(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) of this section, no person who has been convicted as an adult or who has been adjudicated as a juvenile under a criminal statute of this or any other state of the United States shall collaterally attack the validity of that conviction or adjudication unless such attack is commenced within the applicable time period, as provided in this subsection (1), following the date of said conviction, or for purposes of juvenile adjudication the applicable time period will begin at the time of the juvenile's eighteenth birthday:
All class 1 felonies: No limit All other felonies: Three years Misdemeanors: Eighteen months Petty offenses: Six months
(1.5) If an appellate court can determine on the face of the motion, files, and record in a case that a collateral attack is outside the time limits specified in subsection (1) of this section, the appellate court may deny relief on that basis, regardless of whether the issue of timeliness was raised in the trial court.
(2) In recognition of the difficulties attending the litigation of stale claims and the potential for frustrating various statutory provisions directed at repeat offenders, former offenders, and habitual offenders, the only exceptions to the time limitations specified in subsection (1) of this section are:
(a) A case in which the court entering judgment of conviction or entering adjudication did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the alleged offense;
(b) A case in which the court entering judgment of conviction or entering adjudication did not have jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or juvenile;
(c) Where the court hearing the collateral attack finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the failure to seek relief within the applicable time period was caused by an adjudication of incompetence or by commitment of the defendant or juvenile to an institution for treatment as a person with a mental health disorder; or
(d) Where the court hearing the collateral attack finds that the failure to seek relief within the applicable time period was the result of circumstances amounting to justifiable excuse or excusable neglect.
(3) Repealed.
(4) For purposes of this section:
(a) "Adjudication", except as used in subsection (2)(c) of this section, includes "adjudicated" and has the same meaning as defined in section 19-2.5-102.
(b) "Juvenile" has the same meaning as set forth in section 19-1-103.
Source: L. 81: Entire section added, p. 926, § 3, effective July 1. L. 84: (2)(b) and (2)(c) amended and (2)(d) added, p. 486, § 1, effective February 6. L. 98: (1.5) added, p. 948, § 10, effective May 27. L. 2001: Entire section amended, p. 734, § 4, effective July 1. L. 2002: (4)(b) amended, p. 1016, § 17, effective June 1; (3) repealed, p. 761, § 11, effective July 1. L. 2006:
(2)(c) amended, p. 1397, § 41, effective August 7. L. 2018: IP(2) and (2)(c) amended, (SB 18- 091), ch. 35, p. 384, § 14, effective August 8. L. 2021: (4) amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 713, § 23, effective October 1.
Cross references: (1) For collateral attacks upon convictions of traffic infractions, see § 42-4-1708 (5); for collateral attacks upon convictions of alcohol- or drug-related traffic offenses, see § 42-4-1702.
(2) For the legislative declaration in SB 18-091, see section 1 of chapter 35, Session Laws of Colorado 2018.
PART 5 INCARCERATION 16-5-501. Prosecuting attorney - incarceration - legal representation and supporting services at state expense. (Repealed) Source: L. 81: Entire part added, p. 928, § 1, September 1. L. 86: Entire section amended, p. 732, § 1, effective July 1. L. 87: Entire section amended, p. 1496, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2002: Entire section amended, p. 1491, § 134, effective October 1. L. 2013: Entire section amended, (SB 13-250), ch. 333, p. 1929, § 41, effective October 1; entire section repealed, (HB 13-1210), ch. 306, p. 1624, § 3, effective January 1, 2014. ARTICLE 6 Change of Venue and Disqualification of Judge Editor's note: This article was repealed and reenacted in 1972. For historical information concerning the repeal and reenactment, see the editor's note before the article 1 heading.
PART 1
CHANGE OF VENUE
Notes of Decisions
People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424 (Colo. 1993).
· cites it 155× “The district court based its decision on a determination that the motion was not filed within the period prescribed by section 16-5-402, 8A C.R.S. (1986), which limits the time for commencing collateral attacks on criminal convictions.”
Robbins v. People, 107 P.3d 384 (Colo. 2005).
· cites it 118× “2003) (" Robbins III "), and we accepted certiorari to consider the question of whether section 16-5-402, C.R.S. (2004), which sets forth no time limit on the filing of postconviction motions as to first degree felony convictions, precludes the court from considering whether the…”
v. Alvarado Hinojos, 2019 CO 60 (Colo. 2019).
· cites it 52× “¶9 In his dissent, Judge Dailey explained that he was persuaded by the prosecution’s contention that “the use of [an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel] merits argument to procedurally circumvent the time period prescribed in section 16-5-402 defeats the very purpose of section…”
People v. Thomas, 867 P.2d 880 (Colo. 1994).
· cites it 118× “II Section 16-5-402, 8A C.R.S. (1986), contains the following pertinent provisions: Limitation for collateral attack upon trial judgment.”
People v. Hampton, 876 P.2d 1236 (Colo. 1994).
· cites it 53× “The defendant cross-petitioned, asserting that section 16-5-402, 8A C.R.S. (1986), does not apply to attacks on habitual criminal adjudications.”
People v. Clouse, 74 P.3d 336 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).
· cites it 19× “1994)(construing the term "conviction" in § 16-5-402), it expired, absent statutory exception, on October 18, 1996, three years after the issuance of the mandate in that appeal.”
Leyva v. People, 184 P.3d 48 (Colo. 2008).
· cites it 24× “85(b), and applies it as well to a "conviction," for purposes of limiting collateral attacks, see § 16-5-402, C.R.S. (2007). In Delgado, this court interpreted Crim.”
People v. Valdez, 178 P.3d 1269 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
· cites it 28× “The court noted defendant had timely filed his first Crim. P. 35(c) motion with his 1997 letter.”
People v. Loveall, 231 P.3d 408 (Colo. 2010).
