(1) (a) At the first appearance
of a person in custody before any court or any person designated by the court to set bond, the
court or person shall determine the type of bond and conditions of release unless the person is
subject to section 16-4-101.
(b) At a hearing other than an advisement hearing for a person in custody before any
court or any person designated by the court to modify or reduce bond, the court shall conduct or
set a bond hearing if the case is subject to part 3 of article 4.1 of title 24.
(2) If an indictment, information, or complaint has been filed and the type of bond and
conditions of release have been fixed upon return of the indictment or filing of the information
or complaint, the court shall review the propriety of the type of bond and conditions of release
upon first appearance of a person in custody.
(3) (a) The type of bond and conditions of release shall be sufficient to reasonably
ensure the appearance of the person as required and to protect the safety of any person or the
community, taking into consideration the individual characteristics of each person in custody,
including the person's financial condition.
(b) In determining the type of bond and conditions of release, if practicable and available
in the jurisdiction, the court shall use an empirically developed risk assessment instrument
designed to improve pretrial release decisions by providing to the court information that
classifies a person in custody based upon predicted level of risk of pretrial failure.
(4) When the type of bond and conditions of release are determined by the court, the
court shall:
(a) Presume that all persons in custody are eligible for release on bond with the
appropriate and least-restrictive conditions consistent with provisions in paragraph (a) of
subsection (3) of this section unless a person is otherwise ineligible for release pursuant to the
provisions of section 16-4-101 and section 19 of article II of the Colorado constitution. A
monetary condition of release must be reasonable, and any other condition of conduct not
mandated by statute must be tailored to address a specific concern.
(b) To the extent a court uses a bond schedule, the court shall incorporate into the bond
schedule conditions of release and factors that consider the individualized risk and circumstances
of a person in custody and all other relevant criteria and not solely the level of offense; and
(c) Consider all methods of bond and conditions of release to avoid unnecessary pretrial
incarceration and levels of community-based supervision as conditions of pretrial release.
(5) The court may also consider the following criteria as appropriate and relevant in
making a determination of the type of bond and conditions of release:
(a) The employment status and history of the person in custody;
(b) The nature and extent of family relationships of the person in custody;
(c) Past and present residences of the person in custody;
(d) The character and reputation of the person in custody;
(e) Identity of persons who agree to assist the person in custody in attending court at the
proper time;
(f) The likely sentence, considering the nature and the offense presently charged;
(g) The prior criminal record, if any, of the person in custody and any prior failures to
appear for court;
(h) Any facts indicating the possibility of violations of the law if the person in custody is
released without certain conditions of release;
(i) Any facts indicating that the defendant is likely to intimidate or harass possible
witnesses; and
(j) Any other facts tending to indicate that the person in custody has strong ties to the
community and is not likely to flee the jurisdiction.
(6) When a person is charged with an offense punishable by fine only, any monetary
condition of release shall not exceed the amount of the maximum fine penalty.
(7) At the first appearance of a pregnant or postpartum defendant who has complied with
the notice requirement set forth in section 18-1.3-103.7, to set bond, the court or person
designated by the court to set bond shall consider the defendant's pregnancy or postpartum status
when setting bond pursuant to the restrictions set forth in section 19 of article II of the state
constitution and section 16-4-101.
Source: L. 2013: Entire part R&RE, (HB 13-1236), ch. 202, p. 822, § 2, effective May
11. L. 2014: (1) amended, (SB 14-212), ch. 397, p. 1998, § 1, effective July 1. L. 2022: (1)
amended, (SB 22-049), ch. 152, p. 976, § 5, effective May 6. L. 2023: (7) added, (HB 23-1187),
ch. 246, p. 1341, § 3, effective August 7.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
31
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1979–2026 · leading case:
People v. Fields, 697 P.2d 749 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
People v. Fields, 697 P.2d 749 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
· cites it 34× “Defendant's first contention is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to *754 dismiss based upon the alleged violation of defendant's statutory speedy trial rights under § 16-4-103, C.R.S. (1983 Cum.Supp.) and that, if this court holds that § 16-4-107, C.”
People v. Rickman, 178 P.3d 1202 (Colo. 2008).
· cites it 18× “See §§ 16-4-103, -105. Absent statutory authorization, a court may not delegate its authority to set bond conditions.”
People v. Mascarenas, 706 P.2d 404 (Colo. 1985).
· cites it 17× “Although we determined that the Olds case did not fall within section 16-4-103, the following dicta appears: [W]e think the plain intent of the statute is to provide for an accelerated docket for those defendants who are being held in jail pending trial as a result of the…”
People v. Armendariz, 684 P.2d 252 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
· cites it 20× “Defendant first contends that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the defendant because, after his bond was increased, it failed to bring him to trial within 90 days as required by § 16-4-103(2), C.R.S.1973 (1982 Cum.Supp.”
