(1) When in any of the statutes of the state of
Colorado a limitation is fixed upon the time within which a right of action, right of redemption,
or any other right may be asserted either affirmatively or by way of defense or an action, suit, or
proceeding based thereon may be brought, commenced, maintained, or prosecuted and the true
owner of said right is a person under disability at the time such right accrues, then:
(a) If such person under disability is represented by a legal representative at the time the
right accrues, or if a legal representative is appointed for such person under disability at any time
after the right accrues and prior to the termination of such disability, the applicable statute of
limitations shall run against such person under disability in the same manner, for the same
period, and with the same effect as it runs against persons not under disability. Such legal
representative, or his successor in trust, in any event shall be allowed not less than two years
after his appointment within which to take action on behalf of such person under disability, even
though the two-year period expires after the expiration of the period fixed by the applicable
statute of limitations.
(b) If the person under disability dies before the termination of his disability and before
the expiration of the period of limitation in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) and the right is
one which survives to the executor or administrator of a decedent, such executor or administrator
shall take action within one year after the death of such person under disability;
(c) If the disability of any person is terminated before the expiration of the period of
limitation in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) and no legal representative has been appointed
for him, such person shall be allowed to take action within the period fixed by the applicable
statute of limitations or within two years after the removal of the disability, whichever period
expires later.
(2) After the expiration of the period fixed in paragraph (a), (b), or (c) of subsection (1)
of this section, neither the person under disability, nor his legal representative, nor anyone for
him shall be permitted or allowed to take action based on any such right.
Source: L. 39: p. 449, § 3. CSA: C. 102, § 30. CRS 53: § 87-3-3. C.R.S. 1963: § 87-2-
3.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
41
cases (
6 in the last 5 years), 1975–2025 · leading case:
v. Worosello, 2019 COA 166 (Colo. Ct. App. 2019).
v. Worosello, 2019 COA 166 (Colo. Ct. App. 2019).
· cites it 34× “We presume the General Assembly was aware of the general tolling provisions of section 13-81-103 when it created the time limits for collaterally 3Notably, Worosello does not argue that this exception applies, nor did he allege in his Crim.”
Broyles v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 695 P.2d 1136 (Colo. 1985).
· cites it 12× “” Section 37-92-301(4), which is applicable here and which relates to the filing of applications for diligence findings on conditional water rights decreed under the Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, 6 contains no such tolling provision.”
Est. of Stevenson Ex Rel. Talovich v. Hollywood Bar & Cafe, Inc., 832 P.2d 718 (Colo. 1992).
· cites it 5× “Section 13-81-103(l)(a) provides in pertinent part that, notwithstanding other applicable statutes of limitations, a legal representative of a person under a disability may file a lawsuit on behalf of the disabled person within two years of his or her appointment as legal…”
Tenney v. Flaxer, 727 P.2d 1079 (Colo. 1986).
· cites it 40× “We disagreed, concluding that if plaintiff Southard were found on remand to be under a disability sufficient to invoke the general tolling provisions of section 13-81-103(1)(a), his claim would not be barred, since that provision also applied to the limitations period for…”
Barnhill v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colorado, 649 P.2d 716 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
· cites it 18× “It was also undisputed that Charlene was mentally incapacitated, and thus disabled, from the date the tort was committed through the commencement of this action. Under such circumstances, we hold that the statutory period stated in § 13-21-204, C.”
Matter of Est. of Daigle, 634 P.2d 71 (Colo. 1981).
· cites it 10× “2d 135 (1979), and the relationship of section 13-81-103 to other sections of Article 81.”
Elgin v. Bartlett, 994 P.2d 411 (Colo. 1999).
· cites it 6× “2 The two-year statute of limitations applicable to negligence of a health care professional is tolled with regard to “a person otherwise under disability as defined in section 13-81-101, in which case the action may be maintained within the time period as provided in section…”
McKinney v. Armco Recreational Prods., Inc., 419 F. Supp. 464 (D. Colo. 1976).
· cites it 11× “Dodrill, supra, our colleague in a well reasoned opinion resolved the seeming conflict in the application of the two tolling provisions by reviewing their legislative history and concluding that the earlier enacted § 13 — 80—116 and § 13-81-103 were both still in force and…”
Pub. Serv. Co. of Colorado v. Barnhill, 690 P.2d 1248 (Colo. 1984).
