Once a bond has been executed and the person released from custody thereon, whether a charge is then pending or is thereafter filed or transferred to a court of competent jurisdiction, the original bond shall continue in effect until final disposition of the case in the trial court. If a charge filed in the county court is dismissed and the district attorney states on the record that the charge will be refiled in the district court or that the dismissal by the county court will be appealed to the district court, the county court before entering the dismissal shall fix a return date, not later than sixty-three days thereafter, upon which the defendant must appear in the district court and continue the bond. Any bond continued pursuant to this section is subject to the provisions of section 16-4-109.
Source: L. 2013: Entire part R&RE, (HB 13-1236), ch. 202, p. 830, § 2, effective May 11.
16-4-109. Reduction or increase of monetary conditions of bond - change in type of bond or conditions of bond - definitions. (1) Upon application by the district attorney or the defendant, the court before which the proceeding is pending may increase or decrease the financial conditions of bond, may require additional security for a bond, may dispense with security theretofore provided, or may alter any other condition of the bond. If the defendant applies to decrease the financial considerations of bond or modify bond conditions, the court shall set the application for hearing if the case is subject to part 3 of article 4.1 of title 24.
(2) Reasonable notice of an application for modification of a bond by the defendant shall be given to the district attorney.
(3) Reasonable notice of application for modification of a bond by the district attorney shall be given to the defendant, except as provided in subsection (4) of this section.
(4) (a) Upon verified application by the district attorney or a bonding commissioner stating facts or circumstances constituting a breach or a threatened breach of any of the conditions of the bond, the court may issue a warrant commanding any peace officer to bring the defendant without unnecessary delay before the court for a hearing on the matters set forth in the application. Upon issuance of the warrant, the bonding commissioner shall notify the bail bond agent of record by electronic mail to the agent if available within twenty-four hours or by certified mail not more than fourteen days after the warrant is issued. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court may enter an order authorized by subsection (1) of this section. If a bonding commissioner files an application for a hearing pursuant to this subsection (4), the bonding commissioner shall notify the district attorney, for the jurisdiction in which the application is made, of the application within twenty-four hours following the filing of the application.
(b) As used in this subsection (4), "bonding commissioner" means a person employed by a pretrial services program as described in section 16-4-106 (3), and so designated as a bonding commissioner by the chief or presiding judge of the judicial district.
(5) The district attorney has the right to appear at all hearings seeking modification of the terms and conditions of bond and may advise the court on all pertinent matters during the hearing.
Source: L. 2013: Entire part R&RE, (HB 13-1236), ch. 202, p. 830, § 2, effective May 11. L. 2022: (1) amended, (SB 22-049), ch. 152, p. 976, § 6, effective May 6.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
28
cases, 1977–2017 · leading case:
People v. Oram, 217 P.3d 883 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009).
People v. Oram, 217 P.3d 883 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 19× “" § 16-4-108(1)(c), C.R.S.2008. The People contend that section 16-4-108(1)(c) abrogated any common law bonding agent's privilege in Colorado and that, under the second degree burglary statute, section 18-4-203, C.”
People v. Caro, 753 P.2d 196 (Colo. 1988).
· cites it 20× “Laws 190, 207 (now codified, with only minor changes, at section 16-4-108(1)). It also authorized courts to set aside forfeitures prior to judgment in terms similar to former Crim.”
People v. Serra, 2015 COA 130 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015).
· cites it 3× “5(1)(a) (violation of a protection order); § 16-4-108, C.R.S. 2015 (bond conditions); § 18-1-1001, C.”
Oram v. People, 255 P.3d 1032 (Colo. 2011).
· cites it 3× “Section 16-4-108(1)(c), C.R.S. (2010), gives a bonding agent authority to seize and surrender a principal.”
In re People v. Jones, 2015 CO 20 (Colo. 2015).
· cites it 6× “the statutory scheme details the purposes to be served by, and the criteria to be considered in making, those determinations, see § 16-4-108, C.R.S. (2014) (Setting and selection type of bond-eriteria), the various types of pretrial bond available for setting by the court, see §…”
Yording v. Walker, 683 P.2d 788 (Colo. 1984).
· cites it 10× “(1978), presents no limitations upon the trial court’s inherent control over the granting of bail except in the limited circumstances there defined, and no other statute has been cited as having any bearing on the issue here presented.”
People v. Diaz-Garcia, 159 P.3d 679 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).
· cites it 11× “No Mandatory Exoneration Under § 16-4-108 Surety argues initially that the district court erred because surety was entitled to exoneration from bond liability pursuant to § 16-4-108(1)(b.”
People v. Haghshenas, 31 P.3d 180 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 9× “Section 16-4-108(1)(b.5), C.R.S.2000, provides, in pertinent part: (1) Any person executing a bail bond as principal or as surety shall be exonerated as follows: [[Image here]] (b.”
