As used in this part 4, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Anal intercourse" means contact between human beings of the genital organs of one and the anus of another.
(2) "Child" means a person under the age of eighteen years.
(3) "Cunnilingus" means any act of oral stimulation of the vulva or clitoris.
(4) "Fellatio" means any act of oral stimulation of the penis.
(5) "Masturbation" means stimulation of the genital organs by manual or other bodily contact, or by any object, exclusive of sexual intercourse.
(6) "Prostitution by a child" means either a child performing or offering or agreeing to perform any act of sexual intercourse, fellatio, cunnilingus, masturbation, or anal intercourse with any person not the child's spouse in exchange for money or other thing of value or any person performing or offering or agreeing to perform any act of sexual intercourse, fellatio, cunnilingus, masturbation, or anal intercourse with any child not the person's spouse in exchange for money or other thing of value.
(7) "Prostitution of a child" means either inducing a child to perform or offer or agree to perform any act of sexual intercourse, fellatio, cunnilingus, masturbation, or anal intercourse with any person not the child's spouse by coercion or by any threat or intimidation or inducing a child, by coercion or by any threat or intimidation or in exchange for money or other thing of value, to allow any person not the child's spouse to perform or offer or agree to perform any act of sexual intercourse, fellatio, cunnilingus, masturbation, or anal intercourse with or upon such child. Such coercion, threat, or intimidation need not constitute an independent criminal offense and shall be determined solely through its intended or its actual effect upon the child.
Source: L. 79: Entire part RC&RE, p. 740, § 1, effective May 31. L. 85: (6) and (7) amended, p. 623, § 8, effective July 1.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
15
cases (
2 in the last 5 years), 1985–2026 · leading case:
Peo v. Houser, 2020 COA 128, 490 P.3d 863.
Peo v. Houser, 2020 COA 128, 490 P.3d 863.
· cites it 17× “¶9 Second, the division declined to consider Houser’s unpreserved argument that section 18-7-401(6), C.R.S. 2019, which defines “prostitution by a child,” is unconstitutionally vague on its face.”
v. Maloy, 2020 COA 71, 465 P.3d 146.
· cites it 12× “See § 18-7-401(6), C.R.S. 2019. And such proof clearly isn’t required to prove patronizing a child prostitute by “[e]ngag[ing] in an act which is prostitution of a child,” § 18-7-406(1)(a) (emphasis added); see § 18-7-401(7), which is what creates the equal protection problem in…”
People v. Madden, 111 P.3d 452 (Colo. 2005).
· cites it 16× “§ 18-7-401(6), C.R.S. (2004). [10] The act of "prostitution by a child" embodies the common understanding of prostitution where someone gives money or something of value to another in exchange for sex.”
People v. Houser, 2013 COA 11, 337 P.3d 1238.
· cites it 4× “" § 18-7-401(6), C.R.S$.2012 (emphasis added).”
People v. Young, 694 P.2d 841 (Colo. 1985).
· cites it 6× “Section 18-7-401(5) states: "Masturbation” means stimulation of the genital organs by manual or other bodily contact, or by any object, exclusive of sexual intercourse.”
v. Ross, 2019 COA 79, 482 P.3d 452.
· cites it 2× “” § 18-7-401(2), C.R.S. 2018.) ¶3 First, the two groups include many of the same crimes, but the legislature penalizes the ones with child victims more severely.”
People v. Hansen, 708 P.2d 468 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
· cites it 4× “) as follows: “ ‘Prostitution by a child’ means a child performing or offering or agreeing to perform any act of sexual intercourse, fellatio, cunnilingus, masturbation, or anal intercourse with any person not the child’s spouse in exchange for money or other thing of value.”
People v. Trujillo, 251 P.3d 477 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010).
· cites it 2× “See § 18-7-401(2), C.R.S.2009 (definitions applying to Part 4 of Article 7 offenses for child prostitution).”
