(1) In all actions brought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by any person resulting from or occasioned by the tort of any other person, corporation, association, or partnership, whether by negligence or by willful intent of the other person, corporation, association, or partnership and whether the injury has resulted fatally or otherwise, it is lawful for the plaintiff in the complaint to claim interest on the damages alleged from the date the suit is filed; and, on and after July 1, 1979, it is lawful for the plaintiff in the complaint to claim interest on the damages claimed from the date the action accrued. When such interest is claimed, it is the duty of the court in entering judgment for the plaintiff in the action to add to the amount of damages assessed by the verdict of the jury, or found by the court, interest on the amount calculated at the rate of nine percent per annum on actions filed on or after July 1, 1975, and at the legal rate on actions filed prior to such date, and calculated from the date the suit was filed to the date of satisfying the judgment and to include the same in the judgment. On actions filed on or after July 1, 1979, the calculation must include compounding of interest annually from the date the suit was filed. On and after January 1, 1983, if a judgment for money in an action brought to recover damages for personal injuries is appealed by the judgment debtor, postjudgment interest must be calculated on the sum at the rate set forth in subsections (3) and (4) of this section from the date of judgment through the date of satisfying the judgment and must include compounding of interest annually.
(2) (a) If a judgment for money in an action brought to recover damages for personal injuries is appealed by a judgment debtor and the judgment is affirmed, postjudgment interest, as set out in subsections (3) and (4) of this section, is payable from the date of judgment through the date of satisfying the judgment.
(b) If a judgment for money in an action to recover damages for personal injuries is appealed by a judgment debtor and the judgment is modified or reversed with a direction that a judgment for money be entered in the trial court, postjudgment interest, as set out in subsections (3) and (4) of this section, is payable from the date of judgment through the date of satisfying the judgment. This postjudgment interest is payable on the amount of the final judgment.
(3) The rate of postjudgment interest must be certified on each January 1 by the secretary of state to be two percentage points above the discount rate, which discount rate must be the rate of interest a commercial bank pays to the federal reserve bank of Kansas City using a government bond or other eligible paper as security, and rounded to the nearest full percent. Such annual rate of interest must be established as of December 31, 1982, to become effective January 1, 1983. Thereafter, as of December 31 of each year, the annual rate of interest must be established in the same manner, effective on January 1 of the following year.
(4) The rate at which postjudgment interest accrues during each year is the rate which the secretary of state has certified as the annual interest rate pursuant to subsection (3) of this section.
Source: L. 11: p. 296, § 1. C.L. § 6306. CSA: C. 50, § 5. CRS 53: § 41-2-1. C.R.S. 1963: § 41-2-1. L. 75: Entire section amended, p. 569, § 1, effective July 1. L. 79: Entire section amended, p. 316, § 3, effective July 1. L. 82: Entire section amended, p. 227, § 3, effective January 1, 1983. L. 2018: Entire section amended, (SB 18-098), ch. 99, p. 772, § 2, effective August 8.
Cross references: (1) For rate of interest authorized upon a judgment for damages, see § 5-12-102; for general provisions on interest, see article 12 of title 5.
(2) For the legislative declaration in SB 18-098, see section 1 of chapter 99, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.
Notes of Decisions
Thompson v. Catlin Ins. Co., 2018 CO 95 (Colo. 2018).
· cites it 13× “Sperry dealt with section 13-21-101, C.R.S. (2018), while Clark construed that statute's predecessor, chapter 50, section 5 C.”
Rodriguez v. Schutt, 914 P.2d 921 (Colo. 1996).
· cites it 81× “The trial court calculated interest at the nine-percent annual interest rate prescribed by section 13-21-101, 6A C.R.S. (1987). Schutt appealed.”
USAA v. Parker, 200 P.3d 350 (Colo. 2009).
· cites it 63× “By contrast, when section 13-21-101, C.R.S. (2008), refers to "an action brought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by any person," it just as clearly intends the former.”
Sperry v. Field, 205 P.3d 365 (Colo. 2009).
· cites it 67× “Introduction In this action to recover damages for personal injuries, Petitioner Brenda Sperry appeals the court of appeals’ decision holding that section 13-21-101, C.R.S. (2008), entitles a judgment creditor to post-judgment interest from the date judgment is entered until the…”
Seaward Const. Co., Inc. v. Bradley, 817 P.2d 971 (Colo. 1991).
