both feet, of both hands, or of both eyes, or of one foot and one hand, or of one foot and one eye, or of one hand and one eye, or the total loss of hearing of both ears, or the organic loss of speech shall be deemed to be total disability. Organic loss of speech will mean the loss of the ability to express oneself, both by voice and whisper, through the normal organs of speech if such loss is caused by organic changes in such organs. Where such loss exists, the fact that some speech can be produced through the use of an artificial appliance or other organs of the body will be disregarded.

(k)(1) The term member's stillborn child means a member's biological child—

(i) Whose death occurs before expulsion, extraction, or delivery; and

(ii) Whose—

(A) Fetal weight is 350 grams or more; or

(B) Duration in utero is 20 completed weeks of gestation or more, calculated from the date the last normal menstrual period began to the date of expulsion, extraction, or delivery.

(2) The term does not include any fetus or child extracted for purposes of an abortion.

(l) The term member of the family as used in § 9.5(e)(2) means an individual with any of the following relationships to a person who is convicted of intentionally and wrongfully killing the decedent or determined in a civil proceeding to have intentionally and wrongfully killed the decedent:

(1) Spouse;

(2) Biological, adopted, or step child;

(3) Biological, adoptive, or step parent;

(4) Biological, adopted, or step sibling; or

(5) Biological, adoptive, or step grandparent or grandchild.

(m) The term pursuing a course of instruction at an approved educational institution, as used in 38 U.S.C. 101(4)(A)(iii), means, for purposes of this part, pursuing a “program of education,” as that term is defined in 38 U.S.C. 3002(3), at an approved “educational institution,” as that term is defined in 38 U.S.C. 3452(c), as an enrolled student on either a more than half-time basis or on a half-time basis or less.

(n) The term a stepchild who is a member of a veteran's household, as used in 38 U.S.C. 101(4)(A), for purposes of this part, means a stepchild who has been living in the insured's household for at least one year.

(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 501(a), 1980A) [40 FR 4135, Jan. 28, 1975, as amended at 53 FR 17698, May 18, 1988; 61 FR 20135, May 6, 1996; 67 FR 52413, Aug. 12, 2002; 70 FR 75946, Dec. 22, 2005; 73 FR 71930, Nov. 26, 2008; 74 FR 59479, Nov. 18, 2009; 74 FR 62706, Dec. 1, 2009; 77 FR 60306, Oct. 3, 2012; 77 FR 70376, Nov. 26, 2012; 85 FR 14802, Mar. 16, 2020; 90 FR 46476, Sept. 29, 2025]

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 11 cases, 1968–2017 · leading case: Hamilton v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 18 F. Supp. 3d 571 (D.N.J. 2014).

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Hamilton v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 18 F. Supp. 3d 571 (D.N.J. 2014). · cites it 2× “§ 1968 (a)(l)(A)(ii) and 38 C.F.R. § 9.1 (j) (Count 5); violations of various state law contractual duties (Counts 3-4, 6, 7); and fraud (Counts 8-9).”

Norma Denton v. United States, 638 F.2d 1218 (9th Cir. 1981). “Neither the Veterans’ Insurance Act of 1974 nor the regulations promulgated under it ( 38 C.F.R. § 9.1 et seq. (1979)) sets forth an explicit duty to notify Retired Reservists of their SGLI eligibility.”

Annie Lenora Shannon v. United States of Am. & Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 417 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1969). “38 C.F.R. § 9.1 (f). The Administrator establishes the initial amount to be paid by the serviceman for the insurance but may redetermine it based on experience.”

Gutierrez v. Madero, 564 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. App. 1978). “38 C.F.R. § 9.1 (f). For each month a serviceman is insured under the Act, his uniformed service deducts from his pay and remits to the Veterans Administration the costs of the monthly premium.”

Stribling v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 1293 (E.D. Ark. 1968). “Pursuant to the authority of the Administrator an administrative office was established by regulation as follows: 38 C.F.R. 9.1(f) “Office” means the Office *1295 of Servicemen’s Group Life Insurance located at 212 Washington Street, Newark, N.”

Parker v. Off. of Servicemembers' Grp. Life Ins., 91 F. Supp. 2d 820 (E.D. Pa. 2000). “§ 1966 (b); 38 C.F.R. § 9.1 (b). As noted above, defendants contend that the SGLIA preempts plaintiffs state law claims.”

Weymann v. Wilson, 320 F. Supp. 980 (M.D. Fla. 1970). “38 C.F.R. § 9.1 (f). For each month a serviceman is insured under the Act, his uniformed service deducts from his pay and remits to the Veterans Administration the costs of the monthly premium.”

Margaret Rosa Walker v. United States of Am., 493 F.2d 700 (4th Cir. 1974). · cites it 2× “765 et seq, 38 CFR 9.1, et seq. When these provisions have thus far been relatively free from litigation, I cannot but expect both the United States and private insurance companies to assert every defense to payment in the future to avoid the possibility of the double payment…”

Foreman v. Prudential Ins., 657 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1981). “1 The Veterans Administration has enacted regulations to implement the SGLI Program, which are codified at 38 C.F.R. § 9.1 et seq. (1980). As originally enacted, the statute provided SGLI coverage only for servicemen in the regular Armed Forces.”

Marriage of Steiner (Cal. Ct. App. 2017). “The court granted the request, finding the SGLIA and its implementing regulations (see 38 C.F.R. § 9.1 et seq.) allowed Husband to change the policy beneficiary at any time without notice to or the consent of Wife.”

Furman v. Steiner (In re Steiner), 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d 880 (Cal. Ct. App. 5th 2017). “The court granted the request, finding the SGLIA and its implementing regulations (see 38 C.F.R. § 9.1 et seq. ) allowed Husband to change the policy beneficiary at any time without notice to or the consent of Wife.”

— 38 C.F.R. § 9.1(f) — 1 case

— 38 C.F.R. § 9.1(j) — 1 case

Hamilton v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 18 F. Supp. 3d 571 (D.N.J. 2014). “§ 1968 (a)(l)(A)(ii) and 38 C.F.R. § 9.1 (j) (Count 5); violations of various state law contractual duties (Counts 3-4, 6, 7); and fraud (Counts 8-9).”

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