Colorado Revised Statutes

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-102 (2026)

Deferred sentencing of defendant

✓ current as of July 2026
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(1) (a) In any case in which the defendant has entered a plea of guilty, the court accepting the plea has the power, with the written consent of the defendant and his or her attorney of record and the district attorney, to continue the case for the purpose of entering judgment and sentence upon the plea of guilty for a period not to exceed four years for a felony or two years for a misdemeanor or petty offense or traffic offense. The period shall begin to run from the date that the court continues the case.

(b) The period may be extended for an additional time:

(I) Up to one hundred eighty-two days if the failure to pay restitution is the sole condition of supervision which has not been fulfilled, because of inability to pay, and the defendant has shown a future ability to pay. During such time, the court may place the defendant under the supervision of the probation department; or

(II) Up to two years if the deferred judgment is for an offense listed in section 16-11.7- 102 (3), C.R.S., good cause is shown, and the district attorney and defendant consent to the extension.

(2) Prior to entry of a plea of guilty to be followed by deferred judgment and sentence, the district attorney, in the course of plea discussion as provided in sections 16-7-301 and 16-7- 302, is authorized to enter into a written stipulation to be signed by the defendant, the defendant's attorney of record, and the district attorney, under which the defendant is obligated to adhere to such stipulation. The conditions imposed in the stipulation and the responses to violation behavior are similar to probation. A person convicted of a crime, the underlying factual basis of which included an act of domestic violence, as defined in section 18-6-800.3 (1), shall stipulate to the conditions specified in section 18-1.3-204 (2)(b). In addition, the stipulation may require the defendant to perform community or charitable work service projects or make donations thereto. Upon full compliance with such conditions by the defendant, the plea of guilty previously entered shall be withdrawn and the charge upon which the judgment and sentence of the court was deferred shall be dismissed with prejudice. The stipulation shall specifically provide that, upon a breach by the defendant of any condition regulating the conduct of the defendant, the court shall enter judgment and impose sentence upon the guilty plea; except that, if the offense is a violation of article 18 of this title 18, the court may accept an admission or find a violation of the stipulation without entering judgment and imposing sentence if the court first makes findings of fact on the record stating the entry of judgment and sentencing would not be consistent with the purposes of sentencing, that the defendant would be better served by continuing the deferred judgment period, and that public safety would not be jeopardized by the continuation of the deferred judgment. If the court makes those findings and continues the deferred judgment over the objection of the prosecution, the court shall also impose additional and immediate sanctions upon the defendant to address the violation, to include, but not be limited to, the imposition of further terms and conditions that will enhance the likelihood of the defendant's success, respond to the defendant's noncompliance, and promote further individual accountability, including extending the time period of the deferred judgment for up to two additional years or incarceration in the county jail for a period not to exceed ninety days consistent with the provisions of section 18-1.3-202 (1), or both. When, as a condition of the deferred sentence, the court orders the defendant to make restitution, evidence of failure to pay the restitution shall constitute prima facie evidence of a violation. Whether a breach of condition has occurred shall be determined by the court without a jury upon application of the district attorney or a probation officer and upon notice of hearing thereon of not less than seven days to the defendant or the defendant's attorney of record. Application for entry of judgment and imposition of sentence may be made by the district attorney or a probation officer at any time within the term of the deferred judgment or within thirty-five days thereafter. The burden of proof at the hearing shall be by a preponderance of the evidence, and the procedural safeguards required in a revocation of probation hearing shall apply.

(3) When a defendant signs a stipulation by which it is provided that judgment and sentence shall be deferred for a time certain, he or she thereby waives all rights to a speedy trial, as provided in section 18-1-405.

(4) A warrant for the arrest of any defendant for breach of a condition of a deferred sentence may be issued by any judge of a court of record upon the report of a probation officer, or upon the verified complaint of any person, establishing to the satisfaction of the judge probable cause to believe that a condition of the deferred sentence has been violated and that the arrest of the defendant is reasonably necessary. The warrant may be executed by any probation officer or by a peace officer authorized to execute warrants in the county in which the defendant is found.

Source: L. 2002: Entire article added with relocations, p. 1366, § 2, effective October 1. L. 2012: (1) amended, (HB 12-1310), ch. 268, p. 1396, § 11, effective June 7; (1) and (2) amended, (SB 12-175), ch. 208, p. 863, § 106, effective July 1. L. 2013: (2) amended, (SB 13- 250), ch. 333, p. 1941, § 64, effective October 1. L. 2022: (2) amended, (HB 22-1257), ch. 69, p. 357, § 9, effective April 7.