People v. Madden, 87 P.3d 153 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 2× “Defendant contends that parts of § 18-7-401(7) are unconstitutionally vague.”
People v. Emerterio, 819 P.2d 516 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).
· cites it 2× “Section 18-7-401(6) and (7), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.”
Pierson v. People, 2012 CO 47, 279 P.3d 1217.
“(2011) (distinguishing and defining separately "sexual contact" and "sexual penetration"); see also, § 18-7-401(5) (specifically distinguishing between "masturbation" and "sexual intercourse").”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-7-401(2): 3 cases
v. Ross, 2019 COA 79, 482 P.3d 452.
“” § 18-7-401(2), C.R.S. 2018.) ¶3 First, the two groups include many of the same crimes, but the legislature penalizes the ones with child victims more severely.”
People v. Trujillo, 251 P.3d 477 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010).
“See § 18-7-401(2), C.R.S.2009 (definitions applying to Part 4 of Article 7 offenses for child prostitution).”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-7-401(5): 2 cases
People v. Young, 694 P.2d 841 (Colo. 1985).
“Section 18-7-401(5) states: "Masturbation” means stimulation of the genital organs by manual or other bodily contact, or by any object, exclusive of sexual intercourse.”
Pierson v. People, 2012 CO 47, 279 P.3d 1217.
“(2011) (distinguishing and defining separately "sexual contact" and "sexual penetration"); see also, § 18-7-401(5) (specifically distinguishing between "masturbation" and "sexual intercourse").”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-7-401(6): 9 cases
Peo v. Houser, 2020 COA 128, 490 P.3d 863.
“¶9 Second, the division declined to consider Houser’s unpreserved argument that section 18-7-401(6), C.R.S. 2019, which defines “prostitution by a child,” is unconstitutionally vague on its face.”
v. Maloy, 2020 COA 71, 465 P.3d 146.
“See § 18-7-401(6), C.R.S. 2019. And such proof clearly isn’t required to prove patronizing a child prostitute by “[e]ngag[ing] in an act which is prostitution of a child,” § 18-7-406(1)(a) (emphasis added); see § 18-7-401(7), which is what creates the equal protection problem in…”
People v. Madden, 111 P.3d 452 (Colo. 2005).
“§ 18-7-401(6), C.R.S. (2004). [10] The act of "prostitution by a child" embodies the common understanding of prostitution where someone gives money or something of value to another in exchange for sex.”
People v. Houser, 2013 COA 11, 337 P.3d 1238.
“" § 18-7-401(6), C.R.S$.2012 (emphasis added).”
People v. Hansen, 708 P.2d 468 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
“) as follows: “ ‘Prostitution by a child’ means a child performing or offering or agreeing to perform any act of sexual intercourse, fellatio, cunnilingus, masturbation, or anal intercourse with any person not the child’s spouse in exchange for money or other thing of value.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-7-401(7): 5 cases
v. Maloy, 2020 COA 71, 465 P.3d 146.
“See § 18-7-401(6), C.R.S. 2019. And such proof clearly isn’t required to prove patronizing a child prostitute by “[e]ngag[ing] in an act which is prostitution of a child,” § 18-7-406(1)(a) (emphasis added); see § 18-7-401(7), which is what creates the equal protection problem in…”
Peo v. Houser, 2020 COA 128, 490 P.3d 863.
“¶9 Second, the division declined to consider Houser’s unpreserved argument that section 18-7-401(6), C.R.S. 2019, which defines “prostitution by a child,” is unconstitutionally vague on its face.”
People v. Madden, 111 P.3d 452 (Colo. 2005).
“§ 18-7-401(6), C.R.S. (2004). [10] The act of "prostitution by a child" embodies the common understanding of prostitution where someone gives money or something of value to another in exchange for sex.”
People v. Madden, 87 P.3d 153 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
“Defendant contends that parts of § 18-7-401(7) are unconstitutionally vague.”
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