(1) A person commits the crime of murder in the second degree if:
(a) The person knowingly causes the death of a person; or
(b) Acting either alone or with one or more persons, he or she commits or attempts to commit felony arson, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, sexual assault as prohibited by section 18- 3-402, sexual assault in the first or second degree as prohibited by section 18-3-402 or 18-3-403, as those sections existed prior to July 1, 2000, or a class 3 felony for sexual assault on a child as provided in section 18-3-405 (2), or the felony crime of escape as provided in section 18-8-208, and, in the course of or in furtherance of the crime that he or she is committing or attempting to commit, or of immediate flight therefrom, the death of a person, other than one of the participants, is caused by any participant.
(1.5) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of violating subsection (1)(b) of this section that the defendant:
(a) Was not the only participant in the underlying crime; and
(b) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause, or aid the commission thereof; and
(c) Was not armed with a deadly weapon; and
(d) Did not engage himself or herself in or intend to engage in and had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious bodily injury.
(2) Diminished responsibility due to self-induced intoxication is not a defense to murder in the second degree.
(2.5) (Deleted by amendment, L. 96, p. 1844, § 12, effective July 1, 1996.)
(3) (a) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection (3), murder in the second degree is a class 2 felony.
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) of this subsection (3), murder in the second degree is a class 3 felony where the act causing the death was performed upon a sudden heat of passion, caused by a serious and highly provoking act of the intended victim, affecting the defendant sufficiently to excite an irresistible passion in a reasonable person; but, if between the provocation and the killing there is an interval sufficient for the voice of reason and humanity to be heard, the killing is a class 2 felony.
(c) For purposes of determining sudden heat of passion pursuant to subsection (3)(b) of this section, a defendant's act does not constitute an act performed upon a sudden heat of passion if it results solely from the discovery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the victim's actual or perceived gender, gender identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation, including but not limited to under circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted nonforcible romantic or sexual advance toward the defendant.
(4) A defendant convicted pursuant to subsection (1) of this section shall be sentenced by the court in accordance with the provisions of section 18-1.3-406.
(5) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires:
(a) "Gender identity" and "gender expression" have the same meaning as in section 18-1- 901 (3)(h.5).
(b) "Intimate relationship" has the same meaning as in section 18-6-800.3.
(c) "Sexual orientation" has the same meaning as in section 18-9-121 (5)(b).
Source: L. 71: R&RE, p. 418, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 40-3-103. L. 75: (1)(a) amended, p. 622, § 1, effective March 19. L. 77: (1)(a) amended and (1)(b) repealed, pp. 960, 971, §§ 6, 67, effective July 1. L. 86: (4) added, p. 776, § 1, effective July 1. L. 95: IP(1) amended and (2.5) added, p. 1222, § 5, effective July 1. L. 96: Entire section amended, p. 1844, § 12, effective July 1. L. 2002: (4) amended, p. 1512, § 184, effective October 1. L. 2020: (3)(c) and (5) added, (SB 20-221), ch. 279, p. 1368, § 6, effective July 13. L. 2021: (1) amended and (1.5) added, (SB 21- 124), ch. 58, p. 236, § 2, effective September 15.
Cross references: For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsection (4), see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002. For the legislative declaration in SB 20-221, see section 1 of chapter 279, Session Laws of Colorado 2020.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
168
cases (
52 in the last 5 years), 1976–2026 · leading case:
Cassels v. People, 92 P.3d 951 (Colo. 2004).
Cassels v. People, 92 P.3d 951 (Colo. 2004).
· cites it 13× “(2000), one count of second-degree murder pursuant to section 18-3-103, 6 C.R.S. (2000), and two counts of crime of violence pursuant to section 16-11-309, 6 C.”
People v. DelGuidice, 606 P.2d 840 (Colo. 1979).
· cites it 37× “Second-degree murder is defined by the provisions of section 18-3-103, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol.”
People v. Darbe, 62 P.3d 1006 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).
· cites it 8× “The crime of murder in the second degree is defined in § 18-3-103, C.R.S.2001, which provides in relevant part: (1) A person commits the crime of murder in the second degree if the person knowingly causes the death of a person.”
People v. Gallegos, 628 P.2d 999 (Colo. 1981).
· cites it 38× “17 Section 18-3-103(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl.”
v. Wakefield, 2018 COA 37 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 5× “When the charged offense requires intent, knowledge, or 3 willfulness, as second degree murder does, see § 18-3-103(1), C.R.S. 2017, self-defense is an affirmative defense, Pickering, 276 P.”
Mata-Medina v. People, 71 P.3d 973 (Colo. 2003).
· cites it 6× “§ 18-3-103. We recently explained in detail the statutory elements of reckless manslaughter, which are distinguishable from criminally negligent homicide only by degree of culpability.”
Juhl v. People, 172 P.3d 896 (Colo. 2007).
· cites it 6× “[2] Section 18-3-103(1), C.R.S. (2007), a class two felony; section 18-3-106(1)(a), C.”
People v. Garcia, 28 P.3d 340 (Colo. 2001).
· cites it 4× “The court of appeals held that reversal was required because the trial court's instructions improperly characterized second-degree murder-provocation under section 18-3-103, 6 C.R.S. (2000), as a lesser included offense of first and second-degree murder.”
