Colorado Revised Statutes

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-21-105 (2026)

Appeals

✓ current as of July 2026

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(1) The taxpayer may appeal the final determination of the executive director issued pursuant to section 39-21-103, 39-21-104, or 39-21-104.5 within thirty days after the mailing of such determination. Jurisdiction to hear and determine such appeals is in the district courts of this state.

(2) (a) Venue is in the district court of the county where the taxpayer resides or has his or her principal place of business. If the taxpayer has neither a residence nor a principal place of business within the state, venue is in the Denver district court.

(b) The district court shall try the case de novo, reviewing all questions of law and fact, such review being conducted in accordance with the Colorado rules of civil procedure. The taxpayer shall present his or her case in the same manner as the plaintiff in other civil actions and the normal rules of evidence shall apply. The taxpayer has the burden of proof with respect to the issues raised in the written notice described in subsection (3) of this section except as to the issue of whether the taxpayer has been guilty of fraud with intent to evade tax. The burden of proof is on the executive director of the department of revenue or his or her delegate to show that a petitioner is liable as a transferee of property of a taxpayer but not to show that the taxpayer was liable for the tax. The district court may affirm, modify, or reverse the determination of the executive director and may enter judgment on its findings.

(3) A taxpayer appeals a final determination of the executive director by filing, with the clerk of the district court of the proper county, a copy of the notice of final determination received by the taxpayer, together with a written notice stating that the taxpayer appeals to the district court and alleging the pertinent facts upon which such appeal is grounded.

(4) Within fifteen days after filing an appeal to the district court from a decision pursuant to section 39-21-104.5, the taxpayer shall file with the district court a surety bond in twice the amount of the taxes, interest, and other charges stated as due in the final determination by the executive director which are contested on appeal. The taxpayer may, at his or her option, satisfy the surety bond requirement by deposit in a savings account or deposit account held in, or purchase a certificate of deposit issued by, a state or national bank or by a state or federal savings and loan association, in accordance with the provisions of section 11-35-101 (1), C.R.S., an amount equal to twice the amount of the taxes, interest, and other charges stated as due in the final determination by the executive director.

(5) Any taxpayer may, at his or her option, deposit the disputed amount with the executive director of the department of revenue within fifteen days after filing an appeal to the district court. If such amount is so deposited, no further interest accrues on the deficiency contested during the pendency of the action. At the conclusion of the action, after appeal to the supreme court or the court of appeals or after the time for such appeal has expired, the funds deposited must be, at the direction of the court, either retained by the executive director and applied against the deficiency or returned in whole or in part to the taxpayer with interest at the rate imposed under section 39-21-110.5. The taxpayer does not need to make a claim for refund of amounts deposited with the executive director of the department of revenue in order for such amounts to be repaid in accordance with the direction of the court.

(6) Upon filing of the written notice described in subsection (3) of this section, the executive director of the department of revenue is deemed to be a party to the appeal, and the clerk of the district court shall docket the cause as a civil action. The appellant shall cause summons to be issued and cause the same to be served upon the executive director, in accordance with the manner provided by law in civil cases. Notice of the date of trial must be mailed to the taxpayer and to the executive director, at least twenty days before the date of the trial.

(7) The final decision made in an appeal of an executive director's final determination must be entered as a judgment, as in other civil cases, against the taxpayer or against the executive director as the case may be.

(8) (a) The decision of the district court is reviewable by the supreme court or the court of appeals as is otherwise provided by law; except that C.R.C.P. 62 (d) and C.R.C.P. 121 section 1-23 shall not apply. Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection (8), if the taxpayer wishes to seek review of a district court ruling that is adverse to the taxpayer in part or in whole, no later than fifteen days after the ruling the taxpayer shall:

(I) File with the district court a surety bond in twice the amount of the taxes, interest, and other charges stated as due in the district court ruling, which are contested on appeal;

(II) Deposit in a savings account or deposit account held in, or purchase a certificate of deposit issued by, a state or national bank or by a state or federal savings and loan association, in accordance with the provisions of section 11-35-101 (1), C.R.S., an amount equal to twice the amount of the taxes, interest, and other charges stated in the district court ruling; or

(III) Deposit the amount stated as due in the district court ruling with the executive director.

(b) If the taxpayer has posted a bond, made a deposit, or deposited the disputed amount with the executive director as specified in subsections (4) and (5) of this section, such previous payment or posting is continued in effect and no further payment or posting may be required.

