(1) The dissolution of the partnership does not of itself discharge the existing liability of any partner.
(2) A partner is discharged from any existing liability upon dissolution of the partnership by an agreement to that effect between such partner, the partnership creditor, and the person or partnership continuing the business; and such agreement may be inferred from the course of dealing between the creditor having knowledge of the dissolution and the person or partnership continuing the business.
(3) Where a person agrees to assume the existing obligations of a dissolved partnership, the partners whose obligations have been assumed shall be discharged from any liability to any creditor of the partnership who, knowing of the agreement, consents to a material alteration in the nature or time of payment of the creditor's obligations.
(4) The individual property of a deceased person who was a partner shall be liable, to the extent the deceased person was or would have been liable under section 7-60-115, 7-60-118, or 7-60-134, for all obligations of the partnership incurred while the deceased person was a partner but subject to the prior payment of the deceased person's separate debts.
Source: L. 31: p. 666, § 36. CSA: C. 123, § 36. CRS 53: § 104-1-36. C.R.S. 1963: § 104-1-36. L. 95: (4) amended, p. 780, § 7, effective May 24. L. 2004: (2), (3), and (4) amended, p. 1428, § 91, effective July 1.
Notes of Decisions
Wester & Co. v. Nestle, 669 P.2d 1046 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
· cites it 16× “On appeal, the lessor argues that the court should not have applied § 7-60-136, C.R.S.1973, because under § 7-60-127, C.”
Travers v. Rainey, 888 P.2d 372 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
· cites it 5× “See § 7-60-136, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 3A). Rather, Rainey’s obligations are dependent upon a variety of factual and legal issues, such as his right to dissolve the partnership and the propriety of Travers’ and Mitchell’s actions in winding-up or continuing the partnership.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 7-60-136(1): 2 cases
Wester & Co. v. Nestle, 669 P.2d 1046 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
“On appeal, the lessor argues that the court should not have applied § 7-60-136, C.R.S.1973, because under § 7-60-127, C.”
Travers v. Rainey, 888 P.2d 372 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
“See § 7-60-136, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 3A). Rather, Rainey’s obligations are dependent upon a variety of factual and legal issues, such as his right to dissolve the partnership and the propriety of Travers’ and Mitchell’s actions in winding-up or continuing the partnership.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 7-60-136(2): 2 cases
Wester & Co. v. Nestle, 669 P.2d 1046 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
“On appeal, the lessor argues that the court should not have applied § 7-60-136, C.R.S.1973, because under § 7-60-127, C.”
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 7-60-136(3): 2 cases
Wester & Co. v. Nestle, 669 P.2d 1046 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
“On appeal, the lessor argues that the court should not have applied § 7-60-136, C.R.S.1973, because under § 7-60-127, C.”
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