Colorado Revised Statutes

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-10-301 (2026)

Evidence of similar transactions - legislative declaration

✓ current as of July 2026

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(1) The general assembly hereby finds and declares that sexual offenses are a matter of grave statewide concern. These frequently occurring offenses are aggressive and assaultive violations of the well-being, privacy, and security of the victims, are severely contrary to common notions of proper behavior between people, and result in serious and long-lasting harm to individuals and society. These offenses often are not reported or are reported long after the offense for many reasons, including: The frequency with which the victims are vulnerable, such as young children who may be related to the perpetrator; the personal indignity, humiliation, and embarrassment involved in the offenses themselves; and the fear of further personal indignity, humiliation, and embarrassment in connection with investigation and prosecution. These offenses usually occur under circumstances in which there are no witnesses except for the accused and the victim, and, because of this and the frequent delays in reporting, there is often no evidence except for the conflicting testimony. Moreover, there is frequently a reluctance on the part of others to believe that the offenses occurred because of the inequality between the victim and the perpetrator, such as between the child victim and the adult accused, or because of the deviant and distasteful nature of the charges. In addition, it is recognized that some sex offenders cannot or will not respond to treatment or otherwise resist the impulses which motivate such conduct and that sex offenders are extremely habituated. As a result, such offenders often commit numerous offenses involving sexual deviance over many years, with the same or different victims, and often, but not necessarily, through similar methods or by common design. The general assembly reaffirms and reemphasizes that, in the prosecution of sexual offenses, including in proving the corpus delicti of such offenses, there is a greater need and propriety for consideration by the fact finder of evidence of other relevant acts of the accused, including any actions, crimes, wrongs, or transactions, whether isolated acts or ongoing actions and whether occurring prior to or after the charged offense. The general assembly finds that such evidence of other sexual acts is typically relevant and highly probative, and it is expected that normally the probative value of such evidence will outweigh any danger of unfair prejudice, even when incidents are remote from one another in time.

(2) This section applies to prosecution for any offense involving unlawful sexual behavior as defined in section 16-22-102 (9), or first degree murder, as defined in section 18-3- 102 (1)(d), C.R.S., in which the underlying felony on which the first degree murder charge is based is the commission or attempted commission of sexual assault, as described in section 18-3- 402, C.R.S., sexual assault in the first or second degree as those offenses were described in sections 18-3-402 and 18-3-403, C.R.S., as they existed prior to July 1, 2000, or the commission of a class 3 felony for sexual assault on a child as defined in section 18-3-405 (2), C.R.S.

(3) The prosecution may introduce evidence of other acts of the defendant to prove the commission of the offense as charged for any purpose other than propensity, including: Refuting defenses, such as consent or recent fabrication; showing a common plan, scheme, design, or modus operandi, regardless of whether identity is at issue and regardless of whether the charged offense has a close nexus as part of a unified transaction to the other act; showing motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, including grooming of a victim, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident; or for any other matter for which it is relevant. The prosecution may use such evidence either as proof in its case in chief or in rebuttal, including in response to evidence of the defendant's good character.

(4) If the prosecution intends to introduce evidence of other acts of the defendant pursuant to this section, the following procedures shall apply:

(a) The prosecution shall advise the trial court and the defendant in advance of trial of the other act or acts and the purpose or purposes for which the evidence is offered.

(b) The trial court shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether the other act occurred and whether the purpose is proper under the broad inclusionary expectations of this section.

(d) The trial court shall, at the time of the reception into evidence of other acts and again in the general charge to the jury, direct the jury as to the limited purpose or purposes for which the evidence is admitted and for which the jury may consider it.

(e) The court in instructing the jury, and the parties when making statements in the presence of the jury, shall use the words "other act or transaction" and at no time shall refer to "other offense", "other crime", or other terms with a similar connotation.

(5) The procedural requirements of this section shall not apply when the other acts are presented to prove that the offense was committed as part of a pattern of sexual abuse under section 18-3-405 (2)(d), C.R.S.

Source: L. 75: Entire part added, p. 614, § 1, effective April 3. L. 85: (1) amended, p. 622, § 4, effective July 1. L. 87: (1) amended, p. 605, § 5, effective July 1. L. 96: Entire section R&RE, p. 1578, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2000: (2) amended, p. 701, § 22, effective July 1. L. 2002: (2) amended, p. 1182, § 7, effective July 1; (4)(c) amended, p. 761, § 10, effective July 1.

Cross references: For the admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, see C.R.E. 404(b).

PART 4 TRIAL PROCEEDINGS 16-10-401. Trials - authority to exclude victim's advocate from sequestration orders. Notwithstanding any sequestration order entered by the court that excludes members of the general public from a jury trial or a trial before the court, the court may allow a victim's advocate to remain in the courtroom during such trial. For the purposes of this section, "victim's advocate" means any person whose regular or volunteer duties include the support of an alleged victim of physical or sexual abuse or assault.

Source: L. 92: Entire part added, p. 322, § 2, effective July 1.

