Colorado Revised Statutes

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-40-104 (2026)

Unlawful detention defined - definitions

✓ current as of July 2026
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(1) A person has committed an unlawful detention of real property in the following cases:

(a) When entry is made, without right or title, into any vacant or unoccupied lands or tenements;

(b) When entry is made, wrongfully, into any public lands, tenements, mining claims, or other possessions which are claimed or held by a person who may have located, entered, or settled upon the same in conformity with the laws, rules, and regulations of the United States, or of this state, in relation thereto;

(c) When any lessee or tenant at will, or at sufferance, or for any period of time, of any nonresidential real property or residential premises described in section 38-12-1302 (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(d), (1)(e), or (1)(f), including a specific or undivided portion of a building, holds over and continues in possession of the nonresidential real property or residential premises described in section 38-12-1302 (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(d), (1)(e), or (1)(f), or any portion thereof, after the expiration of the term for which the nonresidential real property or residential premises described in section 38-12-1302 (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(d), (1)(e), or (1)(f) was leased or after the tenancy has been terminated by either party;

(d) When such tenant or lessee holds over without permission of the tenant's or lessee's landlord after any default in the payment of rent pursuant to the agreement under which the tenant or lessee holds, and, ten days' notice in writing has been duly served upon the tenant or lessee holding over, requiring in the alternative the payment of the rent or the possession of the premises; except that, for a nonresidential agreement or an employer-provided housing agreement, three days' notice is required pursuant to this section, and for an exempt residential agreement, five days' notice is required pursuant to this section. No such agreement shall contain a waiver by the tenant of the notice requirement of this subsection (1)(d). It is not necessary, in order to work a forfeiture of such agreement for nonpayment of rent, to make a demand for such rent on the day on which the same becomes due; but a failure to pay such rent upon demand, when made, works a forfeiture. (d.5) When such tenant or lessee holds over, without the permission of the landlord, contrary to any condition or covenant the violation of which is defined as a substantial violation in section 13-40-107.5, and notice in writing has been duly served upon such tenant or lessee in accordance with section 13-40-107.5;

(e) When a tenant or lessee holds over without permission, contrary to any material condition or covenant of the agreement under which the tenant or lessee holds, and ten days' notice in writing has been duly served upon the tenant or lessee requiring either compliance with the condition or covenant or the delivery of the possession of the premises; except that, for a nonresidential agreement or an employer-provided housing agreement, three days' notice is required, and for an exempt residential agreement, five days' notice is required; (e.5) (I) When a tenant or lessee has previously been served with the notice described in paragraph (e) of this subsection (1) requiring compliance with a condition or covenant of the agreement, and subsequent to that notice holds over, without permission of the tenant or lessee's landlord, contrary to the same condition or covenant.

(II) A tenancy pursuant to a residential agreement may be terminated at any time pursuant to this subsection (1)(e.5) on the basis of a subsequent violation of the same condition or covenant of the agreement. The termination of a residential tenancy is effective ten days after service of written notice to terminate tenancy. Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection (1)(e.5)(II), a tenancy pursuant to a nonresidential agreement, an exempt residential agreement, or an employer-provided housing agreement may be terminated at any time pursuant to this subsection (1)(e.5) on the basis of a subsequent violation. The termination of a nonresidential tenancy or an employer-provided housing tenancy is effective three days after service of written notice to terminate tenancy, and the termination of a tenancy pursuant to an exempt residential agreement is effective five days after service of written notice to terminate tenancy. (e.8) When a tenant holds over and maintains possession of a residential premises after the landlord has properly initiated a no-fault eviction by satisfying the notice requirements and other requirements associated with the no-fault eviction, as described in section 38-12-1303 (3);

(f) When the property has been duly sold under any power of sale, contained in any mortgage or trust deed that was executed by such person, or any person under whom such person claims by title subsequent to date of the recording of such mortgage or trust deed, and the title under such sale has been duly perfected and the purchaser at such sale, or his or her assigns, has duly demanded the possession thereof;

(g) When the property has been duly sold under the judgment or decree of any court of competent jurisdiction and the party or privies to such judgment or decree, after the expiration of the time of redemption when redemption is allowed by law, refuse or neglect to surrender possession thereof after demand therefor has been duly made by the purchaser at such sale, or his or her assigns;

(h) When an heir or devisee continues in possession of any premises sold and conveyed by any personal representative with authority to sell, after demand therefor is duly made;

(i) When a vendee having obtained possession under an agreement to purchase lands or tenements, and having failed to comply with his agreement, withholds possession thereof from his vendor, or assigns, after demand therefor is duly made.

