Where an inverse condemnation
proceeding is instituted by the owner of any right, title, or interest in real property because of the
alleged taking of his property for any program or project for which federal financial assistance
will be available to pay all or any part of the cost of the program or project, the court rendering a
judgment for the plaintiff in such proceeding and awarding compensation for the taking of
property or the attorney for the acquiring agency effecting a settlement of any such proceeding
shall determine and award or allow to such plaintiff, as a part of such judgment or settlement,
such sum as will, in the opinion of the court or such attorney, reimburse such plaintiff for his
reasonable costs, disbursements, and expenses, including reasonable attorney, appraisal, and
engineering fees actually incurred because of such proceeding.
Source: L. 71: p. 678, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 69-10-16.
Notes of Decisions
Hayden v. Bd. of Cty. Commissioners, 580 P.2d 830 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978).
· cites it 8× “ATTORNEYS' FEES Plaintiffs assert, by way of cross-appeal, that they are entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees under § 24-56-116, C.R.S.1973. We must first address, however, defendant's contention that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider this issue because plaintiffs did…”
Ramos v. Lamm, 539 F. Supp. 730 (D. Colo. 1982).
“§ 24-56-116 Inverse condemnation proceedings.”
Mill v. State, Dep't of Health, 787 P.2d 176 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
· cites it 2× “City of Aurora, supra, and are subject to § 24-56-116, C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Vol. 10B).”
Oberndorf v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 653 F. Supp. 304 (D. Colo. 1987).
“); § 24-56-116, 10 C.R.S. (1982 Repl.Vol.). For the reasons stated above in Upah, these claims are ripe.”
Grynberg v. City of Northglenn, 829 P.2d 473 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
· cites it 5× “The City argues that any attorney fee award is dependent upon the application of § 24-56-116, C.R.S. (1988 Repl.Vol. 10B), which allows attorney fees when the condemning authority has received federal funding.”
Reg'l Transp. Dist. v. Outdoor Sys., Inc., 13 P.3d 806 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).
“" (emphasis added) Another division of this court previously construed similar language in § 24-56-116, C©.R.98.1999, and held that it was not determinative for purposes of a damages award that federal funding had not been actually awarded for construction at the time of the…”
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