(1) Upon the return of the writ of habeas corpus, a day shall be set for the hearing of the cause of imprisonment or detainer not exceeding five days thereafter, unless the prisoner requests a longer time. The prisoner may deny any of the material facts set forth in the return or may allege any fact to show either that the imprisonment or detention is unlawful or that he is then entitled to his discharge, which allegations or denials shall be made on oath. The return may be amended by leave of the court, before or after the same is filed as also may all suggestions made against it, that thereby all material facts may be ascertained. The court shall proceed in a summary way to settle the facts by hearing the testimony and arguments of all parties interested civilly, if there are any, as well as of the prisoner and the person who holds him in custody and shall dispose of the prisoner as the case may require.
(2) If it appears that the prisoner is in custody by virtue of process from any court legally constituted, he can be discharged only for some of the following causes:
(a) Where the court has exceeded the limit of its jurisdiction, either as to the matter, place, sum, or person;
(b) Where, though the original imprisonment was lawful, yet by some act, omission, or event which has subsequently taken place, the party has become entitled to his discharge;
(c) Where the process is defective in some substantial form required by law;
(d) Where the process, though in proper form, has been issued in a case or under circumstances where the law does not allow process or orders for imprisonment or arrest to issue;
(e) Where, although in proper form, the process has been issued or executed by a person either unauthorized to issue or execute the same or where the person having the custody of the prisoner under such process is not the person empowered by law to detain him;
(f) Where the process appears to have been obtained by false pretense or bribery;
(g) Where there is no general law, nor any judgment, order, or decree of a court to authorize the process, if in a civil suit, nor any conviction if in a criminal proceeding.
(3) No court on the return of a habeas corpus shall inquire into the legality or justice of a judgment or decree of a court legally constituted, in any other manner. In all cases where the imprisonment is for a criminal or supposed criminal matter, if it appears to the court that there is sufficient legal cause for the commitment of the prisoner although such commitment may have been informally made, or without due authority, or the process may have been executed by a person not authorized, the court shall make a new commitment, in proper form and directed to the proper officer, or admit the party to bail if the case is bailable.
Source: R.S. p. 353, § 3. G.L. § 1325. G.S. § 1611. R.S. 08: § 2919. C.L. § 6488. CSA: C. 77, § 3. CRS 53: § 65-1-3. C.R.S. 1963: § 65-1-3.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
15
cases, 1982–2002 · leading case:
Marshall v. Kort, 690 P.2d 219 (Colo. 1984).
Marshall v. Kort, 690 P.2d 219 (Colo. 1984).
· cites it 20× “) Section 13-45-103(1), 6 C.R.S. (1978) sets out the procedure for the court to follow upon the return of the writ of habeas corpus, concluding that "[t]he court shall proceed in a summary way to settle the facts by hearing the testimony and arguments of all parties interested…”
Moody v. Corsentino, 843 P.2d 1355 (Colo. 1993).
· cites it 6× “§ 13-45-103(1); Cardiel, 833 P.2d at 752 .”
White v. Rickets, 684 P.2d 239 (Colo. 1984).
· cites it 9× “Section 13-45-103(2) permits the discharge of incarcerated prisoners upon a showing of one or more of the following causes: (a) Where the court has exceeded the limit of its jurisdiction, either as to the matter, place, sum, or person; (b) Where, though the original imprisonment…”
Naranjo v. Johnson, 770 P.2d 784 (Colo. 1989).
· cites it 2× “In this case the petitioner did not seek relief pursuant to Crim.”
Beverly v. Davis, 648 P.2d 621 (Colo. 1982).
· cites it 6× “Under the facts of this *623 case, we therefore hold that it was incumbent upon the appellant to make some showing in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus or at the hearing that he was not in fact the person sought by Texas authorities.”
Cardiel v. Brittian, 833 P.2d 748 (Colo. 1992).
· cites it 3× “§ 13-45-103(1); Calyer, 736 P.2d at 1207 .”
White v. MacFarlane, 713 P.2d 366 (Colo. 1986).
