As used in this article, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Affiliate" means:
(a) A person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote twenty percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the securities:
(I) As a fiduciary or agent without sole discretionary power to vote the securities; or
(II) Solely to secure a debt, if the person has not exercised the power to vote;
(b) A corporation, twenty percent or more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor or a person who directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, twenty percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than a person who holds the securities:
(I) As a fiduciary or agent without sole power to vote the securities; or
(II) Solely to secure a debt, if the person has not in fact exercised the power to vote;
(c) A person whose business is operated by the debtor under a lease or other agreement, or a person substantially all of whose assets are controlled by the debtor; or
(d) A person who operates the debtor's business under a lease or other agreement or controls substantially all of the debtor's assets.
(2) "Asset" means property of a debtor. "Asset" shall not include:
(a) Property to the extent it is encumbered by a valid lien;
(b) Property to the extent it is generally exempt immediately prior to the time of transfer under nonbankruptcy law; or
(c) An interest in property held in tenancy by the entireties to the extent it is not subject to process by a creditor holding a claim against only one tenant.
(3) "Claim" means a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.
(4) "Control" of a debtor or debtor's property by another person does not include conduct undertaken by the other person to enforce rights existing under a valid agreement, entered into in good faith and not primarily for the purpose of obtaining control of the debtor or the debtor's property, including without limitation a lease of such property.
(5) "Creditor" means a person who has a claim.
(6) "Debt" means liability on a claim.
(7) "Debtor" means a person who is liable on a claim.
(8) "Insider" means:
(a) If the debtor is an individual:
(I) A relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor;
(II) A partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(III) A general partner in a partnership described in subparagraph (II) of this paragraph (a); or
(IV) A corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in control;
(b) If the debtor is a corporation:
(I) A director of the debtor;
(II) An officer of the debtor;
(III) A person in control of the debtor;
(IV) A partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(V) A general partner in a partnership described in subparagraph (IV) of this paragraph (b); or
(VI) A relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control of the debtor;
(c) If the debtor is a partnership:
(I) A general partner in the debtor;
(II) A relative of a general partner in, or a general partner of, or a person in control of the debtor;
(III) Another partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(IV) A general partner in a partnership described in subparagraph (III) of this paragraph (c); or
(V) A person in control of the debtor;
(d) An affiliate, or an insider of an affiliate as if the affiliate were the debtor; or
(e) A managing agent of the debtor.
(9) "Lien" means a charge against or an interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation, and includes a security interest created by agreement, a judicial lien obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings, a common-law lien, or a statutory lien.
(10) "Person" means an individual, partnership, corporation, association, organization, government or governmental subdivision or agency, business trust, estate, trust, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(11) "Property" means anything that may be the subject of ownership.
(12) "Relative" means an individual related by consanguinity within the third degree as determined by the common law, a spouse, or an individual related to a spouse within the third degree as so determined, and includes an individual in an adoptive relationship within the third degree.
(13) "Transfer" means every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, and includes payment of money, release, lease, and creation of a lien or other encumbrance.
(14) "Valid lien" means a lien that is effective against the holder of a judicial lien subsequently obtained by legal or equitable process or proceedings.
Source: L. 91: Entire article added, p. 1681, § 1, effective July 1.
Editor's note - Colorado legislative change: This section was numbered as section 1 in the uniform act. In the introductory portion to this section, after the word "article", Colorado added a comma and the words "unless the context otherwise requires". In the introductory portion to subsection (2), Colorado replaced a comma with a period and changed the words "but the term does not include" to "'Asset' shall not include". In subsection (2)(b), after "exempt", Colorado added "immediately prior to the time of transfer". The definition of "control" in subsection (4) has been added and subsequent definitions renumbered accordingly. In subsection (8), the word "means" has been substituted for "includes".
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
20
cases (
6 in the last 5 years), 1995–2026 · leading case:
Benton v. Adams, 56 P.3d 81 (Colo. 2002).
Benton v. Adams, 56 P.3d 81 (Colo. 2002).
· cites it 2× “See § 38-8-102(b)(3), 10 C.R.S. (2002) (defining "claim" to include rights to payment, including those rights not reduced to judgment); § 38-8-102(b)(5), 10 C.”
Vickery v. Evelyn V. Trumble Living Trust, 277 P.3d 864 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011).
· cites it 8× “Because of the division's resolution of the issues, we do not decide (1) whether the trust amendment was a transfer under section 88-8-102(18); or (2) whether the trust was an "asset" of Merry Gayle as defined in section 38-8-102(2) before the change of beneficiary-a…”
Great Neck Plaza L.P. v. Le Peep Restaurants, LLC, 37 P.3d 485 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).
· cites it 2× “§ 38-8-102(13), ©.R.8.2000. The trial court based its finding on the first prong of the fraudulent transfer test, whether the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor.”
Weinman v. Crowley (In re Blair), 588 B.R. 605 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2018).
· cites it 4× “(4) Assets under this section do not include property that has been transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or that has been transferred in a manner making the transfer voidable under this article.”
Double Oak Constr. L.L.C. v. Cornerstone Dev. Int'l, L.L.C., 97 P.3d 140 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 2× “” Section 38-8-102(3), (5), C.R.S.2002. Thus, in light of the enactment of CUFTA, a creditor who does not have a lien on the subject property is nevertheless entitled to assert a civil conspiracy cause of action against persons who participate in a fraudulent conveyance.”
