Colorado Revised Statutes

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401 (2026)

Felonies classified - presumptive penalties

✓ current as of July 2026
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(1) (a) (I) As to any person sentenced for a felony committed after July 1, 1979, and before July 1, 1984, felonies are divided into five classes which are distinguished from one another by the following presumptive ranges of penalties which are authorized upon conviction:

Class Presumptive Range 1 Life imprisonment or death 2 Eight to twelve years plus one year of parole 3 Four to eight years plus one year of parole 4 Two to four years plus one year of parole 5 One to two years plus one year of parole

(II) As to any person sentenced for a felony committed on or after July 1, 1984, and before July 1, 1985, felonies are divided into five classes which are distinguished from one another by the following presumptive ranges of penalties which are authorized upon conviction:

Class Presumptive Range 1 Life imprisonment or death 2 Eight to twelve years 3 Four to eight years 4 Two to four years 5 One to two years

(III) (A) As to any person sentenced for a felony committed on or after July 1, 1985, except as otherwise provided in subsection (1)(a)(III)(E) or (1)(a)(III)(F) of this section, in addition to, or in lieu of, any sentence to imprisonment, probation, community corrections, or work release, a fine within the following presumptive ranges may be imposed for the specified classes of felonies:

Class Minimum Sentence Maximum Sentence 1 No fine No fine 2 Five thousand dollars One million dollars 3 Three thousand dollars Seven hundred fifty thousand dollars 4 Two thousand dollars Five hundred thousand dollars 5 One thousand dollars One hundred thousand dollars 6 One thousand dollars One hundred thousand dollars (A.5) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, any person who attempts to commit, conspires to commit, or commits against an elderly person any felony set forth in part 4 of article 4 of this title, part 1, 2, 3, or 5 of article 5 of this title, article 5.5 of this title, or section 11-51-603, C.R.S., shall be required to pay a mandatory and substantial fine within the limits permitted by law. However, all moneys collected from the offender shall be applied in the following order: Costs for crime victim compensation fund pursuant to section 24-4.1-119, C.R.S.; surcharges for victims and witnesses assistance and law enforcement fund pursuant to section 24-4.2-104, C.R.S.; restitution; time payment fee; late fees; and any other fines, fees, or surcharges. For purposes of this sub-subparagraph (A.5), an "elderly person" or "elderly victim" means a person sixty years of age or older.

(B) Failure to pay a fine imposed pursuant to this subparagraph (III) is grounds for revocation of probation or revocation of a sentence to community corrections, assuming the defendant's ability to pay. If such a revocation occurs, the court may impose the maximum sentence allowable in the given sentencing ranges.

(C) Each judicial district shall have at least one clerk who shall collect and administer the fines imposed under this subparagraph (III) and under section 18-1.3-501 in accordance with the provisions of sub-subparagraph (D) of this subparagraph (III).

(D) All fines collected pursuant to this subsection (1)(a)(III) shall be deposited in the judicial collection enhancement cash fund created in section 16-11-101.6 (2).

(E) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-subparagraph (A) of this subparagraph (III), a person who has been twice convicted of a felony under the laws of this state, any other state, or the United States prior to the conviction for which he or she is being sentenced shall not be eligible to receive a fine in lieu of any sentence to imprisonment, community corrections, or work release but shall be sentenced to at least the minimum sentence specified in subparagraph (V) of this paragraph (a) and may receive a fine in addition to said sentence.

(F) On and after June 6, 2018, if a person is convicted of second degree burglary as described in section 18-4-203 (2), in addition to any other sentence, the court may require the person to pay a fine of at least five thousand dollars but not exceeding seven hundred fifty thousand dollars.

(IV) As to any person sentenced for a felony committed on or after July 1, 1985, but prior to July 1, 1993, felonies are divided into six classes which are distinguished from one another by the following presumptive ranges of penalties which are authorized upon conviction:

Class Minimum Sentence Maximum Sentence 1 Life imprisonment Death 2 Eight years imprisonment Twenty-four years imprisonment 3 Four years imprisonment Sixteen years imprisonment 4 Two years imprisonment Eight years imprisonment 5 One year imprisonment Four years imprisonment 6 One year imprisonment Two years imprisonment

(V) (A) Except as otherwise provided in section 18-1.3-401.5 for offenses contained in article 18 of this title 18 committed on or after October 1, 2013, as to any person sentenced for a felony committed on or after July 1, 1993, and before July 1, 2018, felonies are divided into six classes that are distinguished from one another by the following presumptive ranges of penalties that are authorized upon conviction:

Class Minimum Maximum Mandatory Period Sentence Sentence of Parole 1 Life imprisonment Death None 2 Eight years Twenty-four years Five years imprisonment imprisonment 3 Four years Twelve years Five years imprisonment imprisonment 4 Two years Six years Three years imprisonment imprisonment 5 One year Three years Two years imprisonment imprisonment 6 One year Eighteen months One year imprisonment imprisonment (A.1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (1)(a)(V)(F) of this section, as to any person sentenced for a felony committed on or after July 1, 2018, and prior to July 1, 2020, felonies are divided into six classes that are distinguished from one another by the following presumptive ranges of penalties that are authorized upon conviction:

Class Minimum Maximum Mandatory Period Sentence Sentence of Parole 1 Life imprisonment Death None 2 Eight years Twenty-four years Five years if the offense imprisonment imprisonment is a crime of violence as described in section 18-1.3-406 (2) Three years if the offense is not a crime of violence as described in section 18-1.3-406 (2) 3 Four years Twelve years Three years imprisonment imprisonment 4 Two years Six years Three years imprisonment imprisonment 5 One year Three years Two years imprisonment imprisonment 6 One year Eighteen months One year imprisonment imprisonment

(B) Any person who is paroled pursuant to section 17-22.5-403, or any person who is not paroled and is discharged pursuant to law, shall be subject to the mandatory period of parole established pursuant to subsection (1)(a)(V)(A) or (1)(a)(V)(A.1) of this section. Such mandatory period of parole may not be waived by the offender or waived or suspended by the court and shall be subject to the provisions of section 17-22.5-403 (6), which permits the state board of parole to discharge the offender at any time during the term of parole upon a determination that the offender has been sufficiently rehabilitated and reintegrated into society and can no longer benefit from parole supervision.

(C) Notwithstanding subsection (1)(a)(V)(A) or (1)(a)(V)(A.1) of this section, the mandatory period of parole for a person convicted of a felony offense committed prior to July 1, 1996, pursuant to part 4 of article 3 of this title 18, or part 3 of article 6 of this title 18, shall be five years. Notwithstanding subsection (1)(a)(V)(A) or (1)(a)(V)(A.1) of this section, and except as otherwise provided in subsection (1)(a)(V)(C.5) of this section, the period of parole for a person convicted of a felony offense committed on or after July 1, 1996, but prior to July 1, 2002, pursuant to part 4 of article 3 of this title, or part 3 of article 6 of this title, shall be set by the state board of parole pursuant to section 17-2-201 (5)(a.5), but in no event shall the term of parole exceed the maximum sentence imposed upon the inmate by the court. (C.3) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2002, p. 124, § 1, effective March 26, 2002.) (C.5) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1)(a)(V)(A) or (1)(a)(V)(A.1) of this section, any person sentenced for a sex offense, as defined in section 18-1.3-1003 (5), committed on or after November 1, 1998, shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of part 10 of this article 1.3. (C.7) Any person sentenced for a felony committed on or after July 1, 2002, involving unlawful sexual behavior, as defined in section 16-22-102 (9), or for a felony, committed on or after July 1, 2002, the underlying factual basis of which involved unlawful sexual behavior, and who is not subject to the provisions of part 10 of this article 1.3, shall be subject to the mandatory period of parole specified in subsection (1)(a)(V)(A) or (1)(a)(V)(A.1) of this section.

(D) The mandatory period of parole imposed pursuant to subsection (1)(a)(V)(A) or (1)(a)(V)(A.1) of this section shall commence immediately upon the discharge of an offender from imprisonment in the custody of the department of corrections. If the offender has been granted release to parole supervision by the state board of parole, the offender shall be deemed to have discharged the offender's sentence to imprisonment provided for in subsection (1)(a)(V)(A) or (1)(a)(V)(A.1) of this section in the same manner as if such sentence were discharged pursuant to law; except that the sentence to imprisonment for any person sentenced as a sex offender pursuant to part 10 of this article 1.3 shall not be deemed discharged on release of said person on parole. When an offender is released by the state board of parole or released because the offender's sentence was discharged pursuant to law, the mandatory period of parole shall be served by such offender. An offender sentenced for nonviolent felony offenses, as defined in section 17-22.5-405 (5), may receive earned time pursuant to section 17-22.5-405, while serving a mandatory parole period in accordance with this section, but not while such offender is reincarcerated after a revocation of the mandatory period of parole. An offender who is sentenced for a felony committed on or after July 1, 1993, and paroled on or after January 1, 2009, shall be eligible to receive any earned time while on parole or after reparole following a parole revocation. The offender shall not be eligible for earned time while the offender is reincarcerated after revocation of the mandatory period of parole pursuant to this subsection (1)(a)(V).

(E) If an offender is sentenced consecutively for the commission of two or more felony offenses pursuant to subsection (1)(a)(V)(A) or (1)(a)(V)(A.1) of this section, the mandatory period of parole for such offender shall be the mandatory period of parole established for the highest class felony of which such offender has been convicted.

