(1) On the motion of a person showing an agreement to arbitrate and alleging another person's refusal to arbitrate pursuant to the agreement:
(a) If the refusing party does not appear or does not oppose the motion, the court shall order the parties to arbitrate; and
(b) If the refusing party opposes the motion, the court shall proceed summarily to decide the issue and order the parties to arbitrate unless it finds that there is no enforceable agreement to arbitrate.
(2) On the motion of a person alleging that an arbitration proceeding has been initiated or threatened but that there is not an agreement to arbitrate, the court shall proceed summarily to decide the issue. If the court finds that there is an enforceable agreement to arbitrate, it shall order the parties to arbitrate.
(3) If the court finds that there is no enforceable agreement, it may not invoke the provisions of subsection (1) or (2) of this section to order the parties to arbitrate.
(4) The court may not refuse to order arbitration because the claim subject to arbitration lacks merit or because one or more grounds for the claim have not been established.
(5) If a proceeding involving a claim referable to arbitration under an alleged agreement to arbitrate is pending in court, a motion made under this section shall be filed with that court. Otherwise, a motion made under this section may be filed in any court pursuant to section 13-22- 227.
(6) If a party files a motion with the court to order arbitration, the court on just terms shall stay any judicial proceeding that involves a claim alleged to be subject to the arbitration until the ordering court renders a final decision under this section.
(7) If the court orders arbitration, the court on just terms shall stay any judicial proceeding that involves a claim subject to the arbitration. If a claim subject to the arbitration is severable, the court may limit the stay to that claim.
Source: L. 2004: Entire part R&RE, p. 1720, § 1, effective August 4.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 13-22-204 as it existed prior to 2004.
Notes of Decisions
JA Walker Co. v. Cambria Corp., 159 P.3d 126 (Colo. 2007).
· cites it 23× “Section 13-22-207(@2), C.R.S. (2006) provides that: On the motion of a person alleging that an arbitration proceeding has been initiated or threatened but that there is mot an agreement to arbitrate, the court shall proceed summarily to decide the issue.”
Lane v. Urgitus, 145 P.3d 672 (Colo. 2006).
· cites it 14× “[2] The district court entered an *675 order for binding arbitration pursuant to section 13-22-207, C.R.S. (2005), of Colorado's Uniform Arbitration Act.”
Cork v. Sentry Ins., 194 P.3d 422 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 4× “; see § 13-22-207(1), C.R.S.2007 (An order compelling arbitration may be sought "On the motion of a person showing an agreement to arbitrate").”
Ingold v. AIMCO/Bluffs, L.L.C. Apts., 159 P.3d 116 (Colo. 2007).
· cites it 2× “See § 13-22-207(7), C.R.S. (2006) ("If the court orders arbitration, the court on just terms shall stay any judicial proceeding that involves a claim subject to the arbitration.”
Kutch v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 960 P.2d 93 (Colo. 1998).
· cites it 4× “nted as a neutral or corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party; (III) The arbitrators exceeded their powers; (IV) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or refused to hear evidence…”
Judd Constr. Co. v. Evans Jt. Venture, 642 P.2d 922 (Colo. 1982).
· cites it 2× “appointed as a neutral or corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party; (III) The arbitrators exceeded their powers; (IV) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or refused to hear…”
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cabs, Inc., 751 P.2d 61 (Colo. 1988).
· cites it 2× “The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefore or refusing to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of section 13-22-207, as to prejudice substantially the rights…”
Linzy v. Conifer Care Communities, 2020 COA 88, 469 P.3d 537.
· cites it 2× “§ 13-22-207(3), C.R.S. 2019. ¶ 23 “The party seeking to stay proceedings in a judicial forum and to compel arbitration has the burden of establishing that the matter is subject to arbitration.”
Est. of Grimm v. Evans, 251 P.3d 574 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010).
