(1) (a) (I) It is unlawful for any person to operate any motor vehicle in this state while the revocation of the department prohibiting the operation remains in effect. Any person found to be an habitual offender, who operates a motor vehicle in this state while the revocation of the department prohibiting such operation is in effect, commits a class 2 traffic misdemeanor.
(II) Any person convicted of violating subsection (1)(a)(I) of this section shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment in the county jail for thirty days, or a mandatory minimum fine of three thousand dollars, or both. The minimum jail sentence and fine required by this subsection (1)(a)(II) shall be in addition to any other penalty provided in section 42-4-1701. The court may suspend all or a portion of the mandatory jail sentence or fine if the defendant successfully completes no less than forty hours, and no greater than three hundred hours, of useful public service. In no event shall the court sentence the convicted person to probation. Upon the defendant's successful completion of the useful public service, the court shall vacate the suspended sentence. In the event the defendant fails or refuses to complete the useful public service ordered, the court shall impose the jail sentence, fine, or both, as required under this subsection (1)(a)(II).
(b) (I) A person commits the crime of aggravated driving with a revoked license if he or she is found to be an habitual offender and thereafter operates a motor vehicle in this state while the revocation of the department prohibiting such operation is in effect and, as a part of the same criminal episode, also commits any of the following offenses: (A) and (B) Repealed.
(C) Reckless driving, as described in section 42-4-1401;
(D) Eluding or attempting to elude a police officer, as described in section 42-4-1413;
(E) Violation of any of the requirements specified for accidents and accident reports in sections 42-4-1601 to 42-4-1606; or
(F) Vehicular eluding, as described in section 18-9-116.5, C.R.S.
(II) Aggravated driving with a revoked license is a class 1 traffic misdemeanor; except that a court shall sentence the offender to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of sixty days in the custody of a county jail.
(III) If a defendant is convicted of aggravated driving with a revoked license based upon the commission of DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI pursuant to sub-subparagraph (A) or (B) of subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (b), as that crime existed before August 5, 2015:
(A) The court shall convict and sentence the offender for each offense separately;
(B) The court shall impose all of the penalties for the alcohol-related driving offense, as such penalties are described in section 42-4-1307;
(C) The provisions of section 18-1-408, C.R.S., shall not apply to the sentences imposed for either conviction;
(D) Any probation imposed for a conviction under this section may run concurrently with any probation required by section 42-4-1307; and
(E) The department shall reflect both convictions on the defendant's driving record.
(2) For the purpose of enforcing this section in any case in which the accused is charged with driving a motor vehicle while such person's license, permit, or privilege to drive is revoked or is charged with driving without a license, the court, before hearing such charges, shall require the district attorney to determine whether such person has been determined to be an habitual offender and by reason of such determination is barred from operating a motor vehicle on the highways of this state. If the district attorney determines that the accused has been so held, the district attorney shall cause the appropriate criminal charges to be lodged against the accused.
Source: L. 94: Entire title amended with relocations, p. 2160, § 1, effective January 1, 1995. L. 99: (1) amended, p. 796, § 9, effective July 1. L. 2000: (1)(a) amended, p. 682, § 1, effective July 1; (1)(a) and IP(1)(b)(I) amended and (1)(b)(I)(F) added, p. 710, § 46, effective July 1. L. 2002: (1)(a)(II) and (1)(b)(II) amended, p. 1560, § 364, effective October 1. L. 2008: (1)(b)(I)(A) and (1)(b)(I)(B) amended, p. 251, § 16, effective July 1. L. 2010: (1)(b)(III) added, (HB 10-1347), ch. 258, p. 1158, § 3, effective July 1. L. 2015: (1)(b)(I)(A) and (1)(b)(I)(B) repealed and (1)(b)(II) and IP(1)(b)(III) amended, (HB 15-1043), ch. 262, p. 996, § 4, effective August 5. L. 2021: (1)(a) and (1)(b)(II) amended, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3301, § 711, effective March 1, 2022.
Editor's note: Amendments to subsection (1)(a) by House Bill 00-1107 and House Bill 00-1426 were harmonized.
Cross references: (1) For a class 1 or class 2 traffic misdemeanor, see § 42-4-1701 (3).