(F) Notwithstanding any other provision to the contrary, the maximum sentence for a class 1 felony that is charged after July 1, 2020, is life imprisonment. (V.5) (A) As to any person sentenced for a felony for an offense committed on or after July 1, 2020, felonies are divided into six classes that are distinguished from one another by the following presumptive ranges of penalties that are authorized upon conviction:

Class Minimum Maximum Mandatory Period Sentence Sentence of Parole 1 Life imprisonment None 2 Eight years Twenty-four years Five years if imprisonment imprisonment offense is a crime of violence as described in section 18-1.3-406 (2) Three years if the offense is not a crime of violence as described in section 18-1.3-406 (2) 3 Four years Twelve years Three years imprisonment imprisonment 4 Two years Six years Three years imprisonment imprisonment 5 One year Three years Two years imprisonment imprisonment 6 One year Eighteen months One year imprisonment imprisonment

(B) Any person who is paroled pursuant to section 17-22.5-403, or any person who is not paroled and is discharged pursuant to law, shall be subject to the mandatory period of parole established pursuant to subsection (1)(a)(V.5)(A) of this section. Such mandatory period of parole may not be waived by the offender or waived or suspended by the court and shall be subject to the provisions of section 17-22.5-403 (8), which permits the state board of parole to discharge the offender at any time during the term of parole upon a determination that the offender has been sufficiently rehabilitated and reintegrated into society and can no longer benefit from parole supervision.

(C) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (1)(a)(V.5)(A) of this section, any person sentenced for a sex offense, as defined in section 18-1.3-1003 (5), committed on or after July 1, 2020, shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of part 10 of this article 1.3.

(D) Any person sentenced for a felony conviction entered on or after July 1, 2020, involving unlawful sexual behavior, as defined in section 16-22-102 (9), or for a felony committed on or after July 1, 2020, the underlying factual basis of which involved unlawful sexual behavior, and who is not subject to the provisions of part 10 of this article 1.3, shall be subject to the mandatory period of parole specified in subsection (1)(a)(V.5)(A) of this section.

(E) The mandatory period of parole imposed pursuant to subsection (1)(a)(V.5)(A) of this section shall commence immediately upon the discharge of an offender from imprisonment in the custody of the department of corrections. If the offender has been granted release to parole supervision by the state board of parole, the offender shall be deemed to have discharged the offender's sentence to imprisonment provided for in subsection (1)(a)(V.5)(A) of this section in the same manner as if such sentence were discharged pursuant to law; except that the sentence to imprisonment for any person sentenced as a sex offender pursuant to part 10 of this article 1.3 shall not be deemed discharged on release of said person on parole. When an offender is released by the state board of parole or released because the offender's sentence was discharged pursuant to law, the mandatory period of parole shall be served by such offender. An offender sentenced for a nonviolent felony offense, as defined in section 17-22.5-405 (5), may receive earned time pursuant to section 17-22.5-405 while serving a mandatory parole period in accordance with this section, but not while such offender is reincarcerated after a revocation of the mandatory period of parole. An offender shall be eligible to receive earned time while on parole or after reparole following a parole revocation. The offender shall not be eligible for earned time while the offender is reincarcerated after revocation of the mandatory period of parole pursuant to this subsection (1)(a)(V.5).

(F) If an offender is sentenced consecutively for the commission of two or more felony offenses pursuant to subsection (1)(a)(V.5)(A) of this section, the mandatory period of parole for such offender shall be the mandatory period of parole established for the highest class felony of which such offender has been convicted.

(VI) Any person sentenced for a class 2, 3, 4, or 5 felony, or a class 6 felony that is the offender's second or subsequent felony offense, committed on or after July 1, 1998, regardless of the length of the person's sentence to incarceration and the mandatory period of parole, shall not be deemed to have fully discharged his or her sentence until said person has either completed or been discharged by the state board of parole from the mandatory period of parole imposed pursuant to subparagraph (V) of this paragraph (a).

(b) (I) Except as provided in subsection (6) and subsection (8) of this section and in section 18-1.3-804, a person who has been convicted of a class 2, class 3, class 4, class 5, or class 6 felony shall be punished by the imposition of a definite sentence which is within the presumptive ranges set forth in paragraph (a) of this subsection (1). In imposing the sentence within the presumptive range, the court shall consider the nature and elements of the offense, the character and record of the offender, and all aggravating or mitigating circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender. The prediction of the potential for future criminality by a particular defendant, unless based on prior criminal conduct, shall not be considered in determining the length of sentence to be imposed.

(II) As to any person sentenced for a felony committed on or after July 1, 1985, a person may be sentenced to imprisonment as described in subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (b) or to pay a fine that is within the presumptive ranges set forth in subparagraph (III) of paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) or to both such fine and imprisonment; except that any person who has been twice convicted of a felony under the laws of this state, any other state, or the United States prior to the conviction for which he or she is being sentenced shall not be eligible to receive a fine in lieu of any sentence to imprisonment as described in subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (b) but shall be sentenced to at least the minimum sentence specified in subparagraph (V) of paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) and may receive a fine in addition to said sentence. (II.5) Notwithstanding anything in this section to the contrary, any person sentenced for a sex offense, as defined in section 18-1.3-1003 (5), committed on or after November 1, 1998, may be sentenced to pay a fine in addition to, but not instead of, a sentence for imprisonment or probation pursuant to section 18-1.3-1004.

(III) Notwithstanding anything in this section to the contrary, as to any person sentenced for a crime of violence, as defined in section 18-1.3-406, committed on or after July 1, 1985, a person may be sentenced to pay a fine in addition to, but not instead of, a sentence for imprisonment.

(IV) If a person is convicted of assault in the first degree pursuant to section 18-3-202 or assault in the second degree pursuant to section 18-3-203 (1)(c.5), and the victim is a peace officer, firefighter, or emergency medical service provider engaged in the performance of his or her duties, as defined in section 18-1.3-501 (1.5)(b), notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (III) of paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) and subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (b), the court shall sentence the person to the department of corrections. In addition to a term of imprisonment, the court may impose a fine on the person pursuant to subparagraph (III) of paragraph (a) of this subsection (1).

(c) Except as otherwise provided by statute, felonies are punishable by imprisonment in any correctional facility under the supervision of the executive director of the department of corrections. Nothing in this section shall limit the authority granted in part 8 of this article to increase sentences for habitual criminals. Nothing in this section shall limit the authority granted in parts 9 and 10 of this article to sentence sex offenders to the department of corrections or to sentence sex offenders to probation for an indeterminate term. Nothing in this section shall limit the authority granted in section 18-1.3-804 for increased sentences for habitual burglary offenders.

(2) (a) A corporation which has been found guilty of a class 2 or class 3 felony shall be subject to imposition of a fine of not less than five thousand dollars nor more than fifty thousand dollars. A corporation which has been found guilty of a class 4, class 5, or class 6 felony shall be subject to imposition of a fine of not less than one thousand dollars nor more than thirty thousand dollars.

(b) A corporation which has been found guilty of a class 2, class 3, class 4, class 5, or class 6 felony, for an act committed on or after July 1, 1985, shall be subject to imposition of a fine which is within the presumptive ranges set forth in subparagraph (III) of paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section.

(3) Every person convicted of a felony, whether defined as such within or outside this code, shall be disqualified from holding any office of honor, trust, or profit under the laws of this state or from practicing as an attorney in any of the courts of this state during the actual time of confinement or commitment to imprisonment or release from actual confinement on conditions of probation. Upon his or her discharge after completion of service of his or her sentence or after service under probation, the right to hold any office of honor, trust, or profit shall be restored, except as provided in section 4 of article XII of the state constitution.

(4) (a) (I) A person who has been convicted of a class 1 felony shall be punished by life imprisonment in the department of corrections unless the offense was charged prior to July 1, 2020, and a proceeding held to determine sentence according to the procedure set forth in section 18-1.3-1201, 18-1.3-1302, or 18-1.4-102 results in a verdict that requires imposition of the death penalty, in which event such person shall be sentenced to death.

(II) A person who has been convicted of a class 1 felony shall be punished by life imprisonment in the department of corrections if the offense was committed during a period of time when Colorado's death penalty was unconstitutional.

(III) As to any person sentenced for a class 1 felony, for an act committed on or after July 1, 1985, and before July 1, 1990, life imprisonment shall mean imprisonment without the possibility of parole for forty calendar years. As to any person sentenced for a class 1 felony, for an act committed on or after July 1, 1990, life imprisonment shall mean imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

(b) (I) Notwithstanding subsection (1)(a)(V)(A) of this section and notwithstanding subsection (4)(a) of this section, as to a person who is convicted as an adult of a class 1 felony following direct filing of an information or indictment in the district court pursuant to section 19-2.5-801 or transfer of proceedings to the district court pursuant to section 19-2.5-802, the district court judge shall sentence the person to a term of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after serving a period of forty years, less any earned time granted pursuant to section 17-22.5-405. Regardless of whether the state board of parole releases the person on parole, the person shall remain in the legal custody of the department of corrections for the remainder of the person's life and shall not be discharged.

(II) The provisions of this paragraph (b) shall apply to persons sentenced for offenses committed on or after July 1, 2006.