16-10-402. Use of closed-circuit television - child or witness with intellectual and developmental disabilities. (1) (a) When a witness at the time of a trial is a child less than twelve years of age, or is a person who has an intellectual and developmental disability as defined in section 25.5-10-202, C.R.S., the court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own motion, order that the witness's testimony be taken in a room other than the courtroom and be televised by closed-circuit television in the courtroom if:

(I) The testimony is taken during the proceeding;

(II) The judge determines that testimony by the witness in the courtroom and in the presence of the defendant would result in the witness suffering serious emotional distress or trauma such that the witness would not be able to reasonably communicate; and

(III) Closed-circuit television equipment is available for such use. (b) To obtain an order authorizing the use of closed-circuit television for testimony by a child or developmentally disabled witness, the party shall file a written motion with the court no less than fourteen days prior to the trial.

(c) Only the prosecuting attorney, the attorney for the defendant, the guardian ad litem, if any, and the judge may question the witness when he or she testifies by closed-circuit television.

(d) The operators of the closed-circuit television equipment shall make every effort to be unobtrusive while the witness is testifying.

(2) (a) Only the following persons may be in the room with the witness when the child or developmentally disabled person testifies by closed-circuit television:

(I) The prosecuting attorney;

(II) The attorney for the defendant;

(III) The guardian ad litem, if any;

(IV) The operators of the closed-circuit television equipment;

(V) A person whose presence, in the opinion of the court, contributes to the welfare and well-being of the witness, including a person who has dealt with the witness in a therapeutic setting; and

(VI) The jury.

(b) During the witness's testimony by closed-circuit television, the judge and the defendant, if present, shall remain in the courtroom.

(c) The judge and the defendant shall be allowed to communicate with the persons in the room where the witness is testifying by an appropriate electronic method.

(3) The provisions of this section shall not apply if the defendant is appearing pro se.

(4) This section shall not be interpreted to preclude, for purposes of identification of a defendant, the presence of both the witness and the defendant in the courtroom at the same time.

(5) Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to preclude the removal of the defendant, rather than the witness, from the courtroom upon the stipulation of both parties and the approval of the court.

Source: L. 2005: Entire section added, p. 424, § 4, effective April 29. L. 2012: (1)(b) amended, (SB 12-175), ch. 208, p. 853, § 83, effective July 1. L. 2013: IP(1)(a) amended, (HB 13-1314), ch. 323, p. 1804, § 28, effective March 1, 2014.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 111 cases (11 in the last 5 years), 1976–2026 · leading case: People v. Baker, 178 P.3d 1225 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).

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People v. Baker, 178 P.3d 1225 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 20× “Evidentiary Hearing Under Section 16-10-301 Defendant argues the court abused its discretion when it found by a preponderance of the evidence that the New Mexico sexual assault occurred, because “it permitted the prosecution to present testimony on direct examination, yet did…”

Bondsteel v. People, 2019 CO 26 (Colo. 2019). · cites it 8× “" Such purposes include (1) "[r]efuting defenses"; (2) "showing a common plan, scheme, design, or modus operandi, regardless of whether identity is at issue and regardless of whether the charged offense has a close nexus as part of a unified transaction to the other act"; (3)…”

People v. Everett, 250 P.3d 649 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 7× “§ 16-10-301(1). Thus, the legislature has expressed its policy judgment that evidence of additional sexual misconduct should be more readily available in sexual assault cases.”

Adrian v. People, 770 P.2d 1243 (Colo. 1989). · cites it 30× “Evidence of prior similar transactions in cases involving sexual assault on a child is admissible under section 16-10-301, 8A C.R.S. (1986) and CRE 404(b), if it is offered for the limited purpose of establishing a common plan, scheme, design, identity, modus operandi, motive,…”

People v. Snyder, 874 P.2d 1076 (Colo. 1994). · cites it 18× “In addition to these requirements, section 16-10-301 requires the trial court to instruct the jury as to the limited purpose for which the evidence is admitted and for which the jury may consider it.”

People v. Rollins, 892 P.2d 866 (Colo. 1995). · cites it 24× “The prosecution sought to introduce this evidence as similar transaction evidence pursuant to CRE 404(b) and section 16-10-301, 8A C.R.S. (1986 & 1994 Supp.”

People v. Fell, 832 P.2d 1015 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991). · cites it 14× “The defendant also urges us to place a limitation on the use of similar transaction evidence as defined by § 16-10-301, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A) to cases involving sexual assault on a child.”

People v. Duncan, 33 P.3d 1180 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 18× “Indeed, the General Assembly has in effect expressed a policy judgment in § 16-10-301, C.R.S.2000, that there is a need in sexual assault cases to make similar transaction evidence more readily available.”

