(1)
Any action against a public employee, whether brought pursuant to this article, section 29-5-111,
C.R.S., the common law, or otherwise, which lies in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether
that may be the type of action or the form of relief chosen by the claimant and which arises out
of injuries sustained from an act or omission of such employee which occurred or is alleged in
the complaint to have occurred during the performance of his duties and within the scope of his
employment, unless the act or omission causing such injury was willful and wanton, shall be
subject to the following requirements and limitations, regardless of whether or not such action
against a public employee is one for which the public entity might be liable for costs of defense,
attorney fees, or payment of judgment or settlement under section 24-10-110:
(a) Compliance with the provisions of section 24-10-109, in the forms and within the
times provided by section 24-10-109, shall be a jurisdictional prerequisite to any such action
against a public employee, and shall be required whether or not the injury sustained is alleged in
the complaint to have occurred as the result of the willful and wanton act of such employee, and
failure of compliance shall forever bar any such action against a public employee. Any such
action against a public employee shall be commenced within the time period provided for that
type of action in articles 80 and 81 of title 13, C.R.S., relating to limitation of actions, or it shall
be forever barred.
(b) The maximum amounts that may be recovered in any such action against a public
employee shall be as provided in section 24-10-114 (1), (2), and (3).
(c) A public employee shall not be liable for punitive or exemplary damages arising out
of an act or omission occurring during the performance of his duties and within the scope of his
employment, unless such act or omission was willful and wanton.
(d) The fact that a plaintiff sues both a public entity and a public employee shall not be
deemed to increase any of the maximum amounts that may be recovered in any such action as
provided in this section or in section 24-10-114.
(2) (a) A public employee shall be immune from liability in any claim for injury,
whether brought pursuant to this article, section 29-5-111, C.R.S., the common law, or
otherwise, which lies in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the type of
action or the form of relief chosen by a claimant and which arises out of an act or omission of
such employee occurring during the performance of his duties and within the scope of his
employment unless the act or omission causing such injury was willful and wanton; except that
no such immunity may be asserted in an action for injuries resulting from the circumstances
specified in section 24-10-106 (1).
(b) Any member of any state board, commission, or other advisory body appointed
pursuant to statute, executive order, or otherwise, and any other person acting as a consultant or
witness before any such body, shall be immune from liability in any civil action brought against
said person for acts occurring while the person was acting as such a member, consultant, or
witness, if such person was acting in good faith within the scope of such person's respective
capacity, makes a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter as to which action was taken,
and acts in the reasonable belief that the action taken by such person was warranted by the facts.
(2.5) If a public employee raises the issue of sovereign immunity prior to or after the
commencement of discovery, the court shall suspend discovery; except that any discovery
necessary to decide the issue of sovereign immunity shall be allowed to proceed, and the court
shall decide such issue on motion. The court's decision on such motion shall be a final judgment
and shall be subject to interlocutory appeal.
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to allow any action which lies in tort or
could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the type of action or the form or relief chosen
by a claimant to be brought against a public employee except in compliance with the
requirements of this article.
(4) The immunities provided for in this article shall be in addition to any common-law
immunity applicable to a public employee.
(5) Notwithstanding any provision of this article to the contrary, a public entity may, if it
determines by resolution adopted at an open public meeting by the governing body of the public
entity that it is in the public interest to do so, defend a public employee against a claim for
punitive damages or pay or settle any punitive damage claim against a public employee.
Source: L. 79: Entire section added, p. 865, § 7, effective July 1. L. 85, 1st Ex. Sess.:
IP(1) amended and (1)(c), (1)(d), (2), and (3) added, pp. 10, 11, §§ 7, 8, effective September 27.
L. 86: Entire section added, p. 881, § 15, effective July 1 . L. 92: (1)(a) and (2) amended and
(2.5) added, p. 1118, § 7, effective July 1.
Notes of Decisions
Martinez v. Est. of Bleck Ex Rel. Churchill, 2016 CO 58 (Colo. 2016).
· cites it 78× “That section provides that when "a public employee raises the issue of sovereign immunity" and immunity is denied, the employee may bring an interlocutory appeal of the denial.”
Bresciani v. Haragan, 968 P.2d 153 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).
· cites it 45× “Section 24-10-118, then, is the statute that sets forth the "requirements" referred to by §XX-XX-XXX.”
Ceja v. Lemire, 154 P.3d 1064 (Colo. 2007).
· cites it 17× “Instead, however, section 24-10-118@2)(a) refers to the whole of section 24-10-106(1), and we decline to read language into the statute that simply does not exist.”
Middleton v. Hartman, 45 P.3d 721 (Colo. 2002).
· cites it 12× “" The court determined that section 24-10-118(1) (amended 1992) excuses notice where "the act or omission causing such injury was willful and wanton.”
State Pers. Bd. v. Lloyd, 752 P.2d 559 (Colo. 1988).
· cites it 16× “Second, it added a new section 24-10-118 entitled "Actions Against Public Employees Requirements and Limitations" which provided in relevant part as follows: (1) Any action against a public employee, whether brought pursuant to this article, section 29-5-111, C.”
Dickie v. Mabin, 101 P.3d 1126 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 30× “Instead of extending Lopez to § 24-10-118, I would simply apply the plain language of the statute to the facts at hand.”