Editor's note: (1) This section is similar to former § 16-7-403 as it existed prior to 2002.

(2) Amendments to subsection (1) by House Bill 12-1310 and Senate Bill 12-175 were harmonized.

18-1.3-103. Deferred sentencing - drug offenders - legislative declaration - demonstration program - repeal. (Repealed) Source: L. 2002: Entire article added with relocations, p. 1367, § 2, effective October 1.

Editor's note: (1) This section was similar to former § 16-7-403.7 as it existed prior to 2002.

(2) Subsection (6) provided for the repeal of this section, effective July 1, 2006. (See L. 2002, p. 1367.)

18-1.3-103.4. Senate Bill 13-250 - legislative intent - clarification of internal reference to level 4 drug felonies. The intent of the general assembly in enacting Senate Bill 13-250 was to allow courts, for offenses committed on and after October 1, 2013, to vacate certain level 4 drug felony convictions and enter misdemeanor convictions if the offender completes community-based sentencing. While the term "level 4 drug felony" to which section 18-1.3-103.5 (3)(b) refers was described in section 18-18-405 (2)(c)(II) of the introduced version of Senate Bill 13-250, an amendment to the bill during the legislative process moved the level 4 drug felony description to section 18-18-405 (2)(d). The conforming change was not made to the internal reference in section 18-1.3-103.5 (3)(b), resulting in an incorrect internal reference being published in the 2013 version of the Colorado Revised Statutes. When enacting Senate Bill 13- 250, it was the intent of the general assembly that the level 4 drug felonies to which section 18- 1.3-103.5 (3)(b) refers be those described in section 18-18-405 (2)(d). Accordingly, by the passage of Senate Bill 14-163, enacted in 2014, the general assembly corrects the internal reference found in section 18-1.3-103.5 (3)(b). The correction to the internal reference is effective as of the effective date of Senate Bill 13-250, October 1, 2013, and applies to offenses committed on or after October 1, 2013.

Source: L. 2014: Entire section added, (SB 14-163), ch. 391, p. 1970, § 7, effective June 6. L. 2018: Entire section amended, (HB 18-1375), ch. 274, p. 1701, § 22, effective May 29.

18-1.3-103.5. Felony convictions - vacate and enter conviction on misdemeanor after successful completion. (1) In order to expand opportunities for offenders to avoid a drug felony conviction, to reduce the significant negative consequences of that felony conviction, and to provide positive reinforcement for drug offenders who work to successfully complete any community-based sentence imposed by the court, the legislature hereby creates an additional opportunity for those drug offenders who may not otherwise have been eligible for or successful in other statutorily created programs that allow the drug offender to avoid a felony conviction, such as diversion or deferred judgment.

(2) (a) In a case in which the defendant enters a plea of guilty or is found guilty by the court or a jury for a crime listed in subsection (3) of this section, the court shall order, upon successful completion of any community-based sentence to probation or to a community corrections program, the drug felony conviction vacated and shall enter a conviction for a level 1 drug misdemeanor offense of possession of a controlled substance pursuant to section 18-18- 403.5. Upon entry of the judgment of conviction pursuant to section 18-18-403.5, the court shall indicate in its order that the judgment of conviction is entered pursuant to the provisions of this section.

(b) Whether a sentence is successfully completed shall be determined by the court without a jury with notice to the district attorney and the defendant or the defendant's attorney of record. A community-based sentence is not successfully completed if the defendant has not successfully completed the treatment as ordered by the court and determined appropriate to address the defendant's treatment needs.

(3) This section applies to convictions for the following offenses:

(a) On or after March 1, 2020, possession of a controlled substance, but only when the quantity of the controlled substance is not more than four grams of any material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing any quantity of gamma hydroxybutyrate, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers; not more than two grams of ketamine or cathinones; or not more than four milligrams of flunitrazepam. The district attorney and defendant may stipulate to the amount of the controlled substance possessed by the defendant at the time of sentencing, or the court shall determine the amount at the time of sentencing.

(b) A level 4 drug felony for distribution pursuant to the provisions of section 18-18-405 (2)(d)(II);

(c) Possession of more than twelve ounces of marijuana or more than three ounces of marijuana concentrate;

(d) A violation of section 18-18-415; or

(e) A violation of section 18-18-403.5 (2.5)(a).