(c) (I) Notwithstanding subsections (1)(a)(V)(A), (4)(a), and (4)(b) of this section, as to a person who is convicted as an adult of a class 1 felony following a direct filing of an information or indictment in the district court pursuant to section 19-2.5-801, or transfer of proceedings to the district court pursuant to section 19-2.5-802, or pursuant to either of these sections as they existed prior to their repeal and reenactment, with amendments, by House Bill 96-1005, which felony was committed on or after July 1, 1990, and before July 1, 2006, and who received a sentence to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole:

(A) If the felony for which the person was convicted is murder in the first degree, as described in section 18-3-102 (1)(b), as it existed prior to September 15, 2021, then the district court, after holding a hearing, may sentence the person to a determinate sentence within the range of thirty to fifty years in prison, less any earned time granted pursuant to section 17-22.5- 405, if, after considering the factors described in subsection (4)(c)(II) of this section, the district court finds extraordinary mitigating circumstances. Alternatively, the court may sentence the person to a term of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after serving forty years, less any earned time granted pursuant to section 17-22.5-405.

(B) If the felony for which the person was convicted is not murder in the first degree, as described in section 18-3-102 (1)(b), as it existed prior to September 15, 2021, then the district court shall sentence the person to a term of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after serving forty years, less any earned time granted pursuant to section 17-22.5-405.

(II) In determining whether extraordinary mitigating circumstances exist, the court shall conduct a sentencing hearing, make factual findings to support its decision, and consider relevant evidence presented by either party regarding the following factors:

(A) The diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change associated with youth;

(B) The offender's developmental maturity and chronological age at the time of the offense and the hallmark features of such age, including but not limited to immaturity, impetuosity, and inability to appreciate risks and consequences;

(C) The offender's capacity for change and potential for rehabilitation, including any evidence of the offender's efforts toward, or amenability to, rehabilitation;

(D) The impact of the offense upon any victim or victim's immediate family; and

(E) Any other factors that the court deems relevant to its decision, so long as the court identifies such factors on the record.

(III) If a person is sentenced to a determinate range of thirty to fifty years in prison pursuant to this paragraph (c), the court shall impose a mandatory period of ten years parole.

(IV) If a person is sentenced to a term of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole after serving forty years, less any earned time granted pursuant to section 17-22.5-405, C.R.S., regardless of whether the state board of parole releases the person on parole, the person shall remain in the legal custody of the department of corrections for the remainder of his or her life and shall not be discharged.

(5) In the event the death penalty as provided for in this section is held to be unconstitutional by the Colorado supreme court or the United States supreme court, a person convicted of a crime punishable by death under the laws of this state shall be punished by life imprisonment. In such circumstance, the court which previously sentenced a person to death shall cause such person to be brought before the court, and the court shall sentence such person to life imprisonment.

(6) In imposing a sentence to incarceration, the court shall impose a definite sentence which is within the presumptive ranges set forth in subsection (1) of this section unless it concludes that extraordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances are present, are based on evidence in the record of the sentencing hearing and the presentence report, and support a different sentence which better serves the purposes of this code with respect to sentencing, as set forth in section 18-1-102.5. If the court finds such extraordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances, it may impose a sentence which is lesser or greater than the presumptive range; except that in no case shall the term of sentence be greater than twice the maximum nor less than one-half the minimum term authorized in the presumptive range for the punishment of the offense.

(7) In all cases, except as provided in subsection (8) of this section, in which a sentence which is not within the presumptive range is imposed, the court shall make specific findings on the record of the case, detailing the specific extraordinary circumstances which constitute the reasons for varying from the presumptive sentence.

(8) (a) The presence of any one or more of the following extraordinary aggravating circumstances shall require the court, if it sentences the defendant to incarceration, to sentence the defendant to a term of at least the midpoint in the presumptive range but not more than twice the maximum term authorized in the presumptive range for the punishment of a felony:

(I) The defendant is convicted of a crime of violence under section 18-1.3-406;

(II) The defendant was on parole for another felony at the time of commission of the felony;

(III) The defendant was on probation or was on bond while awaiting sentencing following revocation of probation for another felony at the time of the commission of the felony;

(IV) The defendant was under confinement, in prison, or in any correctional institution as a convicted felon, or an escapee from any correctional institution for another felony at the time of the commission of a felony;

(V) At the time of the commission of the felony, the defendant was on appeal bond following his or her conviction for a previous felony;

(VI) At the time of the commission of a felony, the defendant was on probation for or on bond while awaiting sentencing following revocation of probation for a delinquent act that would have constituted a felony if committed by an adult.

(b) In any case in which one or more of the extraordinary aggravating circumstances provided for in paragraph (a) of this subsection (8) exist, the provisions of subsection (7) of this section shall not apply.

(c) Nothing in this subsection (8) shall preclude the court from considering aggravating circumstances other than those stated in paragraph (a) of this subsection (8) as the basis for sentencing the defendant to a term greater than the presumptive range for the felony.

(d) (I) If the defendant is convicted of the class 2 or the class 3 felony of child abuse under section 18-6-401 (7)(a)(I) or (7)(a)(III), the court shall be required to sentence the defendant to the department of corrections for a term of at least the midpoint in the presumptive range but not more than twice the maximum term authorized in the presumptive range for the punishment of that class felony.

(II) In no case shall any defendant sentenced pursuant to subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (d) be eligible for suspension of sentence or for probation or deferred prosecution.

(e) (I) If the defendant is convicted of the class 2 felony of sexual assault in the first degree under section 18-3-402 (3), commission of which offense occurs prior to November 1, 1998, the court shall be required to sentence the defendant to a term of at least the midpoint in the presumptive range but not more than twice the maximum term authorized in the presumptive range for the punishment of that class of felony.

(II) In no case shall any defendant sentenced pursuant to subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (e) be eligible for suspension of sentence or probation.

(III) As a condition of parole under section 17-2-201 (5)(e), C.R.S., a defendant sentenced pursuant to this paragraph (e) shall be required to participate in a program of mental health counseling or receive appropriate treatment to the extent that the state board of parole deems appropriate to effectuate the successful reintegration of the defendant into the community while recognizing the need for public safety. (e.5) If the defendant is convicted of the class 2 felony of sexual assault under section 18-3-402 (5) or the class 2 felony of sexual assault in the first degree under section 18-3-402 (3) as it existed prior to July 1, 2000, commission of which offense occurs on or after November 1, 1998, the court shall be required to sentence the defendant to the department of corrections for an indeterminate sentence of at least the midpoint in the presumptive range for the punishment of that class of felony up to the defendant's natural life.

(f) The court may consider aggravating circumstances such as serious bodily injury caused to the victim or the use of a weapon in the commission of a crime, notwithstanding the fact that such factors constitute elements of the offense.

(g) If the defendant is convicted of class 4 or class 3 felony vehicular homicide under section 18-3-106 (1)(a) or (1)(b), and while committing vehicular homicide the defendant was in immediate flight from the commission of another felony, the court shall be required to sentence the defendant to the department of corrections for a term of at least the midpoint in the presumptive range but not more than twice the maximum term authorized in the presumptive range for the punishment of the class of felony vehicular homicide of which the defendant is convicted.

(9) The presence of any one or more of the following sentence-enhancing circumstances shall require the court, if it sentences the defendant to incarceration, to sentence the defendant to a term of at least the minimum in the presumptive range but not more than twice the maximum term authorized in the presumptive range for the punishment of a felony:

(a) At the time of the commission of the felony, the defendant was charged with or was on bond for a felony in a previous case and the defendant was convicted of any felony in the previous case; (a.5) At the time of the commission of the felony, the defendant was charged with or was on bond for a delinquent act that would have constituted a felony if committed by an adult;

(b) At the time of the commission of the felony, the defendant was on bond for having pled guilty to a lesser offense when the original offense charged was a felony;

(c) The defendant was under a deferred judgment and sentence for another felony at the time of the commission of the felony; (c.5) At the time of the commission of the felony, the defendant was on bond in a juvenile prosecution under title 19, C.R.S., for having pled guilty to a lesser delinquent act when the original delinquent act charged would have constituted a felony if committed by an adult; (c.7) At the time of the commission of the felony, the defendant was under a deferred judgment and sentence for a delinquent act that would have constituted a felony if committed by an adult;

(d) At the time of the commission of the felony, the defendant was on parole for having been adjudicated a delinquent child for an offense which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult.

(10) (a) The general assembly hereby finds that certain crimes that are listed in subsection (10)(b) of this section present an extraordinary risk of harm to society and therefore, in the interest of public safety, for such crimes that constitute class 3 felonies, the maximum sentence in the presumptive range is increased by four years; for such crimes that constitute class 4 felonies, the maximum sentence in the presumptive range is increased by two years; for such crimes that constitute class 5 felonies, the maximum sentence in the presumptive range is increased by one year; for such crimes that constitute class 6 felonies, the maximum sentence in the presumptive range is increased by six months.

(b) Crimes that present an extraordinary risk of harm to society include the following: (I) to (VIII) Repealed.