Schempp v. Lucre Mgmt. Grp., LLC, 18 P.3d 762 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
· cites it 4× “Accordingly, we conclude that the court erred when it failed to consider the evidence as it relates to the definition of insider found in § 38-8-102, C.R.S8.1999. B. The court also failed to determine if Rollings' actions should be imputed to Schaal.”
CB Richard Ellis, Inc. v. CLGP, LLC, 251 P.3d 523 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010).
· cites it 3× “There is no dispute that here, at the time of the transfer, the broker had a "claim" under section 38-8-102(8), C.R.S.2009 (definition of "claim"), against the LLC.”
Sands v. New Age Fam. P'ship, Ltd., 897 P.2d 917 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).
· cites it 4× “§ 38-8-102, C.R.S. (1994 Cum.Supp.) (A creditor is a “person who has a claim,” and a claim “is a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, feed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured”).”
Fitzgibbons v. Thomason (In Re Thomason), 202 B.R. 768 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1996).
· cites it 2× “” In § 38-8-102(8)(a)(I) an insider is defined as a “relative,” and in § 38-8-102(12) a “relative” is defined to include a spouse.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-102(12): 3 cases
Fitzgibbons v. Thomason (In Re Thomason), 202 B.R. 768 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1996).
“” In § 38-8-102(8)(a)(I) an insider is defined as a “relative,” and in § 38-8-102(12) a “relative” is defined to include a spouse.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-102(13): 3 cases
Great Neck Plaza L.P. v. Le Peep Restaurants, LLC, 37 P.3d 485 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).
“§ 38-8-102(13), ©.R.8.2000. The trial court based its finding on the first prong of the fraudulent transfer test, whether the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor.”
Sands v. New Age Fam. P'ship, Ltd., 897 P.2d 917 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).
“§ 38-8-102, C.R.S. (1994 Cum.Supp.) (A creditor is a “person who has a claim,” and a claim “is a right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, feed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured”).”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-102(18): 1 case
Vickery v. Evelyn V. Trumble Living Trust, 277 P.3d 864 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011).
“Because of the division's resolution of the issues, we do not decide (1) whether the trust amendment was a transfer under section 88-8-102(18); or (2) whether the trust was an "asset" of Merry Gayle as defined in section 38-8-102(2) before the change of beneficiary-a…”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-102(2): 3 cases
Vickery v. Evelyn V. Trumble Living Trust, 277 P.3d 864 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011).
“Because of the division's resolution of the issues, we do not decide (1) whether the trust amendment was a transfer under section 88-8-102(18); or (2) whether the trust was an "asset" of Merry Gayle as defined in section 38-8-102(2) before the change of beneficiary-a…”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-102(2)(b): 2 cases
Weinman v. Crowley (In re Blair), 588 B.R. 605 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2018).
“(4) Assets under this section do not include property that has been transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or that has been transferred in a manner making the transfer voidable under this article.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-102(3): 4 cases
Double Oak Constr. L.L.C. v. Cornerstone Dev. Int'l, L.L.C., 97 P.3d 140 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003).
“” Section 38-8-102(3), (5), C.R.S.2002. Thus, in light of the enactment of CUFTA, a creditor who does not have a lien on the subject property is nevertheless entitled to assert a civil conspiracy cause of action against persons who participate in a fraudulent conveyance.”
Weinman v. Crowley (In re Blair), 588 B.R. 605 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2018).
“(4) Assets under this section do not include property that has been transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors or that has been transferred in a manner making the transfer voidable under this article.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-102(5): 1 case
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-102(6): 1 case
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-102(7): 4 cases
Vickery v. Evelyn V. Trumble Living Trust, 277 P.3d 864 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011).
“Because of the division's resolution of the issues, we do not decide (1) whether the trust amendment was a transfer under section 88-8-102(18); or (2) whether the trust was an "asset" of Merry Gayle as defined in section 38-8-102(2) before the change of beneficiary-a…”
Silverstein, No. 1:22-cv-01817 (D. Colo. Mar. 2, 2026).
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-102(8): 2 cases
CB Richard Ellis, Inc. v. CLGP, LLC, 251 P.3d 523 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010).
“There is no dispute that here, at the time of the transfer, the broker had a "claim" under section 38-8-102(8), C.R.S.2009 (definition of "claim"), against the LLC.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-102(8)(a)(I): 3 cases
Fitzgibbons v. Thomason (In Re Thomason), 202 B.R. 768 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1996).
“” In § 38-8-102(8)(a)(I) an insider is defined as a “relative,” and in § 38-8-102(12) a “relative” is defined to include a spouse.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-102(8)(d): 1 case
Schempp v. Lucre Mgmt. Grp., LLC, 18 P.3d 762 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
“Accordingly, we conclude that the court erred when it failed to consider the evidence as it relates to the definition of insider found in § 38-8-102, C.R.S8.1999. B. The court also failed to determine if Rollings' actions should be imputed to Schaal.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-102(b)(3): 1 case
Benton v. Adams, 56 P.3d 81 (Colo. 2002).
“See § 38-8-102(b)(3), 10 C.R.S. (2002) (defining "claim" to include rights to payment, including those rights not reduced to judgment); § 38-8-102(b)(5), 10 C.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 38-8-102(b)(5): 1 case
Benton v. Adams, 56 P.3d 81 (Colo. 2002).
“See § 38-8-102(b)(3), 10 C.R.S. (2002) (defining "claim" to include rights to payment, including those rights not reduced to judgment); § 38-8-102(b)(5), 10 C.”
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