· cites it 61× “753, 756 (1986) (“CRS § 13-21-101 ... has been amended several times, resulting in language which overlaps and, in some eases, appears contradictory.”
Morris v. Goodwin, 185 P.3d 777 (Colo. 2008).
· cites it 61× “This case presents a question of statutory interpretation as to how a trial court should calculate interest on a personal injury damages award under section 13-21-101, C.R.S. (2007), when the damages awarded by the jury exceeds the Colorado Health Care Availability Act's ("the…”
Sperry v. Field, 186 P.3d 133 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 69× “The parties also agree that, pursuant to section 13-21-101, C.R.S. 2007, Sperry was entitled to postjudgment interest calculated from the date the judgment was entered to the date of satisfaction at the market-determined rate.”
Scholz v. Metro. Pathologists, P.C., 851 P.2d 901 (Colo. 1993).
· cites it 18× “1970) (section 13-21-101 "imparts no discretion to the trial court; it must be applied to any judgment resulting from an action for personal injuries") (emphasis added); Huffman v.”
Francis Ex Rel. Goodridge v. Dahl, 107 P.3d 1171 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 8× “Because the issue may arise again after a new trial on damages, we also address plaintiffs contention that the trial court erred in its calculation of interest on the judgment, pursuant to § 13-21-101(1), C.R.S.2004. We agree. Section 13-21-101(1), provides, in pertinent part:…”
Rodriguez v. Schutt, 896 P.2d 881 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).
· cites it 42× “Conversely, if the judgment is affirmed, landlord seeks a $5,000 offset from the judgment for a payment made by his insurer to husband prior to trial.”
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Starke, 797 P.2d 14 (Colo. 1990).
· cites it 16× “§ 13-21-101, 6A C.R.S. (1987). As the Colorado Court of Appeals has correctly recognized, such prejudgment interest is an element of compensatory damages in actions for personal injuries, awarded to compensate the plaintiff for the time value of the award eventually obtained…”
Schuessler v. Wolter, 310 P.3d 151 (Colo. Ct. App. 2012).
· cites it 6× “Law 197 Pursuant to section 13-21-101, a party must request interest from either the date suit is filed or the date an action acerues.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-101(1) — 59 cases
USAA v. Parker, 200 P.3d 350 (Colo. 2009).
“By contrast, when section 13-21-101, C.R.S. (2008), refers to "an action brought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by any person," it just as clearly intends the former.”
Sperry v. Field, 205 P.3d 365 (Colo. 2009).
“Introduction In this action to recover damages for personal injuries, Petitioner Brenda Sperry appeals the court of appeals’ decision holding that section 13-21-101, C.R.S. (2008), entitles a judgment creditor to post-judgment interest from the date judgment is entered until the…”
Francis Ex Rel. Goodridge v. Dahl, 107 P.3d 1171 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).
“Because the issue may arise again after a new trial on damages, we also address plaintiffs contention that the trial court erred in its calculation of interest on the judgment, pursuant to § 13-21-101(1), C.R.S.2004. We agree. Section 13-21-101(1), provides, in pertinent part:…”
Scholz v. Metro. Pathologists, P.C., 851 P.2d 901 (Colo. 1993).
“1970) (section 13-21-101 "imparts no discretion to the trial court; it must be applied to any judgment resulting from an action for personal injuries") (emphasis added); Huffman v.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-101(1)(a) — 2 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-101(2) — 2 cases
Seaward Const. Co., Inc. v. Bradley, 817 P.2d 971 (Colo. 1991).
“753, 756 (1986) (“CRS § 13-21-101 ... has been amended several times, resulting in language which overlaps and, in some eases, appears contradictory.”
Sperry v. Field, 186 P.3d 133 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008).
“The parties also agree that, pursuant to section 13-21-101, C.R.S. 2007, Sperry was entitled to postjudgment interest calculated from the date the judgment was entered to the date of satisfaction at the market-determined rate.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-101(2)(a) — 3 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-101(2)(b) — 3 cases
Sperry v. Field, 186 P.3d 133 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008).
“The parties also agree that, pursuant to section 13-21-101, C.R.S. 2007, Sperry was entitled to postjudgment interest calculated from the date the judgment was entered to the date of satisfaction at the market-determined rate.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-101(3) — 12 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-101(4) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-101(8) — 1 case
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