(4) Notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary, a defendant is not eligible for relief under this section if:

(a) The defendant has a prior conviction for a crime of violence as described in section 18-1.3-406 or a prior conviction for an offense that is required to be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of section 18-1.3-406 in this state, or a crime in another state, the United States, or any territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States that would be a crime of violence or an offense required to be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of section 18-1.3-406 in this state;

(b) The defendant is ineligible for probation pursuant to section 18-1.3-201; or

(c) (I) The defendant has two or more prior felony convictions for a drug offense pursuant to this title, or a crime in another state, the United States, or any territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States that would be a drug offense violation of this title.

(II) For purposes of this paragraph (c), a felony conviction includes any diversion, deferred prosecution, or deferred judgment and sentence, whether or not completed, for a felony, and any conviction entered as a result of relief previously granted pursuant to this section or as a result of a guilty plea to a misdemeanor offense, as described in article 18 of this title, originally charged as a felony drug offense, as described in article 18 of this title.

Source: L. 2013: Entire section added, (SB 13-250), ch. 333, p. 1900, § 1, effective October 1. L. 2014: (2)(a), (3), (4)(a), and (4)(c) amended, (SB 14-163), ch. 391, p. 1971, § 8, effective July 1. L. 2019: (3)(a) amended, (HB 19-1263), ch. 291, p. 2681, § 7, effective March 1, 2020. L. 2022: (3)(c) and (3)(d) amended and (3)(e) added, (HB 22-1326), ch. 225, p. 1651, § 31, effective July 1. Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 22-1326 stating the purpose of, and the provision directing legislative staff agencies to conduct, a post-enactment review pursuant to § 2-2-1201 scheduled in 2024, 2025, and 2027, see sections 1 and 55 of chapter 225, Session Laws of Colorado 2022. To obtain a copy of the review, once completed, go to "Legislative Resources and Requirements" on the Colorado General Assembly's website.

18-1.3-103.7. Alternative options for pregnant and postpartum people - legislative declaration - definitions. (1) (a) The general assembly finds and declares that:

(I) There is an increasing female population in prisons and jails;

(II) While no system is perfect in responding to the medical conditions of pregnancy, correctional facilities and county jails are particularly ill-equipped to do so;

(III) During criminal cases involving a pregnant or postpartum defendant, the physical and mental health needs of the pregnant defendant or the postpartum defendant and newborn must be considered at all stages of the proceeding as a matter of community health and safety;

(IV) Timely attention to medical conditions and mental health during the perinatal period can improve health and welfare for multiple generations of a family unit;

(V) Pregnancy is a time-sensitive process that has many potential outcomes and variations. A pregnant person may feel healthy and experience no complications. A pregnant person may also experience sudden, harmful medical conditions, such as preeclampsia or placental abruption, or develop complex medical conditions that result in the early termination of a pregnancy or threaten the life of the pregnant person, such as an ectopic pregnancy. At any stage of the perinatal period, situations can occur that cause long-term physical and mental health trauma for the pregnant person.

(VI) Criminal proceedings are not responsive to the timeline or complexity of the perinatal period;

(VII) When a substance use disorder intersects with a pregnancy, it is best handled as a health condition. Increasing the time a pregnant person with a substance use disorder is in a correctional facility or county jail is counter to public health and may drive the pregnant person away from medical care and support services.

(VIII) The end of the pregnancy does not immediately terminate the effects of the pregnancy on the person who was pregnant;

(IX) The postpartum period is an essential time frame for both the person who gave birth and the newborn. It is an opportunity for the newborn: (A) To develop healthy physiologic responses; and (B) To benefit from the attachment and bonding that occurs during this period;

(X) Bonding between a newborn and parent during the postpartum period can improve conditions for other children and care providers in the same family unit and prevent child abuse and neglect; and

(XI) Bonding between a newborn and a parent can improve the overall health of the newborn and the parent and may prevent or reduce long-term health risks that may be increased by separating the newborn from the parent. For example:

(A) A postpartum person who does not breastfeed or chestfeed a newborn may have an increased likelihood of premenopausal breast cancer, ovarian cancer, or type 2 diabetes;

(B) A newborn who is not breastfed or chestfed may have an increased likelihood of childhood obesity, asthma, type 1 or type 2 diabetes, leukemia, or sudden infant death syndrome; and

(C) A child who is separated from any parent may experience stress hormones, which may lead to difficulty sleeping, developmental regression, heart disease, hypertension, obesity, diabetes, or decreased life span. A newborn who is separated from a parent may also experience permanent architectural changes in the brain, including a lower intelligence quotient or an increased likelihood of depression, suicidal ideation, or addiction to alcohol or gambling.