(j) (I) When a tenant or lessee holds over without permission of the landlord after the tenant or lessee has engaged in conduct that is disturbing others or causing a nuisance, which conduct interferes with the quiet enjoyment of the landlord, if the landlord lives in the same or an immediately adjacent property, or of others who reside in an immediately adjacent property, or of other tenants or occupants of the same property, or the tenant or lessee by reason of negligence damaged the housing accommodation, and ten days' notice in writing has been duly served upon the tenant or lessee, which notice contains a description of the specific conduct that disturbed others or caused a nuisance, requiring in the alternative cessation of the conduct that is disturbing others or causing a nuisance that interferes with the quiet enjoyment of the landlord, if the landlord lives in the same or immediately adjacent property, or other tenants or occupants of the same property, or maliciously or by reason of negligence damaged the housing accommodation or possession of the premises so held; except that, for a nonresidential agreement or an employer-provided housing agreement, three days' notice is required pursuant to this subsection (1)(j), and for an exempt residential agreement, five days' notice is required pursuant to this section.

(II) The lawful exercise by a tenant of any rights pursuant to any law or rule relating to occupancy of a property, including this subsection (1)(j), shall not be deemed to interfere with the quiet enjoyment of the landlord or other tenants or other ground for eviction pursuant to this subsection (1)(j).

(III) It shall not constitute a nuisance or disturbance for purposes of this subsection (1)(j) if a victim of domestic violence is being accused of causing a disturbance or nuisance as a direct result of being a victim of domestic violence. This exception applies only to victims of domestic violence and not to perpetrators. (2) and (3) Repealed.

(4) (a) It shall not constitute an unlawful detention of real property as described in paragraph (d.5), (e), or (e.5) of subsection (1) of this section if the tenant or lessee is the victim of domestic violence, as that term is defined in section 18-6-800.3, C.R.S., or of domestic abuse, as that term is defined in section 13-14-101 (2), which domestic violence or domestic abuse was the cause of or resulted in the alleged unlawful detention and which domestic violence or domestic abuse has been documented by the following:

(I) A police report; or

(II) A valid civil or emergency protection order.

(b) A person is not guilty of an unlawful detention of real property pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection (4) if the alleged violation of the rental or lease agreement is a result of domestic violence or domestic abuse against the tenant or lessee.

(c) A rental, lease, or other such agreement shall not contain a waiver by the tenant or lessee of the protections provided in this subsection (4).

(d) Nothing in this subsection (4) shall prevent the landlord from seeking judgment for possession against the tenant or lessee of the premises who perpetuated the violence or abuse that was the cause of or resulted in the alleged unlawful detention.

(5) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:

(a) "Employer-provided housing agreement" means a residential tenancy agreement between an employee and an employer when the employer or an affiliate of the employer acts as a landlord.

(b) "Exempt residential agreement" means a residential agreement leasing a single family home by a landlord who owns five or fewer single family rental homes and who provides notice in the agreement that a ten-day notice period required pursuant to this section does not apply to the tenancy entered into pursuant to the agreement.

Source: L. 1885: p. 224, § 3. R.S. 08: § 2603. C.L. § 6369. CSA: C. 70, § 4. CRS 53: § 58-1-4. C.R.S. 1963: § 58-1-4. L. 79: (1)(h) amended, p. 648, § 4, effective July 1. L. 83: (1)(d) amended, p. 631, § 1, effective July 1. L. 86: (1)(c), (1)(f), and (1)(g) amended and (2) added, p. 434, § 7, effective April 18. L. 87: (1)(e) amended, p. 565, § 1, effective March 13; (2)(a)(I), (2)(a)(II), and (2)(b) amended and (3) added, p. 1356, § 6, effective July 1. L. 94: (1)(d.5) added, p. 1467, § 1, effective May 31. L. 95: (1)(e) amended and (1)(e.5) added, p. 271, § 1, effective July 1. L. 98: (1)(c), (1)(f), and (1)(g) amended, p. 819, § 15, effective August 5. L. 2005: (4) added, p. 401, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2019: (1)(d), (1)(e), and (1)(e.5)(II) amended and (5) added, (HB 19-1118), ch. 230, p. 2316, § 1, effective May 20. L. 2024: IP(1), (1)(c), (1)(e), and (1)(e.5)(II) amended and (1)(e.8) and (1)(j) added, (HB 24-1098), ch. 113, p. 360, § 3, effective April 19.

Editor's note: Subsection (2)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (2), effective January 31, 1989. (See L. 87, p. 1356.) Subsection (3)(b) provided for the repeal of subsection (3), effective July 1, 1991. (See L. 87, p. 1356.)

Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 24-1098, see section 1 of chapter 113, Session Laws of Colorado 2024.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 32 cases (7 in the last 5 years), 1975–2026 · leading case: Francam Bldg. Corp. v. Fail, 646 P.2d 345 (Colo. 1982).
Francam Bldg. Corp. v. Fail, 646 P.2d 345 (Colo. 1982). · cites it 88× “The apparent purpose of our Forcible Entry and Detainer Statute and, more particularly, section 13-40-104, C.R.S. 1973, is to provide the landlord with a summary procedure for recovering possession of his property.”
Duhon v. Nelson, 126 P.3d 262 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 5× “According to plaintiffs, at issue are whether § 13-40-104 was amended by the Mobile Home Park Act and whether a lease for a space in a mobile home park can ever expire.”
Butler v. Farner, 704 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1985). · cites it 8× “However, we note that, as in landlord-tenant disputes, the facts involved in land sale contract disputes will be equally available to both purchaser and vendor.”
Duran v. Hous. Auth. of Cnty. of Denver, 761 P.2d 180 (Colo. 1988). · cites it 8× “waived its right to terminate Duran's lease by serving a demand for past and future rent on her during the pendency of an unlawful detainer action; and (2) Whether Duran's purported tenders of rent during the pendency of the unlawful detainer action are a defense to that action.”
Miles v. Fleming, 214 P.3d 1054 (Colo. 2009). · cites it 2× “§ 13-40-104(1)(e), C.R.S. (2008). In addition to expressly included conditions, it is an implied condition of every lease of real property in this state that neither a tenant nor any of his guests or invitees shall commit any of a number of statutorily enumerated dangerous or…”
Boehme v. United States Postal Serv., 343 F.3d 1260 (10th Cir. 2003). · cites it 3× “Consequently, the dispositive issue in this case is whether plaintiffs’ unlawful detention action under Colo.Rev. Stat. § 13-40-104(l)(d) must be treated as a state-law tort claim, in which case, under § 409(c), the FTCA’s administrative exhaustion requirement would apply, or,…”
Magliocco v. Olson, 762 P.2d 681 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987). · cites it 5× “Landlord notified tenant that he had three days in which either to pay up or deliver possession of the premises pursuant to § 13-40-104, C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A). This notice was served by posting the property on July 2, 1982, and by sending it certified mail to tenant.”
In Re Gagliardi, 290 B.R. 808 (Bankr.D. Colo. 2003). · cites it 2× “C.R.S. § 13-40-104©. 15 . C.R.S. § 13-40-106.”
Woznicki v. Musick, 119 P.3d 567 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 3× “Unlawful Detainer W/J Ranch and Musick contend § 13-40-104(1)(c), C.R.S.2004, which defines unlawful detention as occurring when a tenant holds over, does not apply as a matter of law.”
W. Cities Broad., Inc. v. Schueller, 830 P.2d 1074 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992). “We have construed the notice requirement of § 13-40-104(l)(d) and (e), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.”
Martinez v. Steinbaum, 623 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1981). · cites it 3× “See section 13-40-104(d), C.R.S.1973. No payment or other response was forthcoming and on December 14 the landlord filed an action in county court under section 13^40-109, C.”
Tumbarello v. Byers, 543 P.2d 1278 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975). · cites it 6× “Prior to the commencement of this action, plaintiff sent a "Demand for Possession of Premises" to defendant which, as pertinent to the issues at trial, stated: "You are hereby notified pursuant to [the unlawful detainer statute, now § 13-40-104, C.R.S.1973] that . . . you shall…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-40-104(1) — 2 cases
Butler v. Farner, 704 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1985). “However, we note that, as in landlord-tenant disputes, the facts involved in land sale contract disputes will be equally available to both purchaser and vendor.”
Paraguay Place-View Trust v. Gray, 981 P.2d 681 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-40-104(1)(c) — 2 cases
Woznicki v. Musick, 119 P.3d 567 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005). “Unlawful Detainer W/J Ranch and Musick contend § 13-40-104(1)(c), C.R.S.2004, which defines unlawful detention as occurring when a tenant holds over, does not apply as a matter of law.”
Francam Bldg. Corp. v. Fail, 646 P.2d 345 (Colo. 1982). “The apparent purpose of our Forcible Entry and Detainer Statute and, more particularly, section 13-40-104, C.R.S. 1973, is to provide the landlord with a summary procedure for recovering possession of his property.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-40-104(1)(d) — 6 cases
Francam Bldg. Corp. v. Fail, 646 P.2d 345 (Colo. 1982). “The apparent purpose of our Forcible Entry and Detainer Statute and, more particularly, section 13-40-104, C.R.S. 1973, is to provide the landlord with a summary procedure for recovering possession of his property.”
