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Colo. Rev. Stat. § 2-4-211 (2024)

Common law of England

Edition and currency
C.R.S. 2024: the 2025 and 2026 sessions are not included. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTC.R.S. 2024: the 2025 and 2026 sessions are not included cited 1977–2021 30citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 30 opinions since 1977, 1 of them in the last five years.

The common law of England so far as the same is applicable and of a general nature, and all acts and statutes of the British parliament, made in aid of or to supply the defects of the common law prior to the fourth year of James the First, excepting the second section of the sixth chapter of forty-third Elizabeth, the eighth chapter of thirteenth Elizabeth, and the ninth chapter of thirty-seventh Henry the Eighth, and which are of a general nature, and not local to that kingdom, shall be the rule of decision, and shall be considered as of full force until repealed by legislative authority.

Source: L. 73: R&RE, p. 1425, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 135-1-211.

The 20 cases that cite Colo. Rev. Stat. § 2-4-211 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENVigil v. Franklin, 103 P.3d 322 (Colo. 2004).
cites § 2-4-211 6×cited by 201 cases
Where it cites § 2-4-211
“2003); see also § 2-4-211, C.R.S. (2004) (where the General Assembly expressly retained authority to repeal common law rules).”
The case’s holding
The enactment of the premises liability statute eliminates the common law defense that a danger is open and obvious.
Later courts cite it for
“if a statute is clear and unambiguous on its face, then we need not look beyond the plain language, and 'we must apply the statute as written.” · 11 citing courts
2
GREENState Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 2017 CO 68, 396 P.3d 651.
cites § 2-4-211 2×cited by 202 cases
Where it cites § 2-4-211
“We disagree with the division’s premises that an agent can waive UM/UIM coverage for another only with express authority and that principles of implied and apparent authority do not apply.”
The case’s holding
An agent with implied or apparent authority may reject a principal's uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage, because the statute does not abrogate common law agency principles.
Later courts cite it for
“an agent has apparent authority to affect a principal's relations with a third party when the third party reasonably believes, based on the principal's manifestations, that the agent has authority to act on behalf of the principal.” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENPeople v. Oram, 217 P.3d 883 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009).
cites § 2-4-211 3×cited by 257 cases
Where it cites § 2-4-211
“We agree with Oram in part, but conclude that the bonding agent's privilege in Colorado is narrower in scope than he asserts.”
Later courts cite it for
“the trial court has broad discretion to formulate jury instructions as long as they are correct statements of the law.” · 5 citing courts
4
GREENPeople ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221 (Colo. 2003).
cites § 2-4-211 5×cited by 42 cases
Where it cites § 2-4-211
“Although Colorado has incorporated the common law of 1607, we find its transposition to Colorado, where executive power is intentionally diffused among several officers, is necessarily approximate.”
The case’s holding
The state constitution limits congressional redistricting to once per census period occurring after federal apportionment and before the ensuing general election.
Later courts cite it for
“great public importance involving the fundamental rights of colorado citizens to vote for their representatives.” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENFarmers Grp., Inc. v. Williams, 805 P.2d 419 (Colo. 1991).
cites § 2-4-211 4×cited by 212 cases
Where it cites § 2-4-211
“The question is not whether the General Assembly authorized a private right of action for a breach of duty it statutorily created, but whether the legislature meant to abrogate an existing common-law remedy when it enacted section 10-4-708(1).”
The case’s holding
The treble damages provision of the No-Fault Act does not abolish the common law tort of bad faith and serves as a cumulative remedy.
Later courts cite it for
“we must choose a construction that serves the purpose of the legislative scheme, and must not strain to give language other than its plain meaning, unless the result is absurd.” · 3 citing courts
6
GREENLobato v. State, 218 P.3d 358 (Colo. 2009).
cites § 2-4-211 2×cited by 214 cases
Where it cites § 2-4-211
“§ 2-4-211, C.R.S. (2009). The common law of England, as it existed March 24, 1607, was adopted as the law of Colorado unless repealed or abrogated by the General Assembly.”
The case’s holding
Courts may review the constitutionality of a state school financing system by applying rational basis review to determine if the funding meets constitutional mandates.
Later courts cite it for
“consider other relevant materials such as the 'blue book,' an analysis of ballot proposals prepared by the legislative council .” · 2 citing courts
7
GREENCentric-Jones Co. v. Hufnagel, 848 P.2d 942 (Colo. 1993).
cites § 2-4-211 4×cited by 41 cases
Where it cites § 2-4-211
“1988) (relying on section 2-4-211, 1B C.R.S. (1980)). Since section 13-17-202 does not contain a provision repealing the common law of contracts, I find the common law principles useful in construing the statute in the present case.”
The case’s holding
A statutory offer of judgment is irrevocable for the ten-day acceptance period and is governed by plain statutory interpretation rather than contract principles.
Later courts cite it for
“invokes a special statutory process spelled out in clear and unambiguous language which can and should be enforced without engrafting contract principles onto it.” · 6 citing courts
cites § 2-4-211 2×cited by 63 cases
Where it cites § 2-4-211
“The HCAA simply imposes a cap on an award; the trial court still retains its authority to reduce by remittitur an award it determines to be excessive in light of the evidence before the jury. The HCAA cap applies equally to all medical malpractice personal injury plaintiffs,…”
The case’s holding
Statutory caps on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions do not violate the separation of powers doctrine by infringing upon the judicial role.
Later courts cite it for
“we join those states that have upheld damages caps as not infringing impermissibly on the judicial role in the separation of powers” · 2 citing courts
9