(b) The general assembly finds, therefore, that all alternatives to prosecution, commitment, and incarceration of a pregnant or postpartum person must be considered, including a stay of criminal proceedings or sentencing to reduce the likelihood of negative health and social outcomes for the parent, newborn child, and community.

(c) It is the intent of the general assembly that a person who coerces or extorts a pregnant or postpartum person in the commission of crimes should be subject to being investigated and, as appropriate, prosecuted for a criminal act pursuant to this title 18.

(2) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:

(a) "Newborn" means a person who has been born and who is less than one year old.

(b) "Postpartum period" means a period of one year after the end of a pregnancy, regardless of whether the pregnancy ends with a live birth.

(c) "Pregnant or postpartum defendant" means a person who is pregnant or in a postpartum period who has been accused or convicted of a crime.

(d) "Stay of execution" means delaying the imposition of a sentence or the incarceration portion of the sentence for a pregnant or postpartum defendant after the sentence is announced by a court.

(3) (a) There is a rebuttable presumption against detention and incarceration of a pregnant or postpartum defendant if the defendant provides the court and district attorney with notice of the defendant's status as a pregnant or postpartum defendant at each applicable stage of the proceedings. Subject to subsection (5) of this section and if the court decides to detain or incarcerate the pregnant or postpartum defendant after weighing the applicable legal standards and considerations set forth in subsections (3)(a)(I) to (3)(a)(VI) of this section, the court shall make specific findings on the record that the risk to public safety or any other factor the court is required to consider is substantial enough to outweigh the risk of incarceration. The court shall apply the rebuttable presumption described in this subsection (3)(a) to a pregnant or postpartum defendant in determining whether to:

(I) Issue bond pursuant to article 4 of title 16;

(II) Accept a diversion agreement pursuant to section 18-1.3-101;

(III) Accept or continue a deferred judgment pursuant to section 18-1.3-102;

(IV) Impose a sentence pursuant to section 18-1-102.5, including whether to grant probation pursuant to part 2 of this article 1.3;

(V) Impose an alternative sentence pursuant to section 18-1.3-104 or 18-1.3-106; or

(VI) Grant a stay of execution pursuant to this section.

(b) A court shall not use a pregnant or postpartum defendant's pregnancy or postpartum period as a basis for imposing a greater restriction on the defendant's liberty than a similarly situated defendant who is not pregnant or postpartum, including when a pregnant or postpartum defendant has a substance use disorder.

(4) (a) A person who may be pregnant or postpartum who is arrested or in custody in a county jail or correctional facility may request a pregnancy test upon or following admission to the county jail or correctional facility. Staff at the county jail or correctional facility shall provide a pregnancy test upon request and allow the person to take the pregnancy test within twenty-four hours after the request.

(b) Requesting a pregnancy test, taking a pregnancy test, and the results of a pregnancy test are confidential medical information. This confidential medical information must not be disclosed to outside parties unless the information is required for the person to receive medical care or to allow staff at the county jail or correctional facility to provide necessary care.

(c) If a person is represented by an attorney in a criminal proceeding and the county jail or correctional facility has a signed medical release from the person, the county jail or correctional facility shall give notice to the person's attorney within forty-eight hours, excluding state holidays and weekends, concerning the person's request for a pregnancy test pursuant to subsection (4)(a) of this section.

(5) (a) A pregnant or postpartum defendant may raise the issue of the defendant's pregnancy or postpartum period at any time during criminal proceedings or while serving a sentence. If the pregnancy or postpartum period is raised, the pregnant or postpartum defendant shall provide notice to the district attorney by providing evidence of the pregnancy or the start of the postpartum period with a limited waiver of privilege. A positive pregnancy test or medical record confirming pregnancy or the end of pregnancy, or a birth certificate of a newborn, is prima facie evidence of pregnancy or the start of the postpartum period.