· cites it 2× “§ 13-22-207(1)(b), CRS. 2009. IV. Attorney Fees on Appeal Because neither party's position was substantially frivolous, groundless, or vexatious, we decline to award attorney fees under seetion 1317-102, C.”
Est. of Guido v. Exempla, Inc., 2012 COA 48, 292 P.3d 996.
· cites it 2× “The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefore or refusing to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of section 13-22-207, as to prejudice substantially the rights…”
Shams v. Howard, 165 P.3d 876 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
“See § 13-22-207(7), C.R.8.2006. We do not hereby determine that plaintiffs have a viable warranty claim, despite lapse of the one-year period during which the alleged defects were latent; that all plaintiffs' tort claims are necessarily also warranty claims; or that lack of any…”
Kutch v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 944 P.2d 623 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).
· cites it 2× “appointed as a neutral or corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party; (III) The arbitrators exceeded their powers; (IV) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown therefor or refused to hear…”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-22-207(1): 4 cases
Lane v. Urgitus, 145 P.3d 672 (Colo. 2006).
“[2] The district court entered an *675 order for binding arbitration pursuant to section 13-22-207, C.R.S. (2005), of Colorado's Uniform Arbitration Act.”
Cork v. Sentry Ins., 194 P.3d 422 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008).
“; see § 13-22-207(1), C.R.S.2007 (An order compelling arbitration may be sought "On the motion of a person showing an agreement to arbitrate").”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-22-207(1)(b): 2 cases
JA Walker Co. v. Cambria Corp., 159 P.3d 126 (Colo. 2007).
“Section 13-22-207(@2), C.R.S. (2006) provides that: On the motion of a person alleging that an arbitration proceeding has been initiated or threatened but that there is mot an agreement to arbitrate, the court shall proceed summarily to decide the issue.”
Est. of Grimm v. Evans, 251 P.3d 574 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010).
“§ 13-22-207(1)(b), CRS. 2009. IV. Attorney Fees on Appeal Because neither party's position was substantially frivolous, groundless, or vexatious, we decline to award attorney fees under seetion 1317-102, C.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-22-207(2): 3 cases
JA Walker Co. v. Cambria Corp., 159 P.3d 126 (Colo. 2007).
“Section 13-22-207(@2), C.R.S. (2006) provides that: On the motion of a person alleging that an arbitration proceeding has been initiated or threatened but that there is mot an agreement to arbitrate, the court shall proceed summarily to decide the issue.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-22-207(3): 1 case
Linzy v. Conifer Care Communities, 2020 COA 88, 469 P.3d 537.
“§ 13-22-207(3), C.R.S. 2019. ¶ 23 “The party seeking to stay proceedings in a judicial forum and to compel arbitration has the burden of establishing that the matter is subject to arbitration.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-22-207(6): 1 case
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-22-207(7): 4 cases
Lane v. Urgitus, 145 P.3d 672 (Colo. 2006).
“[2] The district court entered an *675 order for binding arbitration pursuant to section 13-22-207, C.R.S. (2005), of Colorado's Uniform Arbitration Act.”
Ingold v. AIMCO/Bluffs, L.L.C. Apts., 159 P.3d 116 (Colo. 2007).
“See § 13-22-207(7), C.R.S. (2006) ("If the court orders arbitration, the court on just terms shall stay any judicial proceeding that involves a claim subject to the arbitration.”
Shams v. Howard, 165 P.3d 876 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
“See § 13-22-207(7), C.R.8.2006. We do not hereby determine that plaintiffs have a viable warranty claim, despite lapse of the one-year period during which the alleged defects were latent; that all plaintiffs' tort claims are necessarily also warranty claims; or that lack of any…”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-22-207(8): 1 case
Cork v. Sentry Ins., 194 P.3d 422 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008).
“; see § 13-22-207(1), C.R.S.2007 (An order compelling arbitration may be sought "On the motion of a person showing an agreement to arbitrate").”
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