Vaughn v. Dist. Court, 559 P.2d 222 (Colo. 1977).
· cites it 6× “(1) any person executing a bail bond as principal or as surety shall be exonerated as follows: “(c) Upon surrender of the defendant into custody at any time before a judgment has been entered against the sureties for forfeiture of the bond, upon payment of all costs occasioned…”
People v. Chavarria-Sanchez, 207 P.3d 902 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 8× “Further, to the extent that the state was or may be considered a party to the bail bond contract as a "creditor," as the majority indicates, the state did not have an unqualified right to collect on the bond posted by the defendant in the event of his nonappearance for two…”
People v. Goldsmith, 955 P.2d 561 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).
· cites it 9× “While § 16-4-108, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A) now recognizes additional grounds for exoneration of the surety, reincarceration of the defendant on separate charges is not included among them.”
People v. Carrethers, 867 P.2d 189 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).
· cites it 5× “Specifically, surety asserts that the trial court’s action was not authorized pursuant to § 16-4-108(l)(c), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A), because defendant alleg *190 edly was not surrendered until after the appearance date fixed in the bond.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-4-108(1) — 5 cases
People v. Caro, 753 P.2d 196 (Colo. 1988).
“Laws 190, 207 (now codified, with only minor changes, at section 16-4-108(1)). It also authorized courts to set aside forfeitures prior to judgment in terms similar to former Crim.”
People v. Haghshenas, 31 P.3d 180 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).
“Section 16-4-108(1)(b.5), C.R.S.2000, provides, in pertinent part: (1) Any person executing a bail bond as principal or as surety shall be exonerated as follows: [[Image here]] (b.”
People v. Diaz-Garcia, 159 P.3d 679 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).
“No Mandatory Exoneration Under § 16-4-108 Surety argues initially that the district court erred because surety was entitled to exoneration from bond liability pursuant to § 16-4-108(1)(b.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-4-108(1)(a) — 1 case
People v. Caro, 753 P.2d 196 (Colo. 1988).
“Laws 190, 207 (now codified, with only minor changes, at section 16-4-108(1)). It also authorized courts to set aside forfeitures prior to judgment in terms similar to former Crim.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-4-108(1)(c) — 8 cases
People v. Oram, 217 P.3d 883 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009).
“" § 16-4-108(1)(c), C.R.S.2008. The People contend that section 16-4-108(1)(c) abrogated any common law bonding agent's privilege in Colorado and that, under the second degree burglary statute, section 18-4-203, C.”
Oram v. People, 255 P.3d 1032 (Colo. 2011).
“Section 16-4-108(1)(c), C.R.S. (2010), gives a bonding agent authority to seize and surrender a principal.”
People v. Caro, 753 P.2d 196 (Colo. 1988).
“Laws 190, 207 (now codified, with only minor changes, at section 16-4-108(1)). It also authorized courts to set aside forfeitures prior to judgment in terms similar to former Crim.”
Yording v. Walker, 683 P.2d 788 (Colo. 1984).
“(1978), presents no limitations upon the trial court’s inherent control over the granting of bail except in the limited circumstances there defined, and no other statute has been cited as having any bearing on the issue here presented.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-4-108(2) — 4 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-4-108(2)(c) — 1 case
In re People v. Jones, 2015 CO 20 (Colo. 2015).
“the statutory scheme details the purposes to be served by, and the criteria to be considered in making, those determinations, see § 16-4-108, C.R.S. (2014) (Setting and selection type of bond-eriteria), the various types of pretrial bond available for setting by the court, see §…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-4-108(5)(a) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-4-108(5)(b) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-4-108(8)(a) — 2 cases
People v. Serra, 2015 COA 130 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015).
“5(1)(a) (violation of a protection order); § 16-4-108, C.R.S. 2015 (bond conditions); § 18-1-1001, C.”
In re People v. Jones, 2015 CO 20 (Colo. 2015).
“the statutory scheme details the purposes to be served by, and the criteria to be considered in making, those determinations, see § 16-4-108, C.R.S. (2014) (Setting and selection type of bond-eriteria), the various types of pretrial bond available for setting by the court, see §…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-4-108(l) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-4-108(l)(c) — 6 cases
Yording v. Walker, 683 P.2d 788 (Colo. 1984).
“(1978), presents no limitations upon the trial court’s inherent control over the granting of bail except in the limited circumstances there defined, and no other statute has been cited as having any bearing on the issue here presented.”
People v. Carrethers, 867 P.2d 189 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).
“Specifically, surety asserts that the trial court’s action was not authorized pursuant to § 16-4-108(l)(c), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A), because defendant alleg *190 edly was not surrendered until after the appearance date fixed in the bond.”
People v. Goldsmith, 955 P.2d 561 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).
“While § 16-4-108, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A) now recognizes additional grounds for exoneration of the surety, reincarceration of the defendant on separate charges is not included among them.”
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