(b) If the prosecution contests that the defendant is pregnant or in a postpartum state, the court shall hold a hearing to make a determination as soon as practicable, but no later than fourteen days after the issue is raised, unless the defendant requests the hearing be held later than fourteen days after the issue is raised. If the defendant requests a later hearing, the court shall make the determination within the timeline requested. The court shall hold the hearing immediately if the circumstances of the defendant or the defendant's newborn require it. The defendant shall prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant is a pregnant or postpartum defendant.

(c) The court shall protect medical information provided to the court as confidential medical information. A defendant's waiver of medical privilege to present medical evidence of pregnancy or the end of a pregnancy in court is limited to information relevant to determine whether the defendant is or was pregnant and whether the pregnancy has ended.

(6) (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of this section, a court shall not:

(I) Set or release the pregnant or postpartum defendant on bond if the pregnant or postpartum defendant is ineligible for bond;

(II) Accept an agreement or impose an alternative sentence if the pregnant or postpartum defendant is ineligible for a diversion program, deferred judgment, probationary sentence, or another form of alternative sentence; or

(III) Apply the rebuttable presumption pursuant to this section if a pregnant or postpartum defendant was convicted of a crime of violence, as defined in section 18-1.3-406 (2).

(b) The court shall impose any mandatory sentence required by law on a pregnant or postpartum defendant, but the court may grant a stay of execution as set forth in subsection (7) of this section.

(7) (a) Any pregnant or postpartum defendant may request a stay of execution by filing a written request to the court if the pregnant or postpartum defendant is detained or incarcerated in a county jail or correctional facility for any period of time through the end of the pregnancy or the postpartum period.

(b) The court shall hold a hearing to determine the matter as soon as practicable, but no later than fourteen days after the pregnant or postpartum defendant requests a stay of execution, unless the pregnant or postpartum defendant requests a later hearing. If the pregnant or postpartum defendant requests a later hearing, the court shall make the determination within the timeline requested. The court shall hold the hearing immediately if the circumstances of the pregnant or postpartum defendant or newborn require it. The defendant shall prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant is a pregnant or postpartum defendant.

(c) In ruling upon the pregnant or postpartum defendant's request pursuant to subsection (7)(b) of this section, the court shall apply the rebuttable presumption set forth in subsection (3)(a) of this section.

(d) The district attorney and the court shall comply with the requirements of the "Victim Rights Act" pursuant to part 3 of article 4.1 of title 24 in any proceeding conducted pursuant to this section.

(e) Following the hearing conducted pursuant to subsection (7)(b) of this section, the court may order a stay of execution of the sentence for any period of time through the end of the pregnancy or the postpartum period. The court shall order a date, time, and place for the defendant to appear to serve the sentence upon completion of the stay of execution.

(f) If the court grants a stay of execution pursuant to subsection (7)(e) of this section, the court shall order the bond and the conditions of the bond to remain in effect until the date the pregnant or postpartum defendant is ordered to start serving the defendant's sentence.

(g) Notwithstanding this section, a pregnant or postpartum defendant who is ineligible for bail pursuant to section 16-4-101 or 16-4-201.5 is not eligible for a stay of execution.

(h) If the pregnant or postpartum defendant is charged with a new violation or the court receives a verified motion from the district attorney or an agency responsible for supervising the pregnant or postpartum defendant that establishes a prima facie case that the pregnant or postpartum defendant has violated the conditions of the stay of execution and presents a substantial risk to public safety, the court shall set a hearing and require the pregnant or postpartum defendant to appear. After the hearing, the court may end the stay of execution, add new conditions, issue a warrant, or continue the stay of execution.

(8) If a defendant who is sentenced to incarceration learns that the defendant is pregnant following the sentencing hearing, or a postpartum defendant experiences changes to the defendant's postpartum condition following the sentencing hearing, this section does not preclude the pregnant or postpartum defendant from requesting reconsideration of the sentence pursuant to rule 35 (b) of the rules of criminal procedure. During the reconsideration hearing, this section applies.