(c) Upon the taxpayer fulfilling the appeal requirements specified in paragraph (a) of this subsection (8), collection on the judgment is stayed during the pendency of the action.

(d) If the taxpayer deposits the amount stated as due in the district court ruling with the executive director as specified in subparagraph (III) of paragraph (a) of this subsection (8), no further interest shall accrue on the amount deposited during the pendency of the action. At the conclusion of the action, after appeal to the supreme court or after the time for such appeal has expired, the funds deposited must be, at the direction of the court, either retained by the executive director and applied against the deficiency or returned in whole or in part to the taxpayer with interest at the rate imposed under section 39-21-110.5. The taxpayer does not need to make a claim for refund of amounts deposited with the executive director in order for such amounts to be repaid in accordance with the direction of the court.

Source: L. 65: p. 1133, § 2. C.R.S. 1963: § 138-9-4. L. 69: p. 272, § 18. L. 81: (4) amended, p. 1863, § 1, effective June 8. L. 84: (4) amended, p. 1006, § 1, effective March 26. L. 2001: (1) amended, p. 434, § 2, effective April 20. L. 2003: (1) amended, p. 662, § 4, effective March 20. L. 2010: (1) amended, (SB 10-212), ch. 412, p. 2034, § 6, effective July 1. L. 2016: Entire section amended, (SB 16-036), ch. 292, p. 1179, § 1, effective August 10. Cross references: For service of summons and entry of judgment in civil cases, see C.R.C.P. 4 and 58.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 47 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1977–2022 · leading case: Walgreen Co. v. Charnes, 819 P.2d 1039 (Colo. 1991).

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Walgreen Co. v. Charnes, 819 P.2d 1039 (Colo. 1991). · cites it 21× “1 provide as follows: (7) Appeals from the final determination of the executive director may be taken in the same manner as provided in and shall be governed by section 39-21-105, C.R.S., by any party bound by the executive director's decision.”

Hanson v. Colorado Dep't of Revenue, 140 P.3d 256 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006). · cites it 13× “1984)(defective notice did not start thirty-day period prescribed in § 39-21-105 for commencing an appeal), aff'd, 724 P.”

MDC Holdings, Inc. v. Town of Parker, 223 P.3d 710 (Colo. 2010). · cites it 5× “Any such appeal shall be heard de novo and shall be heard as provided in section 39-21-105, C.R.S. ... (Emphasis added).”

Overstreet v. Colorado Dep't of Revenue, 178 P.3d 1259 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 20× “Dianne Overstreet (Taxpayer) appeals the district court’s order dismissing her appeal from a final determination by the executive director of the Colorado Department of Revenue (Department) because she failed to comply with the mandatory bond provisions of section 39-21-105,…”

Noble Energy, Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Revenue, 232 P.3d 293 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010). · cites it 7× “See § 39-21-105, C.R.S. 2009. The court first granted taxpayer’s motion for summary judgment as to the imposition of sales tax on the sand and the separators.”

Reed v. Dolan, 577 P.2d 284 (Colo. 1978). · cites it 12× “The district court dismissed on the ground that plaintiff had failed to comply with the mandatory bond provisions of section 39-21-105, C.R.S. 1973. Plaintiff is here challenging the constitutionality of these bond provisions.”

Bd. of Cnty. Com'rs of Rio Blanco v. Exxonmobil Oil Corp., 192 P.3d 582 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008). · cites it 4× “The County appeals from a judgment entered after a trial to the court.”

State Dep't of Revenue v. Dist. Court, 568 P.2d 1157 (Colo. 1977). · cites it 10× “Wards filed an action in Denver District Court (1) appealing pursuant to section 39-21-105, C.R.S. 1973, from the Department’s tax assessment, and (2) seeking review under section 24-4-106(4), C.”

O'Donnell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 186 P.3d 46 (Colo. 2008). · cites it 4× “Besides supersedeas bonds, when a taxpayer wants to challenge in district court a tax deficiency determined by the Department of Revenue, the statute at issue requires that "the taxpayer shall file with the district court a surety bond in twice the amount" of the judgment owed.”

Winslow Constr. Co. v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 960 P.2d 685 (Colo. 1998). · cites it 4× “1(7) provides: Appeals from the final determination of the executive director may be taken in the same manner as provided in and shall be governed by section 39-21-105, C.R.S., by any party bound by the executive director’s decision.”