· cites it 16× “See § 16-5-402. B. Viability of DJS Under Section 18-1.”
People v. Germany, 674 P.2d 345 (Colo. 1983).
· cites it 48× “” * * ⅜ * * * “The Court concludes clearly and beyond a reasonable doubt that C.R.S. 16-5-402 ... unconstitutionally limits the rights of defendants to collaterally attack constitutionally or procedurally invalid prior convictions.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-5-402(1) — 166 cases
v. Alvarado Hinojos, 2019 CO 60 (Colo. 2019).
“¶9 In his dissent, Judge Dailey explained that he was persuaded by the prosecution’s contention that “the use of [an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel] merits argument to procedurally circumvent the time period prescribed in section 16-5-402 defeats the very purpose of section…”
People v. Hampton, 876 P.2d 1236 (Colo. 1994).
“The defendant cross-petitioned, asserting that section 16-5-402, 8A C.R.S. (1986), does not apply to attacks on habitual criminal adjudications.”
People v. Clouse, 74 P.3d 336 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).
“1994)(construing the term "conviction" in § 16-5-402), it expired, absent statutory exception, on October 18, 1996, three years after the issuance of the mandate in that appeal.”
Leyva v. People, 184 P.3d 48 (Colo. 2008).
“85(b), and applies it as well to a "conviction," for purposes of limiting collateral attacks, see § 16-5-402, C.R.S. (2007). In Delgado, this court interpreted Crim.”
Robbins v. People, 107 P.3d 384 (Colo. 2005).
“2003) (" Robbins III "), and we accepted certiorari to consider the question of whether section 16-5-402, C.R.S. (2004), which sets forth no time limit on the filing of postconviction motions as to first degree felony convictions, precludes the court from considering whether the…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-5-402(1)(a) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-5-402(2) — 33 cases
People v. Hampton, 876 P.2d 1236 (Colo. 1994).
“The defendant cross-petitioned, asserting that section 16-5-402, 8A C.R.S. (1986), does not apply to attacks on habitual criminal adjudications.”
v. Alvarado Hinojos, 2019 CO 60 (Colo. 2019).
“¶9 In his dissent, Judge Dailey explained that he was persuaded by the prosecution’s contention that “the use of [an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel] merits argument to procedurally circumvent the time period prescribed in section 16-5-402 defeats the very purpose of section…”
People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424 (Colo. 1993).
“The district court based its decision on a determination that the motion was not filed within the period prescribed by section 16-5-402, 8A C.R.S. (1986), which limits the time for commencing collateral attacks on criminal convictions.”
Robbins v. People, 107 P.3d 384 (Colo. 2005).
“2003) (" Robbins III "), and we accepted certiorari to consider the question of whether section 16-5-402, C.R.S. (2004), which sets forth no time limit on the filing of postconviction motions as to first degree felony convictions, precludes the court from considering whether the…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-5-402(2)(a) — 16 cases
People v. Loveall, 231 P.3d 408 (Colo. 2010).
“See § 16-5-402. B. Viability of DJS Under Section 18-1.”
People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424 (Colo. 1993).
“The district court based its decision on a determination that the motion was not filed within the period prescribed by section 16-5-402, 8A C.R.S. (1986), which limits the time for commencing collateral attacks on criminal convictions.”
People v. Germany, 674 P.2d 345 (Colo. 1983).
“” * * ⅜ * * * “The Court concludes clearly and beyond a reasonable doubt that C.R.S. 16-5-402 ... unconstitutionally limits the rights of defendants to collaterally attack constitutionally or procedurally invalid prior convictions.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-5-402(2)(c) — 2 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-5-402(2)(d) — 80 cases
v. Alvarado Hinojos, 2019 CO 60 (Colo. 2019).
“¶9 In his dissent, Judge Dailey explained that he was persuaded by the prosecution’s contention that “the use of [an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel] merits argument to procedurally circumvent the time period prescribed in section 16-5-402 defeats the very purpose of section…”
People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424 (Colo. 1993).
“The district court based its decision on a determination that the motion was not filed within the period prescribed by section 16-5-402, 8A C.R.S. (1986), which limits the time for commencing collateral attacks on criminal convictions.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-5-402(3) — 7 cases
People v. Thomas, 867 P.2d 880 (Colo. 1994).
“II Section 16-5-402, 8A C.R.S. (1986), contains the following pertinent provisions: Limitation for collateral attack upon trial judgment.”
People v. Hampton, 876 P.2d 1236 (Colo. 1994).
“The defendant cross-petitioned, asserting that section 16-5-402, 8A C.R.S. (1986), does not apply to attacks on habitual criminal adjudications.”
People v. Germany, 674 P.2d 345 (Colo. 1983).
“” * * ⅜ * * * “The Court concludes clearly and beyond a reasonable doubt that C.R.S. 16-5-402 ... unconstitutionally limits the rights of defendants to collaterally attack constitutionally or procedurally invalid prior convictions.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-5-402(8) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-5-402(l) — 3 cases
Robbins v. People, 107 P.3d 384 (Colo. 2005).
“2003) (" Robbins III "), and we accepted certiorari to consider the question of whether section 16-5-402, C.R.S. (2004), which sets forth no time limit on the filing of postconviction motions as to first degree felony convictions, precludes the court from considering whether the…”
People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 424 (Colo. 1993).
“The district court based its decision on a determination that the motion was not filed within the period prescribed by section 16-5-402, 8A C.R.S. (1986), which limits the time for commencing collateral attacks on criminal convictions.”
People v. Hampton, 876 P.2d 1236 (Colo. 1994).
“The defendant cross-petitioned, asserting that section 16-5-402, 8A C.R.S. (1986), does not apply to attacks on habitual criminal adjudications.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-5-402(l)(a) — 1 case
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