It is recognized by the general assembly that the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, whereunder the state and its political subdivisions are often
immune from suit for injury suffered by private persons, is, in some instances, an inequitable
doctrine. The general assembly also recognizes that the supreme court has abrogated the doctrine
of sovereign immunity effective July 1, 1972, and that thereafter the doctrine shall be recognized
only to such extent as may be provided by statute. The general assembly also recognizes that the
state and its political subdivisions provide essential public services and functions and that
unlimited liability could disrupt or make prohibitively expensive the provision of such essential
public services and functions. The general assembly further recognizes that the taxpayers would
ultimately bear the fiscal burdens of unlimited liability and that limitations on the liability of
public entities and public employees are necessary in order to protect the taxpayers against
excessive fiscal burdens. It is also recognized that public employees, whether elected or
appointed, should be provided with protection from unlimited liability so that such public
employees are not discouraged from providing the services or functions required by the citizens
or from exercising the powers authorized or required by law. It is further recognized that the
state, its political subdivisions, and the public employees of such public entities, by virtue of the
services and functions provided, the powers exercised, and the consequences of unlimited
liability to the governmental process, should be liable for their actions and those of their agents
only to such an extent and subject to such conditions as are provided by this article. The general
assembly also recognizes the desirability of including within one article all the circumstances
under which the state, any of its political subdivisions, or the public employees of such public
entities may be liable in actions which lie in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that
may be the type of action or the form of relief chosen by a claimant and that the distinction for
liability purposes between governmental and proprietary functions should be abolished.
Source: L. 71: p. 1204, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 130-11-2. L. 79: Entire section amended, p.
862, § 1, effective July 1. L. 86: Entire section amended, p. 873, § 1, effective July 1.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
97
cases (
9 in the last 5 years), 1977–2025 · leading case:
Elder v. Williams, 2020 CO 88, 477 P.3d 694.
Elder v. Williams, 2020 CO 88, 477 P.3d 694.
· cites it 5× “The CGIA’s legislative declaration of policy makes clear that one of the CGIA’s purposes is to protect the state and its political subdivisions from unlimited financial liability because “the state and its political subdivisions provide essential public services and functions”…”
Fogg v. MacAluso, 892 P.2d 271 (Colo. 1995).
· cites it 6× “" (emphasis added)). Thus, in its opinion in Cline II, the court of appeals correctly interpreted Trinity.”
sh Found. v. City of Colorado Springs, 2018 CO 10, 410 P.3d 1236.
· cites it 6× “" § 24-10-102, C.R.S. (2017). It recognized that "taxpayers would ultimately bear the fiscal burdens of unlimited liability," and that "limitations on the liability of public entities and public employees are necessary in order to protect the taxpayers against excessive fiscal…”
State Pers. Bd. v. Lloyd, 752 P.2d 559 (Colo. 1988).
· cites it 10× “recognizes the desirability of including within one article all the circumstances under which the state, any of its political subdivisions, or the public employees of such public entities may be liable in actions other than contract .”
Joy Maphis v. City of Boulder, 2022 CO 10, 504 P.3d 287.
· cites it 2× “essential public services," § 24-10-102, C.R.S. ( 2021 ) ; (2) protecting taxpayers "against excessive fiscal burdens" as they would "ultimately bear the fiscal burdens of unlimited liability," id.”
Walton v. State, 968 P.2d 636 (Colo. 1998).
· cites it 4× “See §§ 24-10-102, -106, 7 C.R.S. (1998). Prior to 1971, governmental immunity from suit existed in this state by reason of Colorado’s common law.”
Finnie v. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 79 P.3d 1253 (Colo. 2003).
· cites it 2× “See § 24-10-102, 7B C.R.S. (2003). Allowing public entities to mislead plaintiffs about how to meet the requirements of the notice provision, and then to assert the affirmative defense of noncompliance, is beyond the legitimate purposes of the GIA's notice provision.”
City of Colorado Springs v. Conners, 993 P.2d 1167 (Colo. 2000).
· cites it 4× “See also §§ 24-10-102, -104, -108 (providing limited governmental immunity from suits for injuries that sound in tort).”
Kristensen v. Jones, 575 P.2d 854 (Colo. 1978).
· cites it 5× “” Section 24-10-102, C.R.S. 1973 (emphasis added).”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.