Source: L. 2023: Entire section added, (HB 23-1187), ch. 246, p. 1335, § 1, effective August 7.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 63 cases (15 in the last 5 years), 2002–2026 · leading case: Pineda-Liberato v. People, 2017 CO 95 (Colo. 2017).
Pineda-Liberato v. People, 2017 CO 95 (Colo. 2017). · cites it 37× “Once a defendant pleads guilty to a felony, the deferred judgment statute, section 18-1.3-102, allows the court, with the defendant’s written consent and stipulation to conditions, to continue his case for a prescribed period without entering judgment, and although this deferral…”
v. People, 2019 CO 83 (Colo. 2019). · cites it 48× “Colorado’s deferred judgment statute, section 18-1.3-102, “strictly controls a trial court’s authority to impose a deferred judgment, and a trial court lacks authority to impose a deferred judgment outside the statute’s limits.”
v. People, 2019 CO 101 (Colo. 2019). · cites it 12× “Analysis ¶17 After identifying the standard of review, we discuss the statutes governing deferred judgment revocation proceedings, § 18-1.3-102, C.R.S. (2019), probation revocation hearings, § 16-11-206, C.”
v. People, 2020 CO 40 (Colo. 2020). · cites it 11× “That statute, as relocated and amended, is now codified at section 18-1.3-102. 3 ¶5 In 2016, McCulley filed a petition with the district court under section 16-22-113, seeking to discontinue the requirement that he register as a sex offender.”
Kazadi v. People, 291 P.3d 16 (Colo. 2012). · cites it 17× “Deferred Judgment Statute, Section 18-1.3-102 1 12 Colorado's deferred judgment statute, section 18-1.”
People v. Loveall, 231 P.3d 408 (Colo. 2010). · cites it 13× “§ 18-1.3-102, C.R.S. (2009). To succeed, Loveall must circumvent the three-year statute of limitations for collateral attacks, § 16-5-402(1), C.”
People v. Simonds, 113 P.3d 762 (Colo. 2005). · cites it 58× “(2002) (currently § 18-1.3-102, C.R.S. (2004)). [2] We granted the prosecution's petition for writ of certiorari on the following issue: "Whether the remedy for an agreement that calls for an illegal deferred judgment and sentence should be the same as the remedy for a plea…”
People v. Darlington, 105 P.3d 230 (Colo. 2005). · cites it 17× “Therefore, we must now consider whether section 18-1.3-102 precludes the trial court from accepting a nolo plea where the defendant would be given the benefit of a deferred sentence.”
Finney v. People, 325 P.3d 1044 (Colo. 2014). · cites it 6× “§ 18-1.3-102(@2); Kazadi, 291 P.8d at 21.”
v. People, 2021 CO 40 (Colo. 2021). · cites it 5× “” § 18-1.3-102(1)(a), C.R.S. (2020). “As a condition of continuing the 3 case, the trial court is empowered to implement probation-like supervision 4 conditions that the defendant must adhere to.”
People v. Carbajal, 312 P.3d 1183 (Colo. Ct. App. 2012). · cites it 17× “¶ 2 In this case, we are required to consider the interplay between two Colorado statutory frameworks: (1) the statute relating to deferred judgments and sentencing, set forth in section 18-1.3-102, C.R.S.2011; and (2) the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act, sections…”
People v. Corrales-Castro, 2017 CO 60 (Colo. 2017). · cites it 18× “When Corrales-Castro successfully completed the deferred judgment in 2010, his plea was withdrawn and the charge was dismissed with prejudice pursuant to section 18-1.3-102(2), C.R.S. (2016), which provides that, upon “full compliance with [the conditions of a deferred…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-102(1) — 15 cases
v. People, 2019 CO 83 (Colo. 2019). “Colorado’s deferred judgment statute, section 18-1.3-102, “strictly controls a trial court’s authority to impose a deferred judgment, and a trial court lacks authority to impose a deferred judgment outside the statute’s limits.”
People v. Simonds, 113 P.3d 762 (Colo. 2005). “(2002) (currently § 18-1.3-102, C.R.S. (2004)). [2] We granted the prosecution's petition for writ of certiorari on the following issue: "Whether the remedy for an agreement that calls for an illegal deferred judgment and sentence should be the same as the remedy for a plea…”
People v. Darlington, 105 P.3d 230 (Colo. 2005). “Therefore, we must now consider whether section 18-1.3-102 precludes the trial court from accepting a nolo plea where the defendant would be given the benefit of a deferred sentence.”
Pineda-Liberato v. People, 2017 CO 95 (Colo. 2017). “Once a defendant pleads guilty to a felony, the deferred judgment statute, section 18-1.3-102, allows the court, with the defendant’s written consent and stipulation to conditions, to continue his case for a prescribed period without entering judgment, and although this deferral…”