Duran v. Hous. Auth. of Cnty. of Denver, 761 P.2d 180 (Colo. 1988). “waived its right to terminate Duran's lease by serving a demand for past and future rent on her during the pendency of an unlawful detainer action; and (2) Whether Duran's purported tenders of rent during the pendency of the unlawful detainer action are a defense to that action.”
Tumbarello v. Byers, 543 P.2d 1278 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975). “Prior to the commencement of this action, plaintiff sent a "Demand for Possession of Premises" to defendant which, as pertinent to the issues at trial, stated: "You are hereby notified pursuant to [the unlawful detainer statute, now § 13-40-104, C.R.S.1973] that . . . you shall…”
Woodruff v. Tschetter (Colo. Ct. App. 2026).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-40-104(1)(e) — 2 cases
Miles v. Fleming, 214 P.3d 1054 (Colo. 2009). “§ 13-40-104(1)(e), C.R.S. (2008). In addition to expressly included conditions, it is an implied condition of every lease of real property in this state that neither a tenant nor any of his guests or invitees shall commit any of a number of statutorily enumerated dangerous or…”
Francam Bldg. Corp. v. Fail, 646 P.2d 345 (Colo. 1982). “The apparent purpose of our Forcible Entry and Detainer Statute and, more particularly, section 13-40-104, C.R.S. 1973, is to provide the landlord with a summary procedure for recovering possession of his property.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-40-104(1)(f) — 2 cases
Surface v. Ciardelli (D. Colo. 2023).
Emery v. Khumo Developments (Colo. Ct. App. 2026).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-40-104(1)(g) — 1 case
Welcome to Realty v. Wilson, 2024 COA 122 (Colo. Ct. App. 2024).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-40-104(1)(i) — 1 case
Paraguay Place-View Trust v. Gray, 981 P.2d 681 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-40-104(2) — 1 case
Fed. Land Bank of Wichita v. Needham, 759 P.2d 799 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-40-104(c) — 1 case
July Bldg. Corp. v. Heathrow & Co., 679 P.2d 1120 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-40-104(d) — 2 cases
Martinez v. Steinbaum, 623 P.2d 49 (Colo. 1981). “See section 13-40-104(d), C.R.S.1973. No payment or other response was forthcoming and on December 14 the landlord filed an action in county court under section 13^40-109, C.”
Christensen v. Hoover, 643 P.2d 525 (Colo. 1982).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-40-104(l)(c) — 2 cases
Duhon v. Nelson, 126 P.3d 262 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005). “According to plaintiffs, at issue are whether § 13-40-104 was amended by the Mobile Home Park Act and whether a lease for a space in a mobile home park can ever expire.”
Francam Bldg. Corp. v. Fail, 646 P.2d 345 (Colo. 1982). “The apparent purpose of our Forcible Entry and Detainer Statute and, more particularly, section 13-40-104, C.R.S. 1973, is to provide the landlord with a summary procedure for recovering possession of his property.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-40-104(l)(d) — 7 cases
Francam Bldg. Corp. v. Fail, 646 P.2d 345 (Colo. 1982). “The apparent purpose of our Forcible Entry and Detainer Statute and, more particularly, section 13-40-104, C.R.S. 1973, is to provide the landlord with a summary procedure for recovering possession of his property.”
Boehme v. United States Postal Serv., 343 F.3d 1260 (10th Cir. 2003). “Consequently, the dispositive issue in this case is whether plaintiffs’ unlawful detention action under Colo.Rev. Stat. § 13-40-104(l)(d) must be treated as a state-law tort claim, in which case, under § 409(c), the FTCA’s administrative exhaustion requirement would apply, or,…”
Duran v. Hous. Auth. of Cnty. of Denver, 761 P.2d 180 (Colo. 1988). “waived its right to terminate Duran's lease by serving a demand for past and future rent on her during the pendency of an unlawful detainer action; and (2) Whether Duran's purported tenders of rent during the pendency of the unlawful detainer action are a defense to that action.”
W. Cities Broad., Inc. v. Schueller, 830 P.2d 1074 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992). “We have construed the notice requirement of § 13-40-104(l)(d) and (e), C.R.S. (1987 Repl.”
Magliocco v. Olson, 762 P.2d 681 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987). “Landlord notified tenant that he had three days in which either to pay up or deliver possession of the premises pursuant to § 13-40-104, C.R.S. (1987 Repl.Vol. 6A). This notice was served by posting the property on July 2, 1982, and by sending it certified mail to tenant.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-40-104(l)(e) — 1 case
Francam Bldg. Corp. v. Fail, 646 P.2d 345 (Colo. 1982). “The apparent purpose of our Forcible Entry and Detainer Statute and, more particularly, section 13-40-104, C.R.S. 1973, is to provide the landlord with a summary procedure for recovering possession of his property.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-40-104(l)(f) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-40-104(l)(i) — 2 cases
Butler v. Farner, 704 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1985). “However, we note that, as in landlord-tenant disputes, the facts involved in land sale contract disputes will be equally available to both purchaser and vendor.”
Wu v. Good, 720 P.2d 1005 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.