People v. Rath, 44 P.3d 1033 (Colo. 2002). · cites it 4× “, in which the encounters ended short of sexual penetration, was error because they were not related to the occurrence of sexual intercourse, which it considered the only "contested" issue at trial, and because they were not "sufficiently substantially similar [to the current…”

In Re People v. Elmarr, 2015 CO 53 (Colo. 2015). · cites it 5× “Rather, the discussion centered on section 16-10-301, C.R.S., a statute that applies in cases involving unlawful sexual behavior and *441 permits the prosecution to introduce other similar acts by a defendant "for any purpose other than propensity," including to show common…”

Kogan v. People, 756 P.2d 945 (Colo. 1988). · cites it 8× “The People proceeded at trial to introduce testimony relating to an incident remembered by the child, followed by evidence of similar incidentswhich generally consisted of testimony of "lots" of whatever was alleged with respect to the original incidentto prove common plan,…”

People v. Warren, 55 P.3d 809 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002). · cites it 4× “In contrast to the statutory provision concerning the admissibility of evidence of other sexual acts, see § 16-10-301(4)(a), C.R.S.2001, or Fed.R.Evid.”

Show all 111 citing cases →

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-10-301(1) — 40 cases

Bondsteel v. People, 2019 CO 26 (Colo. 2019). “" Such purposes include (1) "[r]efuting defenses"; (2) "showing a common plan, scheme, design, or modus operandi, regardless of whether identity is at issue and regardless of whether the charged offense has a close nexus as part of a unified transaction to the other act"; (3)…”

People v. Fell, 832 P.2d 1015 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991). “The defendant also urges us to place a limitation on the use of similar transaction evidence as defined by § 16-10-301, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A) to cases involving sexual assault on a child.”

People v. Rowe, 318 P.3d 57 (Colo. Ct. App. 2012).

People v. Snyder, 874 P.2d 1076 (Colo. 1994). “In addition to these requirements, section 16-10-301 requires the trial court to instruct the jury as to the limited purpose for which the evidence is admitted and for which the jury may consider it.”

People v. Everett, 250 P.3d 649 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010). “§ 16-10-301(1). Thus, the legislature has expressed its policy judgment that evidence of additional sexual misconduct should be more readily available in sexual assault cases.”

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-10-301(2) — 6 cases

Adrian v. People, 770 P.2d 1243 (Colo. 1989). “Evidence of prior similar transactions in cases involving sexual assault on a child is admissible under section 16-10-301, 8A C.R.S. (1986) and CRE 404(b), if it is offered for the limited purpose of establishing a common plan, scheme, design, identity, modus operandi, motive,…”

People v. Leonard, 872 P.2d 1325 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).

Pigford v. People, 593 P.2d 354 (Colo. 1979).

People v. Shores, 2016 COA 129 (Colo. Ct. App. 2016).

People v. Opson, 632 P.2d 602 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-10-301(3) — 27 cases

People v. Baker, 178 P.3d 1225 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007). “Evidentiary Hearing Under Section 16-10-301 Defendant argues the court abused its discretion when it found by a preponderance of the evidence that the New Mexico sexual assault occurred, because “it permitted the prosecution to present testimony on direct examination, yet did…”

People v. Conyac, 361 P.3d 1005 (Colo. Ct. App. 2014).

People v. Cook, 197 P.3d 269 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008).

People v. Aldrich, 849 P.2d 821 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-10-301(4) — 11 cases

People v. Rollins, 892 P.2d 866 (Colo. 1995). “The prosecution sought to introduce this evidence as similar transaction evidence pursuant to CRE 404(b) and section 16-10-301, 8A C.R.S. (1986 & 1994 Supp.”

People v. Underwood, 53 P.3d 765 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).

People v. Milligan, 714 P.2d 493 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-10-301(4)(a) — 2 cases

People v. Warren, 55 P.3d 809 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002). “In contrast to the statutory provision concerning the admissibility of evidence of other sexual acts, see § 16-10-301(4)(a), C.R.S.2001, or Fed.R.Evid.”

People v. Fortson, 2018 COA 46 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-10-301(4)(b) — 3 cases

Kinney v. People, 187 P.3d 548 (Colo. 2008).

People v. Wallen, 996 P.2d 182 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).

People v. Underwood, 53 P.3d 765 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-10-301(4)(c) — 3 cases

People v. Ma, 104 P.3d 273 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).

People v. Nara, 964 P.2d 578 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-10-301(4)(d) — 5 cases

People v. Underwood, 53 P.3d 765 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).

People v. Freeman, 47 P.3d 700 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).

People v. Miranda, 410 P.3d 520 (Colo. Ct. App. 2014).

Peo v. Dockins (Colo. Ct. App. 2025).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-10-301(4)(e) — 1 case

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-10-301(5) — 2 cases

People v. Tillery, 231 P.3d 36 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009).

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee,v.Thomas Dean TILLERY, 231 P.3d 36 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-10-301(8) — 6 cases

People v. Villa, 240 P.3d 343 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009).

In Re People v. Elmarr, 2015 CO 53 (Colo. 2015). “Rather, the discussion centered on section 16-10-301, C.R.S., a statute that applies in cases involving unlawful sexual behavior and *441 permits the prosecution to introduce other similar acts by a defendant "for any purpose other than propensity," including to show common…”

People v. Cook, 342 P.3d 539 (Colo. Ct. App. 2014).

People v. Mosley, 167 P.3d 157 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).

People v. Jones, 311 P.3d 274 (Colo. 2013).

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