Any marital relationship, whether established statutorily,
putatively, or by common law, between an actor and a victim shall not be a defense to any
offense under this part 4 unless such defense is specifically set forth in the applicable statutory
section by having the elements of the offense specifically exclude a spouse.
Source: L. 75: Entire part R&RE, p. 631, § 1, effective July 1. L. 88: Entire section
R&RE, p. 725, § 2, effective July 1.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
5
cases, 1981–1997 · leading case:
People v. Flowers, 644 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1982).
People v. Flowers, 644 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1982).
· cites it 10× “The defendant contends that the marital exception to the first-degree sexual assault statute, section 18-3-409, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl.”
People v. Brown, 632 P.2d 1025 (Colo. 1981).
· cites it 5× “On appeal, the defendant asserts: (1) that the marital sexual assault exception of section 18-3-409, C.R.S.1973 (1978 Repl. Vol.”
People v. McGuire, 751 P.2d 1011 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987).
· cites it 4× “Defendant argues 1) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the sexual assault charge based upon the marital rape exception in § 18-3-409, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8B) and 2) that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant a mistrial based on…”
People v. Shannon, 683 P.2d 792 (Colo. 1984).
· cites it 3× “The trial court apparently concluded that Shannon consented to the intercourse on this date, 5 and also indicated that no crime of sexual assault, as defined by the marital exception provision of section 18-3-409, 8 C.R.S. (1978), was committed at that time.”
People v. Brailsford, 933 P.2d 592 (Colo. 1997).
“…to sexual assault offenses was abolished effective July 1, 1988, before the sexual assault in this case occurred. See § 18-3-409, 8B C.R.S. (1996 Supp.).”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.