(IX) Aggravated robbery, as defined in section 18-4-302;

(X) Child abuse, as defined in section 18-6-401;

(XI) Unlawful distribution, manufacturing, dispensing, sale, or possession of a controlled substance with the intent to sell, distribute, manufacture, or dispense, as defined in section 18-18-405;

(XII) Any crime of violence, as defined in section 18-1.3-406;

(XIII) Stalking, as described in section 18-9-111 (4), as it existed prior to August 11, 2010, or section 18-3-602;

(XIV) Sale or distribution of materials to manufacture controlled substances, as described in section 18-18-412.7;

(XV) Felony invasion of privacy for sexual gratification, as described in section 18-3- 405.6;

(XVI) A class 3 felony offense of human trafficking for involuntary servitude, as described in section 18-3-503;

(XVII) A class 3 felony offense of human trafficking for sexual servitude, as described in section 18-3-504;

(XVIII) Assault in the second degree, as described in section 18-3-203 (1)(i); and

(XIX) Sexual exploitation of a child, as described in section 18-6-403 (5.5).

(c) Repealed.

(11) When it shall appear to the satisfaction of the court that the ends of justice and the best interest of the public, as well as the defendant, will be best served thereby, the court shall have the power to suspend the imposition or execution of sentence for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; except that in no instance shall the court have the power to suspend a sentence to a term of incarceration when the defendant is sentenced pursuant to a sentencing provision that requires incarceration or imprisonment in the department of corrections, community corrections, or jail. In no instance shall a sentence be suspended if the defendant is ineligible for probation pursuant to section 18-1.3-201, except upon an express waiver being made by the sentencing court regarding a particular defendant upon recommendation of the district attorney and approval of such recommendation by an order of the sentencing court pursuant to section 18-1.3-201 (4).

(12) Every sentence entered under this section shall include consideration of restitution as required by part 6 of this article and by article 18.5 of title 16, C.R.S.

(13) (a) The court, if it sentences a defendant who is convicted of any one or more of the offenses specified in paragraph (b) of this subsection (13) to incarceration, shall sentence the defendant to a term of at least the midpoint, but not more than twice the maximum, of the presumptive range authorized for the punishment of the offense of which the defendant is convicted if the court makes the following findings on the record:

(I) The victim of the offense was pregnant at the time of commission of the offense; and

(II) The defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim of the offense was pregnant.

(III) (Deleted by amendment, L. 2003, p. 2163, § 3, effective July 1, 2003.)

(b) The provisions of this subsection (13) shall apply to the following offenses:

(I) Murder in the second degree, as described in section 18-3-103;

(II) Manslaughter, as described in section 18-3-104;

(III) Criminally negligent homicide, as described in section 18-3-105;

(IV) Vehicular homicide, as described in section 18-3-106;

(V) Assault in the first degree, as described in section 18-3-202;

(VI) Assault in the second degree, as described in section 18-3-203;

(VII) Vehicular assault, as described in section 18-3-205.

(c) Notwithstanding any provision of this subsection (13) to the contrary, for any of the offenses specified in paragraph (b) of this subsection (13) that constitute crimes of violence, the court shall sentence the defendant in accordance with the provisions of section 18-1.3-406.

(14) The court may sentence a defendant to the youthful offender system created in section 18-1.3-407 if the defendant is an eligible young adult offender pursuant to section 18- 1.3-407.5.

Source: L. 2002: Entire article added with relocations, p. 1392, § 2, effective October 1. L. 2002, 3rd Ex. Sess.: (4) amended, p. 15, § 8, effective October 1. L. 2003: (1)(b)(IV), (4), (8)(d)(I), (8)(e.5), (8)(g), (10)(c), and (11) amended, pp. 1425, 1435, 1429, §§ 4, 32, 13, effective April 29; (1)(a)(VI) amended, p. 2679, § 5, effective July 1; (8)(a)(VI), (9)(a.5), (9)(c.5), and (9)(c.7) amended, p. 1431, § 18, effective July 1; (13)(a)(II) and (13)(a)(III) amended, p. 2163, § 3, effective July 1; (10)(b)(XII) and (10)(b)(XIII) amended and (10)(b)(XIV) added, p. 2387, § 3, effective July 1, 2004. L. 2004: (10)(b)(I) to (10)(b)(VIII) and (10)(c) repealed, p. 633, § 1, effective August 4. L. 2006: (4) amended, p. 1052, § 2, effective May 25. L. 2008: (1)(a)(V)(D) amended, p. 1757, § 6, effective July 1; (1)(a)(III)(A.5) amended, p. 1889, § 54, effective August 5. L. 2009: (14) added, (HB 09-1122), ch. 77, p. 280, § 4, effective October 1. L. 2010:

(10)(b)(XIII) amended, (HB 10-1233), ch. 88, p. 296, § 5, effective August 11; (10)(b)(XIII) and

(10)(b)(XIV) amended and (10)(b)(XV) added, (SB 10-128), ch. 415, p. 2046, § 5, effective July 1, 2012. L. 2014: IP(1)(a)(V)(A) amended, (SB 14-163), ch. 391, p. 1972, § 10, effective June 6;

(10)(b)(XIV) amended and (10)(b)(XVI) and (10)(b)(XVII) added, (HB 14-1273), ch. 282, p. 1154, § 15, effective July 1; (1)(b)(IV) amended, (HB 14-1214), ch. 336, p. 1494, § 1, effective August 6. L. 2015: (1)(a)(V)(B) amended, (HB 15-1122), ch. 37, p. 92, § 7, effective March 20;

(1)(b)(IV) amended, (HB 15-1303), ch. 211, p. 772, § 2, effective September 1. L. 2016:

(4)(b)(I) amended and (4)(c) added, (SB 16-181), ch. 353, p. 1447, § 1, effective June 10; (10)(b)(XVI) and (10)(b)(XVII) amended and (10)(b)(XVIII) added, (HB 16-1080), ch. 327, p. 1328, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2018: (1)(a)(V) amended, (HB 18-1029), ch. 153, p. 1084, § 1, effective April 23; (1)(a)(III)(A) amended and (1)(a)(III)(F) added, (HB 18-1077), ch. 376, p. 2280, § 2, effective June 6. L. 2020: (1)(a)(V)(A.1) and (4)(a) amended and (1)(a)(V)(F) and (1)(a)(V.5) added, (SB 20-100), ch. 61, p. 209, § 10, effective March 23. L. 2021: (10)(a), IP(10)(b), (10)(b)(XVII), (10)(b)(XVIII) amended and (10)(b)(XIX) added (HB 21-1069), ch. 446, p. 2942, § 4, effective September 7; (4)(c)(I) amended, (SB 21-124), ch. 58, p. 237, § 4, effective September 15; (4)(b)(I) and IP(4)(c)(I) amended, (SB 21-059), ch. 136, p. 719, § 42, effective October 1; (1)(a)(III)(F) amended, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3170, § 185, effective March 1, 2022. L. 2022: (1)(a)(III)(D) amended, (HB 22-1336), ch. 132, p. 899, § 1, effective April 25.

Editor's note: (1) This section is similar to former § 18-1-105 as it existed prior to 2002.

(2) This section was amended in 2002 prior to its relocation on October 1, 2002. For that history, see the source note to § 18-1-105.

(3) Amendments to subsection (10)(b)(XIII) by House Bill 10-1233 and Senate Bill 10- 128 were harmonized, effective July 1, 2012.

(4) Amendments to subsection (4)(c)(I) by SB 21-059 and SB 21-124 were harmonized.

Cross references: (1) For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsection (4), see section 16 of chapter 1 of the supplement to the Session Laws of Colorado 2002, Third Extraordinary Session. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2003 act amending subsections (10)(b)(XII) and (10)(b)(XIII) and enacting subsection (10)(b)(XIV), see section 1 of chapter 360, Session Laws of Colorado 2003. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2003 act amending subsections (13)(a)(II) and (13)(a)(III), see section 1 of chapter 340, Session Laws of Colorado 2003. For the legislative declaration contained in the 2006 act amending subsection (4), see section 1 of chapter 228, Session Laws of Colorado 2006. For the legislative declaration in HB 15-1122, see section 1 of chapter 37, Session Laws of Colorado 2015.

(2) For the legislative declaration in HB 21-1069 stating the purpose of, and the provision directing legislative staff agencies to conduct, a post-enactment review pursuant to § 2-2-1201 scheduled in 2024, see sections 1 and 7 of chapter 446, Session Laws of Colorado 2021. To obtain a copy of the review, once completed, go to "Legislative Resources and Requirements" on the Colorado General Assembly's website.

18-1.3-401.5. Drug felonies classified - presumptive and aggravated penalties - legislative intent. (1) The provisions of this section only apply to a conviction for a drug felony offense described in article 18 of this title committed on or after October 1, 2013. For purposes of this section, "felony" means any felony or drug felony defined in the state statutes.

(2) (a) For offenses committed on or after October 1, 2013, drug felonies are divided into four levels that are distinguished from one another by the ranges of penalties, which are authorized upon conviction of a drug felony:

Level Presumptive Range Period of Parole DF1 Eight years Thirty-two years Three years DF2 Four years Eight years Two years DF3 Two years Four years One year DF4 Six months One year One year Level Aggravated Range Period of Parole DF2 Eight years Sixteen years Two years DF3 Four years Six years One year DF4 One year Two years One year

(b) (I) As to any person sentenced for a drug felony committed on or after October 1, 2013, except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (V) of this paragraph (b) and in subsection (7) of this section, in addition to, or in lieu of, any sentence to imprisonment, probation, community corrections, or work release, a fine within the following ranges may be imposed for the specified level of drug felonies:

Level Minimum Sentence Maximum Sentence DF1 Five thousand dollars One million dollars DF2 Three thousand dollars Seven hundred fifty thousand dollars DF3 Two thousand dollars Five hundred thousand dollars DF4 One thousand dollars One hundred thousand dollars

(II) Failure to pay a fine imposed pursuant to this paragraph (b) is grounds for revocation of probation, community corrections, or a suspended sentence, if the defendant has the ability to pay the fine.