GREENPeople v. Davis, 794 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1990).
cites § 2-4-211 2×cited by 154 cases
Where it cites § 2-4-211
“There are no other statutory provisions applicable. In the absence of relevant statutory provisions, this court is guided by the common law of the state as pronounced by the previous decisions of this court.”
The case’s holding
A trial court's failure to provide a limiting construction for a vague statutory aggravator constitutes harmless error if the jury would have reached the same conclusion regardless.
Later courts cite it for
“conscienceless or pitiless' manner which was 'unnecessarily torturous to the victim.” · 2 citing courts
10
cites § 2-4-211 6×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 2-4-211
“¶ 38 , the legislature has determined that the common law generally prevails, § 2-4-211, C.R.S. ( 2021 ) , thus compelling this court to construe alterations strictly and "only recognize changes that the General Assembly has expressly mandated or necessarily implied by…”
11
GREENVaughan v. McMinn, 945 P.2d 404 (Colo. 1997).
cites § 2-4-211 2×cited by 116 cases
Where it cites § 2-4-211
“The General Assembly possesses the authority to abrogate common law remedies, see § 2-4-211, 1 C.R.S. (1997); however, "we will not lightly infer a legislative abrogation of that right absent a clear expression of intent.”
The case’s holding
An amendment to the workers' compensation act does not abrogate common law tort rights unless the legislature explicitly or by clear implication intends to do so.
Later courts cite it for
“the legislature is presumed to be aware of the judicial precedent in an area of law when it legislates in that area.” · 9 citing courts
12
GREENClancy Sys. Int'l, Inc. v. Salazar, 177 P.3d 1235 (Colo. 2008).
cites § 2-4-211 2×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 2-4-211
“Although it has chosen to give the common law of England full force until repealed by legislative authority, see § 2-4-211, C.R.S. (2007), it may therefore selectively modify or abrogate portions of that law, at its choice.”
Later courts cite it for
“should also be understood to intend the displacement of the common law whenever both the code and the common law would provide a means of recovery for the same loss.” · 5 citing courts
13
GREENBayer v. Crested Butte Mountain Resort, Inc., 960 P.2d 70 (Colo. 1998).
cites § 2-4-211 2×cited by 41 cases
Where it cites § 2-4-211
“[8] Indeed, not only should this court accede to legislative mandate, but additionally the fixing of an elevated standard of care is without basis in fact or law once the common carrier status rationale is eliminated. V. In the absence of statutory edict, the courts must develop…”
The case’s holding
A ski lift operator must exercise the highest degree of care commensurate with the lift's practical operation regardless of the season.
Later courts cite it for
“a ski lift operator must exercise the highest degree of care commensurate with the lift's practical operation, regardless of the season.” · 4 citing courts
14
GREENPerry v. Brundage, 614 P.2d 362 (Colo. 1980).
cites § 2-4-211 3×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 2-4-211
“2d 1240 (1973); see section 2-4-211, C.R.S. 1973. This doctrine involves the determination of the validity of a future restraint on property transfer when weighed against the public policy that property should be freeley alienable.”
Later courts cite it for
“involves the determination of the validity of a future restraint on property transfer when weighed against the public policy that property should be freely alienable.” · 2 citing courts
15
cites § 2-4-211 2×cited by 32 cases
Where it cites § 2-4-211
“Moreover, the General Assembly has specifically provided that in the construction of statutes the common law shall remain in full force until repealed by legislative authority, § 2-4-211, 1B C.R.S. (1980), and section 31-15-712 does not by its terms purport to repeal the common…”
The case’s holding
A bidder may rescind a bid before acceptance if the bid contains a good-faith clerical or mathematical mistake and the public authority has not detrimentally relied on it.
Later courts cite it for
“equity will not allow a party to knowingly take advantage of a mistake of another” · 2 citing courts
16
GREENBieber v. People, 856 P.2d 811 (Colo. 1993).
cites § 2-4-211 2×cited by 27 cases
Where it cites § 2-4-211
“§ 2-4-211, 1B C.R.S. (1980). Thus, subsequent action by English courts as well as courts of other jurisdictions in the United States may have persuasive value but has no precedential value for our interpretation.”
Later courts cite it for
“arising from the long-term use of intoxicants but separate from immediate intoxication.” · 2 citing courts
17
GREENWafai v. People, 750 P.2d 37 (Colo. 1988).
cites § 2-4-211 2×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 2-4-211
“Pursuant to section 2-4-211, IB C.R.S. (1980), the common law of England, with certain limited exceptions, “so far as the same is applicable and of a general nature, .”
Later courts cite it for
“an independently sufficient reason for the venue change . . . i.e., to assure the defendant a fair trial within the speedy trial period” · 1 citing court
18
GREENIn re Marriage of JMH & Rouse, 143 P.3d 1116 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).
cites § 2-4-211 3×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 2-4-211
“Thus, for guidance, we look to the origins of common law in Colorado and decisions from other jurisdictions discussing the age of consent for common law marriage. “The common law of England so far as the same is applicable and of a general nature .”
19
GREENWagner v. Hilkey, 914 P.2d 460 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
cites § 2-4-211 3×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 2-4-211
“Section 2-4-211, C.R.S. (1980 Repl.Yol. IB); Shoemaker v.”
Later courts cite it for
“a correct judgment will not be disturbed on review, even if our analysis differs from that of the trial court.” · 4 citing courts
20
GREENNiemet v. Gen. Elec. Co., 843 P.2d 87 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).
cites § 2-4-211 3×cited by 7 cases
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Citing cases by year
197719992021

One bar per year. Tallest: 3 cases in 1977. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

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Colo.21Colo. Ct. App.7D. Colo.1
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Versions

Edition shown: C.R.S. 2024: the 2025 and 2026 sessions are not included. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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