· cites it 6× “The trial court rejected this argument on the ground that the general disability statute, section 13-81-103, 6 C.R.S. (1973), tolled the provisions of section 13-21-204.”
Squires ex rel. Squires v. Goodwin, 829 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (D. Colo. 2011).
· cites it 3× “1986), held that section 13-81-103(1) was controlling in a case where the putative plaintiff was both a minor and mentally impaired, notwithstanding potentially conflicting language in the medical negligence statute of limitations.”
Sommermeyer v. Price, 603 P.2d 135 (Colo. 1979).
· cites it 6× “1963, 153-7-2 and 3; 2 (2) the trial court correctly refused to instruct the jury that a driver’s negligence may be imputed to the owner-passenger in a suit by the owner-passenger against the driver; and (3) because the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act, section…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-81-103(1) — 8 cases
v. Worosello, 2019 COA 166 (Colo. Ct. App. 2019).
“We presume the General Assembly was aware of the general tolling provisions of section 13-81-103 when it created the time limits for collaterally 3Notably, Worosello does not argue that this exception applies, nor did he allege in his Crim.”
Matter of Est. of Daigle, 634 P.2d 71 (Colo. 1981).
“2d 135 (1979), and the relationship of section 13-81-103 to other sections of Article 81.”
Squires ex rel. Squires v. Goodwin, 829 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (D. Colo. 2011).
“1986), held that section 13-81-103(1) was controlling in a case where the putative plaintiff was both a minor and mentally impaired, notwithstanding potentially conflicting language in the medical negligence statute of limitations.”
Tenney v. Flaxer, 727 P.2d 1079 (Colo. 1986).
“We disagreed, concluding that if plaintiff Southard were found on remand to be under a disability sufficient to invoke the general tolling provisions of section 13-81-103(1)(a), his claim would not be barred, since that provision also applied to the limitations period for…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-81-103(1)(a) — 6 cases
v. Worosello, 2019 COA 166 (Colo. Ct. App. 2019).
“We presume the General Assembly was aware of the general tolling provisions of section 13-81-103 when it created the time limits for collaterally 3Notably, Worosello does not argue that this exception applies, nor did he allege in his Crim.”
Tenney v. Flaxer, 727 P.2d 1079 (Colo. 1986).
“We disagreed, concluding that if plaintiff Southard were found on remand to be under a disability sufficient to invoke the general tolling provisions of section 13-81-103(1)(a), his claim would not be barred, since that provision also applied to the limitations period for…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-81-103(1)(b) — 2 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-81-103(1)(c) — 4 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-81-103(2) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-81-103(l)(a) — 9 cases
Est. of Stevenson Ex Rel. Talovich v. Hollywood Bar & Cafe, Inc., 832 P.2d 718 (Colo. 1992).
“Section 13-81-103(l)(a) provides in pertinent part that, notwithstanding other applicable statutes of limitations, a legal representative of a person under a disability may file a lawsuit on behalf of the disabled person within two years of his or her appointment as legal…”
Tenney v. Flaxer, 727 P.2d 1079 (Colo. 1986).
“We disagreed, concluding that if plaintiff Southard were found on remand to be under a disability sufficient to invoke the general tolling provisions of section 13-81-103(1)(a), his claim would not be barred, since that provision also applied to the limitations period for…”
Elgin v. Bartlett, 994 P.2d 411 (Colo. 1999).
“2 The two-year statute of limitations applicable to negligence of a health care professional is tolled with regard to “a person otherwise under disability as defined in section 13-81-101, in which case the action may be maintained within the time period as provided in section…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-81-103(l)(c) — 5 cases
Matter of Est. of Daigle, 634 P.2d 71 (Colo. 1981).
“2d 135 (1979), and the relationship of section 13-81-103 to other sections of Article 81.”
McKinney v. Armco Recreational Prods., Inc., 419 F. Supp. 464 (D. Colo. 1976).
“Dodrill, supra, our colleague in a well reasoned opinion resolved the seeming conflict in the application of the two tolling provisions by reviewing their legislative history and concluding that the earlier enacted § 13 — 80—116 and § 13-81-103 were both still in force and…”
Elgin v. Bartlett, 994 P.2d 411 (Colo. 1999).
“2 The two-year statute of limitations applicable to negligence of a health care professional is tolled with regard to “a person otherwise under disability as defined in section 13-81-101, in which case the action may be maintained within the time period as provided in section…”
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