(III) If a revocation occurs pursuant to subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (b), the court may impose any sentence legally available, subject to the provisions of section 18-1.3-104.5 (2).

(IV) All fines collected pursuant to this paragraph (b) must be deposited in the fines collection fund created in section 18-1.3-401 (1)(a)(III)(D) and are subject to the provisions of that section.

(V) Notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (b), a person who has been twice convicted of a felony under the laws of this state, any other state, or the United States prior to the conviction for which he or she is being sentenced shall not be eligible to receive a fine in lieu of any sentence to imprisonment, community corrections, or work release but shall be sentenced to at least the minimum sentence specified in paragraph (a) of this subsection (2) and may receive a fine in addition to said sentence.

(2.5) It is the intent of the general assembly that sentencing for crimes that involve fentanyl, carfentanil, benzimidazole opiate, or any analog thereof, as described in section 18-18- 204 (2)(g), even in small quantities, reflect the high risk of addiction and death associated with fentanyl, carfentanil, benzimidazole opiate, or any analog thereof. Therefore, the education and treatment procedures provided in section 18-1.3-410 must be implemented to address this substantial health risk.

(3) A person who is paroled pursuant to section 17-22.5-403, C.R.S., or any person who is not paroled and is discharged pursuant to law, shall be subject to the mandatory period of parole established pursuant to paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of this section. The mandatory period of parole may not be waived by the offender or waived or suspended by the court and is subject to the provisions of section 17-22.5-403 (6), C.R.S., which permits the state board of parole to discharge the offender at any time during the term of parole upon a determination that the offender has been sufficiently rehabilitated and reintegrated into society and can no longer benefit from parole supervision.

(4) The mandatory period of parole imposed pursuant to paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of this section commences immediately upon the discharge of an offender from imprisonment in the custody of the department of corrections. If the offender has been granted release to parole supervision by the state board of parole, the offender is deemed to have discharged the offender's sentence to imprisonment provided for in subsection (2) of this section in the same manner as if such sentence were discharged pursuant to law. When an offender is released by the state board of parole or released because the offender's sentence was discharged pursuant to law, the mandatory period of parole must be served by the offender. An offender sentenced for a drug felony may receive earned time pursuant to section 17-22.5-405, C.R.S., while serving a mandatory parole period in accordance with this section.

(5) If an offender is sentenced consecutively for the commission of two or more felony offenses pursuant to sentencing provisions in this section or section 18-1.3-401, the mandatory period of parole for the offender must be the longest mandatory period of parole established for a felony for which the offender was convicted.

(6) Any person sentenced for a level 1, 2, 3, or 4 drug felony that is the offender's second or subsequent felony or drug felony offense, regardless of the length of the person's sentence to incarceration and the mandatory period of parole, is not deemed to have fully discharged his or her sentence until the person either completes, or is discharged by the state board of parole from, the mandatory period of parole imposed pursuant to paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of this section.

(7) Except as provided in section 18-18-405 (2)(a)(III)(B), notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary, if the defendant is convicted of a level 1 drug felony, the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of incarceration in the department of corrections of at least eight years but not more than thirty-two years. The presence of one or more of the aggravating circumstances provided in subsection (10)(a) of this section or in section 18-18-407

(1) requires the court to sentence a defendant convicted of a level 1 drug felony to a term of incarceration in the department of corrections of at least twelve years but no more than thirty- two years. The court may impose a fine in addition to imprisonment.

(8) In imposing a sentence to incarceration, the court shall impose a definite sentence that is within the presumptive ranges set forth in subsection (2) of this section; except that, for level 2, level 3, and level 4 drug felonies, the court may sentence the defendant in the aggravated range if it concludes aggravating circumstances exist. The aggravating circumstances must be based on evidence in the record of the sentencing hearing, the presentence report, and any factors agreed to by the parties and must support a different sentence that better serves the purposes of this code with respect to sentencing, as set forth in section 18-1-102.5.

(9) In all cases, except as provided in subsection (10) of this section, in which a sentence that is not within the presumptive range is imposed, the court shall make specific findings on the record, detailing the aggravating circumstances that constitute the reasons for varying from the presumptive sentence.

(10) (a) Except for a level 1 drug felony, the presence of one or more of the following aggravating circumstances at the time of the commission of a drug felony offense requires the court, if it sentences the defendant to incarceration, to sentence the defendant to a term of at least the midpoint in the presumptive range but not more than the maximum term of the aggravated range:

(I) The defendant was on parole for another felony;

(II) The defendant was on probation or was on bond while awaiting sentencing following revocation of probation for another felony;

(III) The defendant was under confinement, in prison, or in any correctional institution as a convicted felon, or an escapee from any correctional institution for another felony; (III.5) The defendant was on appeal bond following his or her conviction for a previous felony;

(IV) The defendant was on probation for or on bond while awaiting sentencing following revocation of probation for a delinquent act that would have constituted a felony if committed by an adult; or

(V) The defendant committed a violation of section 18-18-405 (2)(a)(III)(A), and the unlawful distribution, manufacturing, dispensing, or sale of the material, compound, mixture, or preparation weighed more than fifty grams and contained fentanyl, carfentanil, benzimidazole opiate, or an analog thereof as described in section 18-18-204 (2)(g).

(b) In any case in which one or more of the aggravating circumstances provided for in paragraph (a) of this subsection (10) exist, the provisions of subsection (9) of this section do not apply.

(c) Nothing in this subsection (10) precludes the court from considering aggravating circumstances other than those stated in paragraph (a) of this subsection (10) as the basis for sentencing the defendant to a term greater than the presumptive range for the drug felony.

(11) Except for a level 1 drug felony, the presence of any one or more of the following sentence-enhancing circumstances allows the court, if it sentences the defendant to incarceration, to sentence the defendant to a term in the presumptive or aggravated range:

(a) At the time of the commission of the drug felony, the defendant was charged with or was on bond for a felony in a previous case and the defendant was convicted of any felony in the previous case;

(b) At the time of the commission of the drug felony, the defendant was charged with or was on bond for a delinquent act that would have constituted a felony if committed by an adult;

(c) At the time of the commission of the drug felony, the defendant was on bond for having pled guilty to a lesser offense when the original offense charged was a felony; (c.5) At the time of the commission of the drug felony, the defendant was under a deferred judgment and sentence for another felony;

(d) At the time of the commission of the drug felony, the defendant was on bond in a juvenile prosecution under title 19, C.R.S., for having pled guilty to a lesser delinquent act when the original delinquent act charged would have constituted a felony if committed by an adult;

(e) At the time of the commission of the drug felony, the defendant was under a deferred judgment and sentence for a delinquent act that would have constituted a felony if committed by an adult; or

(f) At the time of the commission of the drug felony, the defendant was on parole for having been adjudicated a delinquent child for an offense that would constitute a felony if committed by an adult.

(12) When it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the ends of justice and the best interest of the public, as well as the defendant, will be best served thereby, the court has the power to suspend the imposition or execution of sentence for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; except that the court may not suspend a sentence when the defendant is convicted of a level 1 drug felony. In no instance may a sentence be suspended if the defendant is ineligible for probation pursuant to section 18-1.3-201, except upon an express waiver being made by the sentencing court regarding a particular defendant upon recommendation of the district attorney and approval of such recommendation by an order of the sentencing court pursuant to section 18-1.3-201 (4).

(13) Every sentence entered under this section must include consideration of restitution as required by part 6 of this article and by article 18.5 of title 16, C.R.S.

(14) (a) Notwithstanding subsection (2)(a) of this section, for the purpose of sentencing a person convicted of a level 4 drug felony committed on or after July 1, 2022, in violation of section 18-18-403.5 (2.5), a court shall either sentence an offender to probation for up to two years, with the possibility of a total of one hundred eighty days in county jail, or for a third or subsequent offense, a total of up to three hundred sixty-four days in county jail, which may be imposed in whole or in part during the time period of probation as a condition of probation or as a sanction for a violation of probation; or sentence an offender to up to one hundred eighty days in the county jail; except that for a third or subsequent offense, the court may sentence an offender to up to three hundred sixty-four days in the county jail if the court sentences the offender to jail. In addition to the sentence to probation or to the county jail, the court may impose a fine of not more than one thousand dollars.

(b) A court may sentence a person convicted of a level 4 drug felony committed on or after July 1, 2022, in violation of section 18-18-403.5 (2.5), to a county jail sentencing alternative provided pursuant to section 18-1.3-106 or placement in a community corrections program as a condition of probation provided pursuant to section 18-1.3-301 (4) as a sentencing alternative.

(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, an offender convicted of a level 4 drug felony committed on or after July 1, 2022, in violation of section 18-18-403.5 (2.5), is not subject to the jurisdiction of the department of corrections or a mandatory period of parole.