People v. Fite, 627 P.2d 761 (Colo. 1981).
· cites it 25× “She asserts various grounds for reversal including the claimed unconstitutionality of *763 the second degree murder statute, section 18-3-103(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl.”
People v. Sepeda, 581 P.2d 723 (Colo. 1978).
· cites it 12× “NOTES [1] Section 18-3-103, C.R.S.1973. [2] Section 18-2-101, C.”
People v. Fisher, 759 P.2d 33 (Colo. 1988).
· cites it 10× “Fisher was charged by information with second degree murder, in violation of section 18-3-103(1)(a), [1] and crime of violence, in violation of section 16-11-309.”
People v. Jefferson, 748 P.2d 1223 (Colo. 1988).
· cites it 12× “1981), held the statute facially unconstitutional as violative of defendants' equal protection rights under article II, section 25 of the Colorado Constitution because it could not be rationally distinguished from Colorado's second-degree murder statute, section 18-3-103(1)(a),…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-103(1) — 30 cases
v. Wakefield, 2018 COA 37 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018).
“When the charged offense requires intent, knowledge, or 3 willfulness, as second degree murder does, see § 18-3-103(1), C.R.S. 2017, self-defense is an affirmative defense, Pickering, 276 P.”
Juhl v. People, 172 P.3d 896 (Colo. 2007).
“[2] Section 18-3-103(1), C.R.S. (2007), a class two felony; section 18-3-106(1)(a), C.”
v. Draper, 2021 COA 120 (Colo. Ct. App. 2021).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-103(1)(a) — 37 cases
People v. Jefferson, 748 P.2d 1223 (Colo. 1988).
“1981), held the statute facially unconstitutional as violative of defendants' equal protection rights under article II, section 25 of the Colorado Constitution because it could not be rationally distinguished from Colorado's second-degree murder statute, section 18-3-103(1)(a),…”
People v. Fisher, 759 P.2d 33 (Colo. 1988).
“Fisher was charged by information with second degree murder, in violation of section 18-3-103(1)(a), [1] and crime of violence, in violation of section 16-11-309.”
People v. DelGuidice, 606 P.2d 840 (Colo. 1979).
“Second-degree murder is defined by the provisions of section 18-3-103, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-103(1)(b) — 14 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-103(1)(d) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-103(2) — 11 cases
People v. Gallegos, 628 P.2d 999 (Colo. 1981).
“17 Section 18-3-103(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl.”
People v. Fite, 627 P.2d 761 (Colo. 1981).
“She asserts various grounds for reversal including the claimed unconstitutionality of *763 the second degree murder statute, section 18-3-103(2), C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl.”
People v. DelGuidice, 606 P.2d 840 (Colo. 1979).
“Second-degree murder is defined by the provisions of section 18-3-103, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol.”
People v. Sepeda, 581 P.2d 723 (Colo. 1978).
“NOTES [1] Section 18-3-103, C.R.S.1973. [2] Section 18-2-101, C.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-103(3) — 7 cases
People v. Darbe, 62 P.3d 1006 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).
“The crime of murder in the second degree is defined in § 18-3-103, C.R.S.2001, which provides in relevant part: (1) A person commits the crime of murder in the second degree if the person knowingly causes the death of a person.”
People v. Jefferson, 748 P.2d 1223 (Colo. 1988).
“1981), held the statute facially unconstitutional as violative of defendants' equal protection rights under article II, section 25 of the Colorado Constitution because it could not be rationally distinguished from Colorado's second-degree murder statute, section 18-3-103(1)(a),…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-103(3)(a) — 6 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-103(3)(b) — 12 cases
Cassels v. People, 92 P.3d 951 (Colo. 2004).
“(2000), one count of second-degree murder pursuant to section 18-3-103, 6 C.R.S. (2000), and two counts of crime of violence pursuant to section 16-11-309, 6 C.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-103(4) — 9 cases
People v. Darbe, 62 P.3d 1006 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).
“The crime of murder in the second degree is defined in § 18-3-103, C.R.S.2001, which provides in relevant part: (1) A person commits the crime of murder in the second degree if the person knowingly causes the death of a person.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-103(8)(b) — 2 cases
Cassels v. People, 92 P.3d 951 (Colo. 2004).
“(2000), one count of second-degree murder pursuant to section 18-3-103, 6 C.R.S. (2000), and two counts of crime of violence pursuant to section 16-11-309, 6 C.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-103(b) — 1 case
Cassels v. People, 92 P.3d 951 (Colo. 2004).
“(2000), one count of second-degree murder pursuant to section 18-3-103, 6 C.R.S. (2000), and two counts of crime of violence pursuant to section 16-11-309, 6 C.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-103(l)(a) — 27 cases
People v. Fisher, 759 P.2d 33 (Colo. 1988).
“Fisher was charged by information with second degree murder, in violation of section 18-3-103(1)(a), [1] and crime of violence, in violation of section 16-11-309.”
People v. DelGuidice, 606 P.2d 840 (Colo. 1979).
“Second-degree murder is defined by the provisions of section 18-3-103, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl.Vol.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-3-103(l)(b) — 5 cases
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