(1) A person commits perjury on a motor vehicle registration application if such person knowingly makes a materially false statement, other than those prohibited by sections 18-8-502 and 18-8-503, C.R.S., on a motor vehicle registration application that such person does not believe to be true, under an oath required or authorized by law.
(2) Perjury on a motor vehicle registration application is a petty offense.
Source: L. 2005: Entire article amended with relocations, p. 1104, § 2, effective August 8. L. 2021: (2) amended, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3303, § 721, effective March 1, 2022.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 42-3-140 as it existed prior to 2005, and the former § 42-3-122 was relocated to § 42-3-207.
Cross references: For the penalty for a petty offense, see § 18-1.3-503.
Notes of Decisions
People v. Redinger, 906 P.2d 81 (Colo. 1995).
· cites it 2× “), superseding § 42-3-122(1)(a), 17 C.R.S. (1993). However, suspected traffic infractions are treated the same as suspected crimes for Fourth Amendment purposes of reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant's vehicle.”
People v. Thomas, 839 P.2d 1174 (Colo. 1992).
“§ 42-3-122(2)(b), 17 C.R.S. (1992 Supp.).”
Gonsoir v. People, 793 P.2d 1165 (Colo. 1990).
· cites it 2× “The record also establishes that after jury selection but prior to the commencement of the prosecutor's opening statement Gonsoir’s attorney requested suppression of any reference during the prosecutor's opening statement to the alcohol content of Gonsoir's blood at the time of…”
Eckart v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off. of the State, 775 P.2d 97 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).
· cites it 2× “Claimant argues that because this activity was a violation of § 42-3-122, C.R.S. (1984 Repl.Vol. 17), and was found to have “existed,” the hearing officer was required to award him benefits pursuant to § 8-73-108(4)(l).”
Eckart v. Indus. Claims Appeals Off., 775 P.2d 97 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).
· cites it 2× “Claimant argues that because this activity was a violation of § 42-3-122, C.R.S. (1984 Repl. Vol. 17), and was found to have "existed," the hearing officer was required to award him benefits pursuant to § 8-73-108(4)(1).”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-3-122(1)(a): 1 case
People v. Redinger, 906 P.2d 81 (Colo. 1995).
“), superseding § 42-3-122(1)(a), 17 C.R.S. (1993). However, suspected traffic infractions are treated the same as suspected crimes for Fourth Amendment purposes of reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant's vehicle.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-3-122(2)(b): 1 case
People v. Thomas, 839 P.2d 1174 (Colo. 1992).
“§ 42-3-122(2)(b), 17 C.R.S. (1992 Supp.).”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-3-122(l)(a): 2 cases
People v. Redinger, 906 P.2d 81 (Colo. 1995).
“), superseding § 42-3-122(1)(a), 17 C.R.S. (1993). However, suspected traffic infractions are treated the same as suspected crimes for Fourth Amendment purposes of reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant's vehicle.”
Gonsoir v. People, 793 P.2d 1165 (Colo. 1990).
“The record also establishes that after jury selection but prior to the commencement of the prosecutor's opening statement Gonsoir’s attorney requested suppression of any reference during the prosecutor's opening statement to the alcohol content of Gonsoir's blood at the time of…”
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