Source: L. 2013: Entire section added, (SB 13-250), ch. 333, p. 1903, § 4, effective October 1. L. 2014: IP(2)(b)(I), (4), (7), (11), and (12) amended and (2)(b)(V) and (10)(a)(III.5) added, (SB 14-163), ch. 391, p. 1972, § 11, effective June 6. L. 2015: (3) amended, (HB 15- 1122), ch. 37, p. 92, § 8, effective March 20. L. 2022: (2.5), (10)(a)(V), and (14) added and (7), (10)(a)(III), and (10)(a)(IV) amended (HB 22-1326), ch. 225, p. 1631, § 6, effective July 1.

Cross references: For the legislative declaration in HB 15-1122, see section 1 of chapter 37, Session Laws of Colorado 2015. For the legislative declaration in HB 22-1326 stating the purpose of, and the provision directing legislative staff agencies to conduct, a post-enactment review pursuant to § 2-2-1201 scheduled in 2024, 2025, and 2027, see sections 1 and 55 of chapter 225, Session Laws of Colorado 2022. To obtain a copy of the review, once completed, go to "Legislative Resources and Requirements" on the Colorado General Assembly's website.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 381 cases (102 in the last 5 years), 2002–2026 · leading case: Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713 (Colo. 2005).
Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713 (Colo. 2005). · cites it 218× “Instead, in this case we consider only the general sentencing statute, section 18-1.3-401, C.R.S. (2004), and particularly section 18-1.”
Mountjoy, Jr. v. People, 2018 CO 92 (Colo. 2018). · cites it 29× “In this case, Mountjoy was convicted of three offenses: (1) Reckless manslaughter, a class four felony with a presumptive range of two to six years imprisonment; (2) Illegal discharge of a firearm, a class five felony with a presumptive range of one to three years imprisonment;…”
People v. Tillery, 231 P.3d 36 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 72× “3-406(1)(a), any person convicted of a crime of violence that is not a sexual offense shall receive a sentence "of at least the midpoint in, but not more than twice the maximum of, the presumptive range provided for such offense in section 18-1.3-401(1)(a), as modified for an…”
People v. Tate Banks v. People Jensen v. People, 2015 CO 42 (Colo. 2015). · cites it 111× “Colorado’s Sentencing Scheme ¶71        The critical statute here is section 18-1.3-401, C.R.S. (2014), which outlines the presumptive penalties for each class of felony.”
People v. Huber, 139 P.3d 628 (Colo. 2006). · cites it 32× “If the existence of any prior conviction extends the range that is subject to traditional sentencing considerations to include the aggravated sentencing range of section 18-1.3-401, C.R.S. (2005), as we held in both DeHerrera and Lopez , then surely the fact "of" a conviction…”
People v. Isaacks, 133 P.3d 1190 (Colo. 2006). · cites it 26× “2d 403 (2004), to Colorado's statutory sentencing scheme and concluded that aggravated sentencing under section 18-1.3-401(6), C.R.S. (2005), is constitutionally permissible when it is based on "facts admitted by the defendant.”
People v. Sandoval, 2016 COA 19 (Colo. Ct. App. 2016). · cites it 14× “3-301(1)(b) specifically provides, “[i]n making a direct sentence to a community corrections program, the sentencing court may impose a sentence to community corrections which includes terms, lengths, and conditions pursuant to section 18-1.3-401 .” (Emphasis added.) ¶17 This…”
People v. Sandoval, 2018 CO 21 (Colo. 2018). · cites it 14× “The statutory provision authorizing direct sentencing to community corrections provides that "the sentencing court may impose a sentence to community corrections which includes terms, lengths, and conditions pursuant to section 18-1.”
Yates v. People, 2019 CO 90 (Colo. 2019). · cites it 9× “§ 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A.1) (applying to felonies committed on or after July 1, 2018); see also § 18-1.”
Vensor v. People, 151 P.3d 1274 (Colo. 2007). · cites it 28× “On the basis of extraordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances, sentencing courts are authorized to sentence felons to as little as half the minimum of the presumptive range or as much as twice the maximum of the presumptive range for the class of felony of which a…”
Diehl v. Weiser, 2019 CO 70 (Colo. 2019). · cites it 15× “Similarly, section 18-1.3-401 refers to the "discharge" of the prison sentence on release to parole and also to the "full[ ] discharge" of the sentence only after parole has been served.”
People v. Rice, 2015 COA 168 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015). · cites it 24× “¶16 In imposing a sentence, the court shall impose a definite sentence which is within the presumptive ranges set forth in section 18-1.3-401(1) unless it concludes that extraordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances are present, are based on evidence in the record of the…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(1) — 10 cases
People v. Rice, 2015 COA 168 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015). “¶16 In imposing a sentence, the court shall impose a definite sentence which is within the presumptive ranges set forth in section 18-1.3-401(1) unless it concludes that extraordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances are present, are based on evidence in the record of the…”
People v. Tate Banks v. People Jensen v. People, 2015 CO 42 (Colo. 2015). “Colorado’s Sentencing Scheme ¶71        The critical statute here is section 18-1.3-401, C.R.S. (2014), which outlines the presumptive penalties for each class of felony.”
People v. Gee, 2015 COA 151 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015).
People v. Lehmkuhl, 117 P.3d 98 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
People v. Hall, 87 P.3d 210 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(1)(V)(A) — 1 case
Peo v. Smith (Colo. Ct. App. 2025).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a) — 43 cases
People v. Sandoval, 2016 COA 19 (Colo. Ct. App. 2016). “3-301(1)(b) specifically provides, “[i]n making a direct sentence to a community corrections program, the sentencing court may impose a sentence to community corrections which includes terms, lengths, and conditions pursuant to section 18-1.3-401 .” (Emphasis added.) ¶17 This…”
People v. Rice, 2015 COA 168 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015). “¶16 In imposing a sentence, the court shall impose a definite sentence which is within the presumptive ranges set forth in section 18-1.3-401(1) unless it concludes that extraordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances are present, are based on evidence in the record of the…”
People v. Tate Banks v. People Jensen v. People, 2015 CO 42 (Colo. 2015). “Colorado’s Sentencing Scheme ¶71        The critical statute here is section 18-1.3-401, C.R.S. (2014), which outlines the presumptive penalties for each class of felony.”
People v. Tillery, 231 P.3d 36 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009). “3-406(1)(a), any person convicted of a crime of violence that is not a sexual offense shall receive a sentence "of at least the midpoint in, but not more than twice the maximum of, the presumptive range provided for such offense in section 18-1.3-401(1)(a), as modified for an…”
People v. Hinojos-Mendoza, 140 P.3d 30 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(III) — 1 case
Blake v. King, 185 P.3d 142 (Colo. 2008).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(III)(A) — 3 cases
People v. In the Interest of J.C, 2018 COA 22 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018).
Peo v. Taylor (Colo. Ct. App. 2024).
Peo v. Taylor (Colo. Ct. App. 2024).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(IV) — 2 cases
People v. Smith, 183 P.3d 726 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008).
v. Palmer, 2018 COA 38 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(IV)(A) — 1 case
People v. Frazier, 77 P.3d 838 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V) — 29 cases
Diehl v. Weiser, 2019 CO 70 (Colo. 2019). “Similarly, section 18-1.3-401 refers to the "discharge" of the prison sentence on release to parole and also to the "full[ ] discharge" of the sentence only after parole has been served.”
v. People, 2020 CO 3 (Colo. 2020).
Yates v. People, 2019 CO 90 (Colo. 2019). “§ 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A.1) (applying to felonies committed on or after July 1, 2018); see also § 18-1.”
Edwards v. People, 196 P.3d 1138 (Colo. 2008).
v. People, 2020 CO 79 (Colo. 2020).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A) — 142 cases
Yates v. People, 2019 CO 90 (Colo. 2019). “§ 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A.1) (applying to felonies committed on or after July 1, 2018); see also § 18-1.”
People v. Sandoval, 2016 COA 19 (Colo. Ct. App. 2016). “3-301(1)(b) specifically provides, “[i]n making a direct sentence to a community corrections program, the sentencing court may impose a sentence to community corrections which includes terms, lengths, and conditions pursuant to section 18-1.3-401 .” (Emphasis added.) ¶17 This…”
v. People, 2019 CO 89 (Colo. 2019).
People v. Tillery, 231 P.3d 36 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009). “3-406(1)(a), any person convicted of a crime of violence that is not a sexual offense shall receive a sentence "of at least the midpoint in, but not more than twice the maximum of, the presumptive range provided for such offense in section 18-1.3-401(1)(a), as modified for an…”
People v. Simon, 219 P.3d 789 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(B) — 1 case
People v. Rockwell, 125 P.3d 410 (Colo. 2006).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(C) — 3 cases
People v. Quintano, 81 P.3d 1093 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
People v. Trujillo, 261 P.3d 485 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010).
People v. Walker, 75 P.3d 722 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(D) — 6 cases
Diehl v. Weiser, 2019 CO 70 (Colo. 2019). “Similarly, section 18-1.3-401 refers to the "discharge" of the prison sentence on release to parole and also to the "full[ ] discharge" of the sentence only after parole has been served.”
People v. Taylor, 74 P.3d 396 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
People v. Hall, 87 P.3d 210 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
People v. Edwards, 165 P.3d 904 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(E) — 3 cases
People v. Heredia, 122 P.3d 1041 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).
Diehl v. Weiser, 2019 CO 70 (Colo. 2019). “Similarly, section 18-1.3-401 refers to the "discharge" of the prison sentence on release to parole and also to the "full[ ] discharge" of the sentence only after parole has been served.”