Finney v. People, 325 P.3d 1044 (Colo. 2014). “§ 18-1.3-102(@2); Kazadi, 291 P.8d at 21.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-102(1)(2) — 1 case
Mayo v. People, 181 P.3d 1207 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-102(1)(a) — 13 cases
v. People, 2021 CO 40 (Colo. 2021). “” § 18-1.3-102(1)(a), C.R.S. (2020). “As a condition of continuing the 3 case, the trial court is empowered to implement probation-like supervision 4 conditions that the defendant must adhere to.”
Kazadi v. People, 291 P.3d 16 (Colo. 2012). “Deferred Judgment Statute, Section 18-1.3-102 1 12 Colorado's deferred judgment statute, section 18-1.”
v. People, 2020 CO 40 (Colo. 2020). “That statute, as relocated and amended, is now codified at section 18-1.3-102. 3 ¶5 In 2016, McCulley filed a petition with the district court under section 16-22-113, seeking to discontinue the requirement that he register as a sex offender.”
Esquibel v. Bd. of Educ. Centennial Sch. Dist. R-1, 2016 COA 9 (Colo. Ct. App. 2016).
People v. $11,200.00 U.S. Currency, 313 P.3d 554 (Colo. 2013).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-102(1)(b) — 1 case
Pineda-Liberato v. People, 2017 CO 95 (Colo. 2017). “Once a defendant pleads guilty to a felony, the deferred judgment statute, section 18-1.3-102, allows the court, with the defendant’s written consent and stipulation to conditions, to continue his case for a prescribed period without entering judgment, and although this deferral…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-102(2) — 46 cases
v. People, 2019 CO 101 (Colo. 2019). “Analysis ¶17 After identifying the standard of review, we discuss the statutes governing deferred judgment revocation proceedings, § 18-1.3-102, C.R.S. (2019), probation revocation hearings, § 16-11-206, C.”
v. People, 2020 CO 40 (Colo. 2020). “That statute, as relocated and amended, is now codified at section 18-1.3-102. 3 ¶5 In 2016, McCulley filed a petition with the district court under section 16-22-113, seeking to discontinue the requirement that he register as a sex offender.”
Pineda-Liberato v. People, 2017 CO 95 (Colo. 2017). “Once a defendant pleads guilty to a felony, the deferred judgment statute, section 18-1.3-102, allows the court, with the defendant’s written consent and stipulation to conditions, to continue his case for a prescribed period without entering judgment, and although this deferral…”
Kazadi v. People, 291 P.3d 16 (Colo. 2012). “Deferred Judgment Statute, Section 18-1.3-102 1 12 Colorado's deferred judgment statute, section 18-1.”
People v. Corrales-Castro, 2017 CO 60 (Colo. 2017). “When Corrales-Castro successfully completed the deferred judgment in 2010, his plea was withdrawn and the charge was dismissed with prejudice pursuant to section 18-1.3-102(2), C.R.S. (2016), which provides that, upon “full compliance with [the conditions of a deferred…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-102(b)(1) — 1 case
Pineda-Liberato v. People, 2017 CO 95 (Colo. 2017). “Once a defendant pleads guilty to a felony, the deferred judgment statute, section 18-1.3-102, allows the court, with the defendant’s written consent and stipulation to conditions, to continue his case for a prescribed period without entering judgment, and although this deferral…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-102(b)(l) — 1 case
Pineda-Liberato v. People, 2017 CO 95 (Colo. 2017). “Once a defendant pleads guilty to a felony, the deferred judgment statute, section 18-1.3-102, allows the court, with the defendant’s written consent and stipulation to conditions, to continue his case for a prescribed period without entering judgment, and although this deferral…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-102(l) — 1 case
Pineda-Liberato v. People, 2017 CO 95 (Colo. 2017). “Once a defendant pleads guilty to a felony, the deferred judgment statute, section 18-1.3-102, allows the court, with the defendant’s written consent and stipulation to conditions, to continue his case for a prescribed period without entering judgment, and although this deferral…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-102(l)(b) — 1 case
Pineda-Liberato v. People, 2017 CO 95 (Colo. 2017). “Once a defendant pleads guilty to a felony, the deferred judgment statute, section 18-1.3-102, allows the court, with the defendant’s written consent and stipulation to conditions, to continue his case for a prescribed period without entering judgment, and although this deferral…”
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