Arapahoe Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 831 P.2d 451 (Colo. 1992). · cites it 5× “(1987), and section 39-21-105, 16B C.R.S. (1982). 7 The district court found competent evidence in the record to support the Manager’s findings.”

A.D. Store Co. v. Exec. Dir. of Dep't of Revenue, 19 P.3d 680 (Colo. 2001). · cites it 4× “Auer's appealed that ruling to the Denver district court under section 39-21-105, 11 C.R.S. (2000). The parties stipulated to the relevant facts, and submitted the matter for a determination of law.”

Show all 47 citing cases →

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-21-105(1) — 5 cases

Hanson v. Colorado Dep't of Revenue, 140 P.3d 256 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006). “1984)(defective notice did not start thirty-day period prescribed in § 39-21-105 for commencing an appeal), aff'd, 724 P.”

Overstreet v. Colorado Dep't of Revenue, 178 P.3d 1259 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007). “Dianne Overstreet (Taxpayer) appeals the district court’s order dismissing her appeal from a final determination by the executive director of the Colorado Department of Revenue (Department) because she failed to comply with the mandatory bond provisions of section 39-21-105,…”

Adolph Coors Co. v. Charnes, 690 P.2d 893 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).

M & J Leasing Co. v. Exec. Dir. of the Dep't of Revenue, 796 P.2d 28 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).

Flores v. Colorado Dep't of Revenue, State, Tax Div., 802 P.2d 1175 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-21-105(2) — 1 case

Colorado Dep't of Revenue v. Woodmen of the World, 919 P.2d 806 (Colo. 1996).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-21-105(2)(a) — 1 case

Winslow Constr. Co. v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 960 P.2d 685 (Colo. 1998). “1(7) provides: Appeals from the final determination of the executive director may be taken in the same manner as provided in and shall be governed by section 39-21-105, C.R.S., by any party bound by the executive director’s decision.”

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-21-105(2)(b) — 13 cases

Walgreen Co. v. Charnes, 819 P.2d 1039 (Colo. 1991). “1 provide as follows: (7) Appeals from the final determination of the executive director may be taken in the same manner as provided in and shall be governed by section 39-21-105, C.R.S., by any party bound by the executive director's decision.”

Noble Energy, Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Revenue, 232 P.3d 293 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010). “See § 39-21-105, C.R.S. 2009. The court first granted taxpayer’s motion for summary judgment as to the imposition of sales tax on the sand and the separators.”

Bd. of Cnty. Com'rs of Rio Blanco v. Exxonmobil Oil Corp., 192 P.3d 582 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008). “The County appeals from a judgment entered after a trial to the court.”

At & T Commc'ns of the Mountain States, Inc. v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 778 P.2d 677 (Colo. 1989).

Kraftco Corp. v. Charnes, 636 P.2d 1300 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-21-105(4) — 6 cases

Reed v. Dolan, 577 P.2d 284 (Colo. 1978). “The district court dismissed on the ground that plaintiff had failed to comply with the mandatory bond provisions of section 39-21-105, C.R.S. 1973. Plaintiff is here challenging the constitutionality of these bond provisions.”

Callow v. Dep't of Revenue, 594 P.2d 1051 (Colo. 1979).

Sky Chefs v. City & Cnty. of Denver, Dep't of Revenue, Sales, Use, & Occupational Tax Section, 653 P.2d 402 (Colo. 1982).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-21-105(4)(a) — 3 cases

O'Donnell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 186 P.3d 46 (Colo. 2008). “Besides supersedeas bonds, when a taxpayer wants to challenge in district court a tax deficiency determined by the Department of Revenue, the statute at issue requires that "the taxpayer shall file with the district court a surety bond in twice the amount" of the judgment owed.”

AF Prop. P'ship v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 852 P.2d 1267 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-21-105(4)(b) — 1 case

Coors Brewing Co. v. City of Golden, 411 P.3d 767 (Colo. Ct. App. 2013).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-21-105(5) — 1 case

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 39-21-105(7) — 4 cases

Bd. of Cnty. Com'rs of Rio Blanco v. Exxonmobil Oil Corp., 192 P.3d 582 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008). “The County appeals from a judgment entered after a trial to the court.”

Catholic Health Initiatives Colorado v. City of Pueblo, 183 P.3d 612 (Colo. Ct. App. 2008).

Pub. Serv. Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 397 P.3d 1111 (Colo. Ct. App. 2011).

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