v. People, 2019 CO 78 (Colo. 2019).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(F) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(VI) — 1 case
Diehl v. Weiser, 2019 CO 70 (Colo. 2019). “Similarly, section 18-1.3-401 refers to the "discharge" of the prison sentence on release to parole and also to the "full[ ] discharge" of the sentence only after parole has been served.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(v)(A) — 1 case
People v. Andracki, 68 P.3d 526 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(1)(b)(I) — 3 cases
Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713 (Colo. 2005). “Instead, in this case we consider only the general sentencing statute, section 18-1.3-401, C.R.S. (2004), and particularly section 18-1.”
Peo v. Lucero (Colo. Ct. App. 2025).
Peo v. Jost (Colo. Ct. App. 2024).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(1)(c) — 1 case
Peo v. Jost (Colo. Ct. App. 2024).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(10) — 27 cases
People v. Tillery, 231 P.3d 36 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009). “3-406(1)(a), any person convicted of a crime of violence that is not a sexual offense shall receive a sentence "of at least the midpoint in, but not more than twice the maximum of, the presumptive range provided for such offense in section 18-1.3-401(1)(a), as modified for an…”
People v. Valenzuela, 216 P.3d 588 (Colo. 2009).
Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713 (Colo. 2005). “Instead, in this case we consider only the general sentencing statute, section 18-1.3-401, C.R.S. (2004), and particularly section 18-1.”
People v. Lahr, 316 P.3d 74 (Colo. Ct. App. 2013).
Vensor v. People, 151 P.3d 1274 (Colo. 2007). “On the basis of extraordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances, sentencing courts are authorized to sentence felons to as little as half the minimum of the presumptive range or as much as twice the maximum of the presumptive range for the class of felony of which a…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(10)(a) — 22 cases
People v. Simon, 219 P.3d 789 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009).
People v. Tillery, 231 P.3d 36 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009). “3-406(1)(a), any person convicted of a crime of violence that is not a sexual offense shall receive a sentence "of at least the midpoint in, but not more than twice the maximum of, the presumptive range provided for such offense in section 18-1.3-401(1)(a), as modified for an…”
Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713 (Colo. 2005). “Instead, in this case we consider only the general sentencing statute, section 18-1.3-401, C.R.S. (2004), and particularly section 18-1.”
People v. Whitman, 205 P.3d 371 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
People v. Kyle, 111 P.3d 491 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(10)(a)(XI) — 1 case
People v. Rice, 2015 COA 168 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015). “¶16 In imposing a sentence, the court shall impose a definite sentence which is within the presumptive ranges set forth in section 18-1.3-401(1) unless it concludes that extraordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances are present, are based on evidence in the record of the…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(10)(b) — 7 cases
People v. Tillery, 231 P.3d 36 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009). “3-406(1)(a), any person convicted of a crime of violence that is not a sexual offense shall receive a sentence "of at least the midpoint in, but not more than twice the maximum of, the presumptive range provided for such offense in section 18-1.3-401(1)(a), as modified for an…”
People v. Valenzuela, 216 P.3d 588 (Colo. 2009).
Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713 (Colo. 2005). “Instead, in this case we consider only the general sentencing statute, section 18-1.3-401, C.R.S. (2004), and particularly section 18-1.”
v. Lee, 2019 COA 130 (Colo. Ct. App. 2019).
People v. Canody, 166 P.3d 218 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(10)(b)(IV) — 1 case
People v. Quintano, 81 P.3d 1093 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(10)(b)(XI) — 4 cases
Yates v. People, 2019 CO 90 (Colo. 2019). “§ 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A.1) (applying to felonies committed on or after July 1, 2018); see also § 18-1.”
People v. Valenzuela, 216 P.3d 588 (Colo. 2009).
People v. Rice, 2015 COA 168 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015). “¶16 In imposing a sentence, the court shall impose a definite sentence which is within the presumptive ranges set forth in section 18-1.3-401(1) unless it concludes that extraordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances are present, are based on evidence in the record of the…”
People v. Blinderman, 148 P.3d 232 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(10)(b)(XI1) — 2 cases
People v. Baca, 2015 COA 153 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015).
People v. LOYAS, 259 P.3d 505 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(10)(b)(XII) — 12 cases
People v. Tillery, 231 P.3d 36 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009). “3-406(1)(a), any person convicted of a crime of violence that is not a sexual offense shall receive a sentence "of at least the midpoint in, but not more than twice the maximum of, the presumptive range provided for such offense in section 18-1.3-401(1)(a), as modified for an…”
Peo v. Lowe, 2020 COA 116 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020).
v. Palmer, 2018 COA 38 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018).
People v. Trujillo, 169 P.3d 235 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
People v. Laurson, 70 P.3d 564 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(10)(b)(XIT) — 1 case
People v. Laurson, 70 P.3d 564 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(10)(b)(XT) — 1 case
People v. Rice, 378 P.3d 791 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(10)(c) — 2 cases
People v. Tillery, 231 P.3d 36 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009). “3-406(1)(a), any person convicted of a crime of violence that is not a sexual offense shall receive a sentence "of at least the midpoint in, but not more than twice the maximum of, the presumptive range provided for such offense in section 18-1.3-401(1)(a), as modified for an…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(11) — 7 cases
Fierro v. People, 206 P.3d 460 (Colo. 2009).
People v. Wolfe, 213 P.3d 1035 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009).
In re People v. Huckabay, 2020 CO 42 (Colo. 2020).
v. Propst, 2021 COA 13 (Colo. Ct. App. 2021).
People v. Hummel, 131 P.3d 1204 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(13)(c) — 1 case
v. People, 2020 CO 15 (Colo. 2020).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(3) — 4 cases
In re Miranda, 289 P.3d 957 (Colo. 2012).
Miranda v. People, 276 P.3d 122 (Colo. 2012).
People v. Cohen, 369 P.3d 289 (Colo. 2016).
People v. Alicia Andrea Martinez (Colo. Ct. App. 2022).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(4) — 4 cases
People v. Tate Banks v. People Jensen v. People, 2015 CO 42 (Colo. 2015). “Colorado’s Sentencing Scheme ¶71        The critical statute here is section 18-1.3-401, C.R.S. (2014), which outlines the presumptive penalties for each class of felony.”
Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256 (Colo. 2003).
People v. Canister, 110 P.3d 380 (Colo. 2005).
People v. Hagos, 110 P.3d 1290 (Colo. 2005).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(4)(a) — 6 cases
People v. Tate Banks v. People Jensen v. People, 2015 CO 42 (Colo. 2015). “Colorado’s Sentencing Scheme ¶71        The critical statute here is section 18-1.3-401, C.R.S. (2014), which outlines the presumptive penalties for each class of felony.”
People v. Montour, 157 P.3d 489 (Colo. 2007).
People v. Banks, 412 P.3d 417 (Colo. Ct. App. 2012).
People v. Davis, 2018 COA 113 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018).
People v. Gutierrez-Ruiz, 383 P.3d 44 (Colo. Ct. App. 2014).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(4)(b) — 2 cases
People v. Tate Banks v. People Jensen v. People, 2015 CO 42 (Colo. 2015). “Colorado’s Sentencing Scheme ¶71        The critical statute here is section 18-1.3-401, C.R.S. (2014), which outlines the presumptive penalties for each class of felony.”
People v. Banks, 412 P.3d 417 (Colo. Ct. App. 2012).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(4)(b)(I) — 7 cases
People v. Rainer, 412 P.3d 520 (Colo. Ct. App. 2013).
People v. Tate Banks v. People Jensen v. People, 2015 CO 42 (Colo. 2015). “Colorado’s Sentencing Scheme ¶71        The critical statute here is section 18-1.3-401, C.R.S. (2014), which outlines the presumptive penalties for each class of felony.”
State of Iowa v. Damion John Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545 (Iowa 2015).
People v. Davis, 2018 COA 113 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018).
People v. Banks, 412 P.3d 417 (Colo. Ct. App. 2012).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(4)(b)(II) — 2 cases
People v. Tate Banks v. People Jensen v. People, 2015 CO 42 (Colo. 2015). “Colorado’s Sentencing Scheme ¶71        The critical statute here is section 18-1.3-401, C.R.S. (2014), which outlines the presumptive penalties for each class of felony.”
People v. Davis, 2018 COA 113 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(4)(c) — 1 case
People v. Davis, 2018 COA 113 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(4)(c)(I) — 3 cases
Peo v. Vigil (Colo. Ct. App. 2024).
Peo v. Vigil (Colo. Ct. App. 2024).
Peo v. Vigil (Colo. Ct. App. 2024).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(4)(c)(I)(A) — 4 cases
People v. Davis, 2018 COA 113 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018).
Peo v. Vigil (Colo. Ct. App. 2024).
Peo v. Vigil (Colo. Ct. App. 2024).
Peo v. Vigil (Colo. Ct. App. 2024).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(4)(c)(I)(B) — 4 cases
Ybanez v. People, 2018 CO 16 (Colo. 2018).
Peo v. Vigil (Colo. Ct. App. 2024).
Peo v. Vigil (Colo. Ct. App. 2024).
Peo v. Vigil (Colo. Ct. App. 2024).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(5) — 4 cases
Woldt v. People, 64 P.3d 256 (Colo. 2003).
People v. Tate Banks v. People Jensen v. People, 2015 CO 42 (Colo. 2015). “Colorado’s Sentencing Scheme ¶71        The critical statute here is section 18-1.3-401, C.R.S. (2014), which outlines the presumptive penalties for each class of felony.”
People v. Banks, 412 P.3d 417 (Colo. Ct. App. 2012).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(6) — 65 cases
Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713 (Colo. 2005). “Instead, in this case we consider only the general sentencing statute, section 18-1.3-401, C.R.S. (2004), and particularly section 18-1.”
Mountjoy, Jr. v. People, 2018 CO 92 (Colo. 2018). “In this case, Mountjoy was convicted of three offenses: (1) Reckless manslaughter, a class four felony with a presumptive range of two to six years imprisonment; (2) Illegal discharge of a firearm, a class five felony with a presumptive range of one to three years imprisonment;…”
People v. Huber, 139 P.3d 628 (Colo. 2006). “If the existence of any prior conviction extends the range that is subject to traditional sentencing considerations to include the aggravated sentencing range of section 18-1.3-401, C.R.S. (2005), as we held in both DeHerrera and Lopez , then surely the fact "of" a conviction…”
People v. Isaacks, 133 P.3d 1190 (Colo. 2006). “2d 403 (2004), to Colorado's statutory sentencing scheme and concluded that aggravated sentencing under section 18-1.3-401(6), C.R.S. (2005), is constitutionally permissible when it is based on "facts admitted by the defendant.”
Villanueva v. People, 199 P.3d 1228 (Colo. 2009).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(68) — 1 case
People v. Martinez, 128 P.3d 291 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(7) — 15 cases
Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713 (Colo. 2005). “Instead, in this case we consider only the general sentencing statute, section 18-1.3-401, C.R.S. (2004), and particularly section 18-1.”
People v. Smith, 183 P.3d 726 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008).
People v. Quintano, 81 P.3d 1093 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
People v. Boespflug, 107 P.3d 1118 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
People v. Watts, 165 P.3d 707 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(8) — 9 cases
In re Miranda, 289 P.3d 957 (Colo. 2012).
People v. Lahr, 316 P.3d 74 (Colo. Ct. App. 2013).
Vensor v. People, 151 P.3d 1274 (Colo. 2007). “On the basis of extraordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances, sentencing courts are authorized to sentence felons to as little as half the minimum of the presumptive range or as much as twice the maximum of the presumptive range for the class of felony of which a…”
Tumentsereg v. People, 247 P.3d 1015 (Colo. 2011).
People v. Robinson, 187 P.3d 1166 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(8)(a) — 9 cases
Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713 (Colo. 2005). “Instead, in this case we consider only the general sentencing statute, section 18-1.3-401, C.R.S. (2004), and particularly section 18-1.”
People v. Glasser, 293 P.3d 68 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011).
People v. Montoya, 141 P.3d 916 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).
People v. Willcoxon, 80 P.3d 817 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).
People v. Adams, 2016 CO 74 (Colo. 2016).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(8)(a)(I) — 6 cases
People v. Manyik, 2016 COA 42 (Colo. Ct. App. 2016).
People v. Manyik, 383 P.3d 77 (Colo. Ct. App. 2016).
People v. Alvarado, 284 P.3d 99 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011).
People v. Phipps, 411 P.3d 1157 (Colo. Ct. App. 2016).
People v. Manyik, 2016 COA 42 (Colo. Ct. App. 2016).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(8)(a)(I1) — 1 case
People v. Reed, 338 P.3d 364 (Colo. Ct. App. 2013).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(8)(a)(ID) — 1 case
People v. Reed, 338 P.3d 364 (Colo. Ct. App. 2013).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(8)(a)(II) — 11 cases
v. People, 2019 CO 100 (Colo. 2019).
People v. Robinson, 187 P.3d 1166 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008).
People v. Reed, 338 P.3d 364 (Colo. Ct. App. 2013).
People v. Montoya, 141 P.3d 916 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).
People v. Valenzuela, 216 P.3d 588 (Colo. 2009).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(8)(a)(IID) — 1 case
People v. Linares-Guzman, 195 P.3d 1130 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(8)(a)(III) — 8 cases
People v. Whitman, 205 P.3d 371 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
People v. O'connell, 134 P.3d 460 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).
People v. Linares-Guzman, 195 P.3d 1130 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008).
People v. Fogle, 116 P.3d 1227 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
People v. Roberts, 179 P.3d 129 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(8)(a)(IV) — 9 cases
People v. Diaz, 2015 CO 28 (Colo. 2015).
People v. Adams, 2016 CO 74 (Colo. 2016).
People v. Wylie, 260 P.3d 57 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010).
People v. Willcoxon, 80 P.3d 817 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).
People v. Nitz, 104 P.3d 240 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(8)(c) — 1 case
& 20CA1488 Peo v. Sikorsky (Colo. Ct. App. 2022).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(8)(d) — 2 cases
People v. Ortega, 266 P.3d 424 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011).
Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713 (Colo. 2005). “Instead, in this case we consider only the general sentencing statute, section 18-1.3-401, C.R.S. (2004), and particularly section 18-1.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(8)(d)(I) — 4 cases
Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713 (Colo. 2005). “Instead, in this case we consider only the general sentencing statute, section 18-1.3-401, C.R.S. (2004), and particularly section 18-1.”
People v. Mazzarelli, 2016 COA 35 (Colo. Ct. App. 2016).
People v. Mazzarelli, 2016 COA 35 (Colo. Ct. App. 2016).
People v. Mazzarelli, 446 P.3d 821 (Colo. Ct. App. 2016).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(8)(f) — 1 case
Peo v. Brown (Colo. Ct. App. 2025).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(8)(g) — 1 case
People v. Prieto, 124 P.3d 842 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(9) — 5 cases
People v. Bachofer, 192 P.3d 454 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008).
People v. Alvarado, 284 P.3d 99 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011).
People v. French, 165 P.3d 836 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
People v. Hall, 87 P.3d 210 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
People v. Ramirez, 140 P.3d 169 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(9)(a) — 8 cases
People v. French, 165 P.3d 836 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
People v. Sandoval-Candelaria, 328 P.3d 193 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011).
People v. Sandoval-Candelaria, 321 P.3d 487 (Colo. 2014).
People v. French, 141 P.3d 856 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).
People v. Hall, 87 P.3d 210 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(9)(b) — 2 cases
People v. French, 165 P.3d 836 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
People v. French, 141 P.3d 856 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(I)(a)(V)(E) — 1 case
People v. Hall, 87 P.3d 210 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(V)(A) — 2 cases
v. Session, 2020 COA 158 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020).
People v. McRae, 2016 COA 117 (Colo. Ct. App. 2016).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(b) — 1 case
People v. Johnson, 121 P.3d 285 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(l)(a) — 1 case
People v. Watkins, 126 P.3d 309 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(l)(a)(III)(A) — 1 case
People v. Pourat, 100 P.3d 503 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(l)(a)(III)(E) — 1 case
Vensor v. People, 151 P.3d 1274 (Colo. 2007). “On the basis of extraordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances, sentencing courts are authorized to sentence felons to as little as half the minimum of the presumptive range or as much as twice the maximum of the presumptive range for the class of felony of which a…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(l)(a)(V) — 5 cases
People v. Harper, 111 P.3d 482 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
Romero v. People, 179 P.3d 984 (Colo. 2007).
Vensor v. People, 151 P.3d 1274 (Colo. 2007). “On the basis of extraordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances, sentencing courts are authorized to sentence felons to as little as half the minimum of the presumptive range or as much as twice the maximum of the presumptive range for the class of felony of which a…”
People v. Kendrick, 143 P.3d 1175 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).
People v. Villarreal, 131 P.3d 1119 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(l)(a)(V)(A) — 30 cases
Frazier v. People, 90 P.3d 807 (Colo. 2004).
People v. Manyik, 383 P.3d 77 (Colo. Ct. App. 2016).
People v. Smith, 121 P.3d 243 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).
People v. Hogan, 114 P.3d 42 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
People v. Lassek, 122 P.3d 1029 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(l)(a)(V)(B) — 2 cases
People v. Harper, 111 P.3d 482 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
People v. Norton, 63 P.3d 339 (Colo. 2003).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(l)(a)(V)(E) — 4 cases
People v. Heredia, 122 P.3d 1041 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).
People v. Pahlavan, 83 P.3d 1138 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
People v. White, 179 P.3d 58 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
People v. Starcher, 107 P.3d 1127 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(l)(a)(V)(a) — 1 case
Romero v. People, 179 P.3d 984 (Colo. 2007).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(l)(a)(VI) — 1 case
People v. Cross, 114 P.3d 1 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(l)(b)(I) — 1 case
Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713 (Colo. 2005). “Instead, in this case we consider only the general sentencing statute, section 18-1.3-401, C.R.S. (2004), and particularly section 18-1.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401(l)(b)(II) — 1 case
Vensor v. People, 151 P.3d 1274 (Colo. 2007). “On the basis of extraordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances, sentencing courts are authorized to sentence felons to as little as half the minimum of the presumptive range or as much as twice the maximum of the presumptive range for the class of felony of which a…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.