7 C.F.R. § 1.146

Petitions for reopening hearing; for rehearing or reargument of proceeding; or for reconsideration of the decision of the Judicial Officer

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(a) Petition requisite—(1) Filing; service; ruling. A petition for reopening the hearing to take further evidence, or for rehearing or reargument of the proceeding, or for reconsideration of the decision of the Judicial Officer, must be made by petition filed with the Hearing Clerk. Every such petition must state specifically the grounds relied upon. Any such petition filed prior to the filing of an appeal of the Judge's decision pursuant to § 1.145 shall be ruled upon by the Judge, and any such petition filed thereafter shall be ruled upon by the Judicial Officer.

(2) Petition to reopen hearing. A petition to reopen a hearing to take further evidence may be filed at any time prior to the issuance of the decision of the Judicial Officer. Every such petition shall state briefly the nature and purpose of the evidence to be adduced, shall show that such evidence is not merely cumulative, and shall set forth a good reason why such evidence was not adduced at the hearing.

(3) Petition to rehear or reargue proceeding, or to reconsider the decision of the Judicial Officer. A petition to rehear or reargue the proceeding or to reconsider the decision of the Judicial Officer shall be filed within 10 days after the date of service of such decision upon the party filing the petition. Every petition must state specifically the matters claimed to have been erroneously decided and alleged errors must be briefly stated.

(b) Procedure for disposition of petitions. Within 20 days following the service of any petition provided for in this section, any party to the proceeding may file with the Hearing Clerk a reply thereto. As soon as practicable thereafter, the Judge or the Judicial Officer, as the case may be, shall announce the determination whether to grant or deny the petition. The decision of the Judicial Officer shall automatically be stayed pending the determination to grant or deny a timely petition. Such decision shall not be final for purposes of judicial review until the petition is denied or the decision is affirmed or modified pursuant to the petition and the time for judicial review shall begin to run upon the filing of such final action on the petition. In the event that any such petition is granted, the applicable rules of practice, as set out elsewhere herein, shall be followed. A person filing a petition under this section shall be regarded as the moving party, although such person shall be referred to as the complainant or respondent, depending upon the designation in the original proceeding.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 9 cases, 1985–2018 · leading case: Knapp v. United States Dep't of Agric., 796 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 2015).

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Knapp v. United States Dep't of Agric., 796 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. 2015). “Nov. 6, 2013). Knapp filed a timely petition for review in this court on January 2, 2014.”

Utica Packing Co. & David Fenster v. John R. Block, Sec'y, United States Dep't of Agric., 781 F.2d 71 (6th Cir. 1986). “7 C.F.R. § 1.146 (a)(3). I. A. In 1978 David Fenster, president and part owner of Utica Packing Company was convicted of bribing a meat inspector.”

Reinhart v. United States Dep't of Agric., 39 F. App'x 954 (6th Cir. 2002). “7 C.F.R. § 1.146 (b) (providing that “the time for judicial review shall begin to run upon the fifing of such final action on the petition [for rehearing]”).”

Jacob F. Bosma D/B/A Chino Livestock Comm'n Co. & Yardage v. United States Dep't of Agric., 754 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1985). “See 7 C.F.R. § 1.146 (a)(2) (1982). The statute specifically provides that in determining the amount of the penalty, “the Secretary shall consider the gravity of the offense, the size of the business involved, and the effect of the penalty on the person’s ability to continue to…”

Lancelot Kollman Ramos v. US Dept. of Agric., 322 F. App'x 814 (11th Cir. 2009). · cites it 2× “7 C.F.R. § 1.146 (a)(2). Neither the title of Kollman’s document nor, more importantly, its contents would have put the Judicial Officer on notice that the Motion to Set Aside Default Decision and Order was, in fact, a request that the proceedings be reopened pursuant to Rule of…”

Veg-Mix, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 832 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1987). “” 7 C.F.R. § 1.146 (a)(2) (1987). Veg-Mix did not meet that deadline.”

Animal Legal Def. Fund v. United States Dep't of Agric. (D.D.C. 2018). “at 21, which intervention might enable it to do, see 7 C.F.R. § 1.146 ; Compl. at 15. 6 Moreover, even if ALDF’s relocation arguments are as futile as USDA contends, there is still the possibility that its other stated goal in intervention—the revocation of Cricket Hollow’s…”

Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Perdue, 346 F. Supp. 3d 153 (D.C. Cir. 2018). “at 21, which intervention might enable it to do, see 7 C.F.R. § 1.146 ; Compl. at 15. Moreover, even if ALDF's relocation arguments are as futile as USDA contends, there is still the possibility that its other stated goal in intervention-the revocation of Cricket Hollow's…”

Julian Toney & Anita L. Toney v. Dan Glickman, Sec'y of the United States Dep't of Agric., 101 F.3d 1236 (8th Cir. 1997). “7 C.F.R. § 1.146 (a)(2). The fact that counsel was unaware of the reports is insufficient to justify reopening the hearing if the Toneys themselves knew about them, and there is nothing in the record or briefs to suggest that they did not.”

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