5 C.F.R. § 930.211

Actions against administrative law judges

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(a) Procedures. An agency may remove, suspend, reduce in level, reduce in pay, or furlough for 30 days or less an administrative law judge only for good cause established and determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board on the record and after opportunity for a hearing before the Board as prescribed in 5 U.S.C. 7521 and 5 CFR part 1201. Procedures for adverse actions by agencies under part 752 of this chapter do not apply to actions against administrative law judges.

(b) Status during removal proceedings. In exceptional cases when there are circumstances in which the retention of an administrative law judge in his or her position, pending adjudication of the existence of good cause for his or her removal, is detrimental to the interests of the Federal Government, the agency may:

(1) Assign the administrative law judge to duties consistent with his or her normal duties in which these circumstances would not exist;

(2) Place the administrative law judge on leave with his or her consent;

(3) Carry the administrative law judge on annual leave, sick leave, leave without pay, or absence without leave, as appropriate, if he or she is voluntarily absent for reasons not originating with the agency; or

(4) If the alternatives in paragraphs (b)(1) through (b)(3) of this section are not available, the agency may consider placing the administrative law judge in a paid non-duty or administrative leave status.

(c) Exceptions from procedures. The procedures in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section do not apply:

(1) In making dismissals or taking other actions under 5 CFR part 731;

(2) In making dismissals or other actions made by agencies in the interest of national security under 5 U.S.C. 7532;

(3) To reduction in force actions taken by agencies under 5 U.S.C. 3502; or

(4) In any action initiated by the Office of Special Counsel under 5 U.S.C. 1215.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 9 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1980–2023 · leading case: Simon Nash v. Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Stanford Ross, Alan K. Campbell, Robert L. Trachtenberg, Philip T. Brown, & Wallace Tannenbaum, 613 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980).
Simon Nash v. Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Stanford Ross, Alan K. Campbell, Robert L. Trachtenberg, Philip T. Brown, & Wallace Tannenbaum, 613 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980). · cites it 2× “§ 4301 (2)(E) and 5 C.F.R. § 930.211 . An additional threat to the AUs statutory independence is allegedly posed by the so-called “Quality Assurance Program,” which attempts to control the number of decisions denying Social Security Benefits.”
Ass'n of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C. 1984). “See also 5 C.F.R. § 930.211 (1984). AUs do not receive monetary awards or periodic step increases based upon performance.”
Sydnor v. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 336 F. App'x 175 (3rd Cir. 2009). “214 , which implemented § 7521, has since been superseded by 5 C.F.R. § 930.211 . Section 930.214 provided in pertinent part: An agency may remove, suspend, reduce in grade, reduce in pay, or furlough for 30 days or less, an administrative law judge pnly for good cause,…”
Sprague v. Brook, 149 F.R.D. 575 (N.D. Ill. 1993). “5 C.F.R. § 930.211 . In response to the OPM regulations, the plaintiffs have filed this lawsuit, claiming that the regulations violate the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.”
Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Rumsfeld, 422 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2006). “203 (oversight of OPM); 5 C.F.R. § 930.211 (no agency power to conduct performance reviews).”
Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1989). “§ 4301 (2)(D) (exempting AUs from performance appraisals); 5 C.F.R. § 930.211 (same). The third alleged threat to AUs’ decisional independence is the “Quality Assurance System,” which attempted to control the number of AU decisions reversing previous state-level determinations…”
Michael Levinson v. Michael L. Levinson, 2023 MSPB 20 (MSPB 2023). “§ 7521 (a), (b)(1); see 5 C.F.R. § 930.211 (reflecting the same proposition).”
Michael Levinson v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 2023 MSPB 20 (MSPB 2023). “§ 7521 (a), (b)(1); see 5 C.F.R. § 930.211 (reflecting the same proposition).”
Duka v. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 103 F. Supp. 3d 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). “§ 7521 ; 5 C.F.R. § 930.211 (a). The SEC Commissioners, in turn, “cannot themselves be removed by the President except [for] inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”
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