Hernandez v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 2018 COA 151 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 19× “4 ¶7 The CGIA grants immunity to public entities “from liability in all claims for injury which lie in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether this may be the type of action or the form of relief chosen by the claimant . . .”
State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493 (Colo. 2000).
· cites it 5× “Section 24-10-118(2), 7 C.R.S. (1999), provides: A public employee shall be immune from liability in any claim for injury .”
Barham v. Scalia, 928 P.2d 1381 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
· cites it 10× “Defendants contend that, because Barham failed to comply with the notice of claim requirements in § 24-10-109 and § 24-10-118, C.R.S. (1988 RepLVol. 10A), the trial court erred in not dismissing Barham’s claims for intentional interference with contract and outrageous conduct.”
Robinson v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (D. Colo. 1999).
· cites it 14× “he execution of the arrest warrant violates the Fourth Amendment or that Denver police had an official policy or widespread custom concerning press involvement in the execution of arrest warrants; (3) plaintiff cannot claim violation of substantive due process in the context of…”
City of Lakewood v. Brace, 919 P.2d 231 (Colo. 1996).
· cites it 6× “The trial court found that there were genuine issues of material fact whether they acted in a manner that was “willful and wanton” under section 24-10-118(2)(a), 10A C.R.S. (1995 Supp.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-118(1) — 14 cases
State Pers. Bd. v. Lloyd, 752 P.2d 559 (Colo. 1988).
“Second, it added a new section 24-10-118 entitled "Actions Against Public Employees Requirements and Limitations" which provided in relevant part as follows: (1) Any action against a public employee, whether brought pursuant to this article, section 29-5-111, C.”
Middleton v. Hartman, 45 P.3d 721 (Colo. 2002).
“" The court determined that section 24-10-118(1) (amended 1992) excuses notice where "the act or omission causing such injury was willful and wanton.”
Bresciani v. Haragan, 968 P.2d 153 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).
“Section 24-10-118, then, is the statute that sets forth the "requirements" referred to by §XX-XX-XXX.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-118(1)(a) — 10 cases
Dickie v. Mabin, 101 P.3d 1126 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
“Instead of extending Lopez to § 24-10-118, I would simply apply the plain language of the statute to the facts at hand.”
Middleton v. Hartman, 45 P.3d 721 (Colo. 2002).
“" The court determined that section 24-10-118(1) (amended 1992) excuses notice where "the act or omission causing such injury was willful and wanton.”
Bresciani v. Haragan, 968 P.2d 153 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).
“Section 24-10-118, then, is the statute that sets forth the "requirements" referred to by §XX-XX-XXX.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-118(1)(c) — 2 cases
Hernandez v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 2018 COA 151 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018).
“4 ¶7 The CGIA grants immunity to public entities “from liability in all claims for injury which lie in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether this may be the type of action or the form of relief chosen by the claimant . . .”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-118(2) — 30 cases
State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493 (Colo. 2000).
“Section 24-10-118(2), 7 C.R.S. (1999), provides: A public employee shall be immune from liability in any claim for injury .”
Robinson v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (D. Colo. 1999).
“he execution of the arrest warrant violates the Fourth Amendment or that Denver police had an official policy or widespread custom concerning press involvement in the execution of arrest warrants; (3) plaintiff cannot claim violation of substantive due process in the context of…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-118(2)(2) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-118(2)(a) — 45 cases
Martinez v. Est. of Bleck Ex Rel. Churchill, 2016 CO 58 (Colo. 2016).
“That section provides that when "a public employee raises the issue of sovereign immunity" and immunity is denied, the employee may bring an interlocutory appeal of the denial.”
Ceja v. Lemire, 154 P.3d 1064 (Colo. 2007).
“Instead, however, section 24-10-118@2)(a) refers to the whole of section 24-10-106(1), and we decline to read language into the statute that simply does not exist.”
Hernandez v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 2018 COA 151 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018).
“4 ¶7 The CGIA grants immunity to public entities “from liability in all claims for injury which lie in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether this may be the type of action or the form of relief chosen by the claimant . . .”
Bresciani v. Haragan, 968 P.2d 153 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).
“Section 24-10-118, then, is the statute that sets forth the "requirements" referred to by §XX-XX-XXX.”
City of Lakewood v. Brace, 919 P.2d 231 (Colo. 1996).
“The trial court found that there were genuine issues of material fact whether they acted in a manner that was “willful and wanton” under section 24-10-118(2)(a), 10A C.R.S. (1995 Supp.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-118(5) — 3 cases
Barham v. Scalia, 928 P.2d 1381 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996).
“Defendants contend that, because Barham failed to comply with the notice of claim requirements in § 24-10-109 and § 24-10-118, C.R.S. (1988 RepLVol. 10A), the trial court erred in not dismissing Barham’s claims for intentional interference with contract and outrageous conduct.”
Robinson v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (D. Colo. 1999).
“he execution of the arrest warrant violates the Fourth Amendment or that Denver police had an official policy or widespread custom concerning press involvement in the execution of arrest warrants; (3) plaintiff cannot claim violation of substantive due process in the context of…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-118(b) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-118(l) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-118(l)(a) — 11 cases
Bresciani v. Haragan, 968 P.2d 153 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).
“Section 24-10-118, then, is the statute that sets forth the "requirements" referred to by §XX-XX-XXX.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-118(l)(b) — 1 case
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