· cites it 4× “Section 13-45-103, which governs habeas corpus hearings, provides in part: (2) If it appears that the prisoner is in custody by virtue of process from any court legally constituted, he can be discharged only for some of the following causes: [[Image here]] *368 (b) Where, though…”
Andretti v. Johnson, 779 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1989).
· cites it 3× “Subsections 13-45-103(2) and (3), 6A C.R.S. (1987), specify the limited circumstances under which we may grant habeas corpus relief.”
Horton v. Suthers, 43 P.3d 611 (Colo. 2002).
“The sole issue for resolution in a habeas corpus proceeding is whether the petitioner is being unlawfully detained. See, e.”
People v. Calyer, 736 P.2d 1204 (Colo. 1987).
· cites it 3× “§ 13-45-103(1); see T. Borillo, Colorado Practice, Criminal Practice and Procedure § 1315 (1971).”
Slater v. McKinna, 997 P.2d 1196 (Colo. 2000).
· cites it 4× “§ 13-45-103(2), 5 C.R.S. (1999). Slater argues that section 13-45-103(2)(b) applies in his case because his transfer to Colorado was a subsequent event entitling him to discharge.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-45-103(1): 7 cases
Marshall v. Kort, 690 P.2d 219 (Colo. 1984).
“) Section 13-45-103(1), 6 C.R.S. (1978) sets out the procedure for the court to follow upon the return of the writ of habeas corpus, concluding that "[t]he court shall proceed in a summary way to settle the facts by hearing the testimony and arguments of all parties interested…”
Beverly v. Davis, 648 P.2d 621 (Colo. 1982).
“Under the facts of this *623 case, we therefore hold that it was incumbent upon the appellant to make some showing in his petition for a writ of habeas corpus or at the hearing that he was not in fact the person sought by Texas authorities.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-45-103(2): 5 cases
White v. Rickets, 684 P.2d 239 (Colo. 1984).
“Section 13-45-103(2) permits the discharge of incarcerated prisoners upon a showing of one or more of the following causes: (a) Where the court has exceeded the limit of its jurisdiction, either as to the matter, place, sum, or person; (b) Where, though the original imprisonment…”
Andretti v. Johnson, 779 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1989).
“Subsections 13-45-103(2) and (3), 6A C.R.S. (1987), specify the limited circumstances under which we may grant habeas corpus relief.”
Slater v. McKinna, 997 P.2d 1196 (Colo. 2000).
“§ 13-45-103(2), 5 C.R.S. (1999). Slater argues that section 13-45-103(2)(b) applies in his case because his transfer to Colorado was a subsequent event entitling him to discharge.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-45-103(2)(b): 6 cases
Marshall v. Kort, 690 P.2d 219 (Colo. 1984).
“) Section 13-45-103(1), 6 C.R.S. (1978) sets out the procedure for the court to follow upon the return of the writ of habeas corpus, concluding that "[t]he court shall proceed in a summary way to settle the facts by hearing the testimony and arguments of all parties interested…”
White v. Rickets, 684 P.2d 239 (Colo. 1984).
“Section 13-45-103(2) permits the discharge of incarcerated prisoners upon a showing of one or more of the following causes: (a) Where the court has exceeded the limit of its jurisdiction, either as to the matter, place, sum, or person; (b) Where, though the original imprisonment…”
Andretti v. Johnson, 779 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1989).
“Subsections 13-45-103(2) and (3), 6A C.R.S. (1987), specify the limited circumstances under which we may grant habeas corpus relief.”
Slater v. McKinna, 997 P.2d 1196 (Colo. 2000).
“§ 13-45-103(2), 5 C.R.S. (1999). Slater argues that section 13-45-103(2)(b) applies in his case because his transfer to Colorado was a subsequent event entitling him to discharge.”
People v. Calyer, 736 P.2d 1204 (Colo. 1987).
“§ 13-45-103(1); see T. Borillo, Colorado Practice, Criminal Practice and Procedure § 1315 (1971).”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-45-103(3): 1 case
Horton v. Suthers, 43 P.3d 611 (Colo. 2002).
“The sole issue for resolution in a habeas corpus proceeding is whether the petitioner is being unlawfully detained. See, e.”
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