(2) For the legislative declaration contained in the 2002 act amending subsections (1)(a)(II) and (1)(b)(II), see section 1 of chapter 318, Session Laws of Colorado 2002.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
73
cases (
4 in the last 5 years), 1979–2026 · leading case:
People v. McKnight, 617 P.2d 1178 (Colo. 1980).
People v. McKnight, 617 P.2d 1178 (Colo. 1980).
· cites it 36× “The appellant, Dewey Kenneth McKnight, was convicted in district court of Driving After Judgment Prohibited, section 42-2-206, C.R.S. 1973. McKnight has appealed, challenging the constitutionality of the statutes upon which his conviction is based.”
Griego v. People, 19 P.3d 1 (Colo. 2001).
· cites it 8× “9, § 42-2-206, 1999 Colo. Sess. Laws 792 , 796- *6 97; ch.”
v. Wambolt, 2018 COA 88 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 37× “Section 42-2-206 ¶ 21 Section 42-2-206, the statute establishing DARP and ADARP, has been amended since Wambolt was charged and tried.”
People v. Heinz, 589 P.2d 931 (Colo. 1979).
· cites it 23× “This interlocutory appeal was taken to obtain review of a district court order which dismissed a charge against the defendant, Danny Brent Heinz, of violating section 42-2-206, C.R.S. 1973 (driving after revocation).”
People v. Moore, 615 P.2d 726 (Colo. 1980).
· cites it 21× “) (count one), and Driving After Judgment Prohibited, section 42-2-206, C.R.S. 1973 (count two).”
People v. Roybal, 618 P.2d 1121 (Colo. 1980).
· cites it 12× “Andrew Roybal appeals from his conviction in district court for Driving After Judgment Prohibited, section 42-2-206, C.R.S. 1973. We reverse.”
People v. Valdez, 2017 COA 41 (Colo. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 2× “The Trial Court Did Not Err in Allowing the Prosecution to Present Evidence Linking DNA From the Crime Scene to a DNA Sample Previously Taken from Valdéz in Connection with His Arrest on a Felony Traffic Offense ¶ 4 In his suppression motion, Valdez argued that taking the DNA…”
People v. Strock, 252 P.3d 1148 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010).
· cites it 3× “2009, and driving after revocation prohibited, § 42-2-206(1)(a)(I), C.R.9.2009, those offenses appeared on each mittimus admitted into evidence at Strock's habitual criminal adjudication and the offenses are class six felonies that are listed under the "Habitual Offenders"…”
People v. Hampton, 619 P.2d 48 (Colo. 1980).
· cites it 24× “This appeal raises questions concerning the ability of a defendant charged with Driving After Judgment Prohibited, section 42-2-206, C.R.S. 1973, 1 to collaterally attack traffic offense convictions which form the basis of the defendant’s habitual traffic offender status.”
Zubiate v. People, 2017 CO 17 (Colo. 2017).
· cites it 6× “¶16 Section 42-2-206(1)(b)(I), C.R.S. (2016), of the traffic code establishes the offense of aggravated DARP that is at issue here and provides: A person commits the crime of aggravated driving with a revoked license if he or she is found to be an habitual offender and…”
People v. Mersman, 148 P.3d 199 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).
· cites it 3× “Section 42-2-206(l)(b)(I)(A), C.R.S.2006.”
People v. Patnode, 126 P.3d 249 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 7× “Defendant first asserts that the trial court erred in making a habitual criminal finding when two of defendant’s three prior felony convictions were for driving after revocation of his driving privilege as a habitual traffic offender in violation of § 42-2-206, C.R.S. 2004. When…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-2-206(1) — 27 cases
Griego v. People, 19 P.3d 1 (Colo. 2001).
“9, § 42-2-206, 1999 Colo. Sess. Laws 792 , 796- *6 97; ch.”
People v. McKnight, 617 P.2d 1178 (Colo. 1980).
“The appellant, Dewey Kenneth McKnight, was convicted in district court of Driving After Judgment Prohibited, section 42-2-206, C.R.S. 1973. McKnight has appealed, challenging the constitutionality of the statutes upon which his conviction is based.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-2-206(1)(a) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-2-206(1)(a)(I) — 6 cases
People v. Strock, 252 P.3d 1148 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010).
