No lien claimed by virtue of this
article, as against the owner of the property or as against one primarily liable for the debt upon
which the lien is based or as against anyone who is neither the owner of the property nor one
primarily liable for such debt, shall hold the property longer than six months after the last work
or labor is performed, or laborers or materials are furnished, or after the completion of the
building, structure, or other improvement, or the completion of the alteration, addition to, or
repair thereof, as prescribed in section 38-22-109, unless an action has been commenced within
that time to enforce the same, and unless also a notice stating that such action has been
commenced is filed for record within that time in the office of the county clerk and recorder of
the county in which said property is situate. Where two or more liens are claimed of record
against the same property, the commencement of any action and the filing of the notice of the
commencement of such action within that time by any one or more of such lien claimants in
which action all the lien claimants as appear of record are made parties, either plaintiff or
defendant shall be sufficient.
Source: L. 1899: p. 271, § 10. R.S. 08: § 4034. L. 15: p. 333, § 2. C.L. § 6451. CSA: C.
101, § 24. L. 37: p. 481, § 4. CRS 53: § 86-3-10. C.R.S. 1963: § 86-3-10. L. 2000: Entire
section amended, p. 210, § 9, effective August 2.
Cross references: For filing notice of lis pendens, see C.R.C.P. 105(f).
Notes of Decisions
Weize Co. v. Colorado Reg'l Constr., Inc., 251 P.3d 489 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010).
· cites it 4× “Lis Pendens On cross-appeal, Weize and Martz contend the trial court erred in directing a verdiet on Weize's lien foreclosure claim for failure to have recorded a lis pendens as required by section 38-22-110, C.R.8.2009. We discern no error.”
King v. W. R. Hall Transp. & Storage Co., 641 P.2d 916 (Colo. 1982).
· cites it 13× “On the same day, the court advised the plaintiff that it intended to dismiss all lien defendants except one because there was no identity as to property owners or material delivered as required by section 38-22-110, C.R.S.1973. 4 The court entered *918 an order on February 14,…”
Fowler & Peth, Inc. v. Regan, 151 P.3d 1281 (Colo. 2007).
· cites it 4× “(2006) (written contract requirement); § 38-22-102, C.R.S. (2006) (payment requirements); § 38-22-103, C.”
Merrick & Co. v. Est. of Verzuh, 987 P.2d 950 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).
· cites it 10× “1999, apply to extend the time for commencement of a foreclosure action under § 38-22-110, C.R.S.1999. Because we conclude that § 38-22-109(7) would extend the filing period if Merrick had abandoned work on the project before its completion, and because there are genuine issues…”
Trs. of Mortg. Trust of Am. v. Dist. Court in & for the Cnty. of Routt, 621 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1980).
· cites it 3× “In the ordinary mechanic’s lien case, the six-month limitations period set down in section 38-22-110, C.R.S.1973, applies to joinder of additional parties by amendment; and a statute of limitation defense, being affirmative in nature, must be raised by responsive pleading.”
Franklin Contract Sales Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 615 P.2d 684 (Colo. 1980).
· cites it 5× “1973, in the Amco action on August 21, 1975, within the six-month period for commencing an action to enforce a lien pursuant to section 38-22-110, C.R.S. 1973. The court did not grant the motion until October 27, 1975, after the six-month period had expired.”
Amco Elec. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Denver, 622 P.2d 608 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981).
· cites it 4× “Appellants next contend that the filing of a lis pendens in accordance with § 38-22-110, C.R.S.1973, is an essential requirement to perfecting a lien claim, and that Franklin’s failure to do so in this ease is fatal to its claim.”
Abrams v. Colorado Seal & Stripe, Inc., 702 P.2d 765 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
· cites it 7× “Defendants argue that because Seal & Stripe performed paving work in November 1979 but did not file its cross-claim until August 1980, it did not comply with the requirement that a lien action be commenced within six months after the last work or labor is performed.”
McIntire & Quiros of Colo. v. Westinghouse Cr. Corp., 576 P.2d 1026 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978).
· cites it 2× “However, because we rule that the dismissal was substantively incorrect, the complaint will be reinstated as against all the defendants without regard to this procedural mistake.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.