People v. Coleman, 844 P.2d 1215 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
· cites it 7× “When defendant’s trial commenced in December 1988, he moved to dismiss, alleging that the speedy trial provisions of § 16-4-103(2), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A) had been violated.”
People v. Avery, 736 P.2d 1233 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986).
· cites it 6× “These alleged errors may be summarized as follows: (1) declaring a mistrial during jury selection which denied her right to a speedy trial under § 16-4-103, C.R.S. (1986 Repl. Vol. 8A) and subjected her to double jeopardy; (2) requiring complete sequestration of the jury…”
People v. Olds, 656 P.2d 705 (Colo. 1983).
· cites it 11× “In response to his motion which claimed that his right to speedy trial had been violated, the trial court dismissed the charges pending against him, holding that section 16-4-103(2), C.R.S.1973 (1982 Supp.”
People v. Moye, 635 P.2d 194 (Colo. 1981).
· cites it 3× “See generally section 16-4-103(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl.”
State ex rel. Torrez v. Whitaker, 410 P.3d 201 (N.M. 2018).
“{37} While those reforms focused on alleviating one of the worst consequences of using money to decide who will be released pretrial-jailing people for lack of money instead of for any real risk they posed-they did little to address the other primary undesirable result of the…”
State ex rel. Torrez v. Whitaker, 2018 NMSC 5 (N.M. 2018).
“Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-4-103 (3)(a)-(b), 4(b) (West 2017) (instructing courts to consider risk assessment instruments and a person’s financial condition when setting bond and prohibiting courts from setting bonds based solely on the level of offense).”
People v. Marquez, 739 P.2d 917 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).
· cites it 9× “*918 He contends his right to speedy trial pursuant to § 16-4-103(2) C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A) was violated and that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel.”
v. Barnett, 2020 COA 167 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020).
· cites it 2× “§ 16-4-103(1), C.R.S. 2020 (setting forth the various criteria and factors a court must consider to “determine the type of bond and conditions of release”).”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-4-103(1) — 3 cases
v. Barnett, 2020 COA 167 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020).
“§ 16-4-103(1), C.R.S. 2020 (setting forth the various criteria and factors a court must consider to “determine the type of bond and conditions of release”).”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-4-103(2) — 16 cases
People v. Mascarenas, 706 P.2d 404 (Colo. 1985).
“Although we determined that the Olds case did not fall within section 16-4-103, the following dicta appears: [W]e think the plain intent of the statute is to provide for an accelerated docket for those defendants who are being held in jail pending trial as a result of the…”
People v. Armendariz, 684 P.2d 252 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
“Defendant first contends that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the defendant because, after his bond was increased, it failed to bring him to trial within 90 days as required by § 16-4-103(2), C.R.S.1973 (1982 Cum.Supp.”
People v. Coleman, 844 P.2d 1215 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
“When defendant’s trial commenced in December 1988, he moved to dismiss, alleging that the speedy trial provisions of § 16-4-103(2), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A) had been violated.”
People v. Fields, 697 P.2d 749 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
“Defendant's first contention is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to *754 dismiss based upon the alleged violation of defendant's statutory speedy trial rights under § 16-4-103, C.R.S. (1983 Cum.Supp.) and that, if this court holds that § 16-4-107, C.”
People v. Olds, 656 P.2d 705 (Colo. 1983).
“In response to his motion which claimed that his right to speedy trial had been violated, the trial court dismissed the charges pending against him, holding that section 16-4-103(2), C.R.S.1973 (1982 Supp.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-4-103(2)(a) — 1 case
People v. Rickman, 178 P.3d 1202 (Colo. 2008).
“See §§ 16-4-103, -105. Absent statutory authorization, a court may not delegate its authority to set bond conditions.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-4-103(2)(c) — 1 case
People v. Rickman, 178 P.3d 1202 (Colo. 2008).
“See §§ 16-4-103, -105. Absent statutory authorization, a court may not delegate its authority to set bond conditions.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-4-103(2)(e) — 1 case
People v. Rickman, 178 P.3d 1202 (Colo. 2008).
“See §§ 16-4-103, -105. Absent statutory authorization, a court may not delegate its authority to set bond conditions.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-4-103(2)(f) — 1 case
People v. Rickman, 178 P.3d 1202 (Colo. 2008).
“See §§ 16-4-103, -105. Absent statutory authorization, a court may not delegate its authority to set bond conditions.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-4-103(3) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-4-103(3)(a) — 2 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-4-103(3)(b) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-4-103(4)(a) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-4-103(5) — 3 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-4-103(5)(a) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-4-103(5)(f) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-4-103(l)(a) — 1 case
People v. Rickman, 178 P.3d 1202 (Colo. 2008).
“See §§ 16-4-103, -105. Absent statutory authorization, a court may not delegate its authority to set bond conditions.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.