“2009, and driving after revocation prohibited, § 42-2-206(1)(a)(I), C.R.9.2009, those offenses appeared on each mittimus admitted into evidence at Strock's habitual criminal adjudication and the offenses are class six felonies that are listed under the "Habitual Offenders"…”
v. Wambolt, 2018 COA 88 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018).
“Section 42-2-206 ¶ 21 Section 42-2-206, the statute establishing DARP and ADARP, has been amended since Wambolt was charged and tried.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-2-206(1)(b) — 4 cases
v. Wambolt, 2018 COA 88 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018).
“Section 42-2-206 ¶ 21 Section 42-2-206, the statute establishing DARP and ADARP, has been amended since Wambolt was charged and tried.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-2-206(1)(b)(D) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-2-206(1)(b)(I) — 7 cases
People v. Strock, 252 P.3d 1148 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010).
“2009, and driving after revocation prohibited, § 42-2-206(1)(a)(I), C.R.9.2009, those offenses appeared on each mittimus admitted into evidence at Strock's habitual criminal adjudication and the offenses are class six felonies that are listed under the "Habitual Offenders"…”
v. Wambolt, 2018 COA 88 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018).
“Section 42-2-206 ¶ 21 Section 42-2-206, the statute establishing DARP and ADARP, has been amended since Wambolt was charged and tried.”
Zubiate v. People, 2017 CO 17 (Colo. 2017).
“¶16 Section 42-2-206(1)(b)(I), C.R.S. (2016), of the traffic code establishes the offense of aggravated DARP that is at issue here and provides: A person commits the crime of aggravated driving with a revoked license if he or she is found to be an habitual offender and…”
v. Sims, 2020 COA 78 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020).
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-2-206(1)(b)(I)(A) — 3 cases
v. Wambolt, 2018 COA 88 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018).
“Section 42-2-206 ¶ 21 Section 42-2-206, the statute establishing DARP and ADARP, has been amended since Wambolt was charged and tried.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-2-206(1)(b)(I)(C) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-2-206(1)(b)(I)(D) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-2-206(1)(b)(I1) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-2-206(1)(b)(II) — 2 cases
v. Wambolt, 2018 COA 88 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018).
“Section 42-2-206 ¶ 21 Section 42-2-206, the statute establishing DARP and ADARP, has been amended since Wambolt was charged and tried.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-2-206(1)(b)(III) — 2 cases
v. Wambolt, 2018 COA 88 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018).
“Section 42-2-206 ¶ 21 Section 42-2-206, the statute establishing DARP and ADARP, has been amended since Wambolt was charged and tried.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-2-206(1)(b)(III)(A) — 3 cases
v. Wambolt, 2018 COA 88 (Colo. Ct. App. 2018).
“Section 42-2-206 ¶ 21 Section 42-2-206, the statute establishing DARP and ADARP, has been amended since Wambolt was charged and tried.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-2-206(1)(b)(III)(C) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-2-206(2) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-2-206(b)(I) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-2-206(b)(III) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-2-206(b)(III)(C) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-2-206(l)(a)(I) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-2-206(l)(b) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-2-206(l)(b)(I) — 1 case
Zubiate v. People, 2017 CO 17 (Colo. 2017).
“¶16 Section 42-2-206(1)(b)(I), C.R.S. (2016), of the traffic code establishes the offense of aggravated DARP that is at issue here and provides: A person commits the crime of aggravated driving with a revoked license if he or she is found to be an habitual offender and…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-2-206(l)(b)(I)(A) — 1 case
People v. Mersman, 148 P.3d 199 (Colo. Ct. App. 2006).
“Section 42-2-206(l)(b)(I)(A), C.R.S.2006.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-2-206(l)(b)(II) — 1 case
People v. Valdez, 2017 COA 41 (Colo. Ct. App. 2017).
“The Trial Court Did Not Err in Allowing the Prosecution to Present Evidence Linking DNA From the Crime Scene to a DNA Sample Previously Taken from Valdéz in Connection with His Arrest on a Felony Traffic Offense ¶ 4 In his suppression motion, Valdez argued that taking the DNA…”
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