(1) It is the intent of the general assembly that the "Workers' Compensation Act of Colorado" be interpreted so as to assure the quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits to injured workers at a reasonable cost to employers, without the necessity of any litigation, recognizing that the workers' compensation system in Colorado is based on a mutual renunciation of common law rights and defenses by employers and employees alike.
(2) The general assembly hereby finds that the determination of whether an individual is an employee for purposes of the "Workers' Compensation Act of Colorado" is subject to a great deal of speculation and litigation. It is the intent of the general assembly to provide an easily ascertainable standard for determining whether an individual is an employee. In order to further this objective, the test for determining whether an individual is an employee for the purposes of the "Workers' Compensation Act of Colorado" shall be based on the nine criteria found in section 8-40-202 (2)(b)(II) which shall supersede the common law. The fact that an individual performs services exclusively or primarily for another shall not be conclusive evidence that the individual is an employee.
Source: L. 90: Entire article R&RE, p. 468, § 1, effective July 1. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 1291, § 3, effective July 1. L. 93: Entire section amended, p. 355, § 1, effective April 12. L. 95: (2) amended, p. 343, § 1, effective July 1.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 8-40-101.5 as it existed prior to 1990.
PART 2
DEFINITIONS
Notes of Decisions
Pinnacol Assurance v. Hoff, 2016 CO 53 (Colo. 2016).
· cites it 4× “1995); see also § 8-40-102(1). To that end, any “employer” subject to the Act must “secure compensation for all employees” by maintaining workers’ compensation insurance.”
One Hour Cleaners v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 914 P.2d 501 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).
· cites it 4× “See § 8-40-102(1), C.R.S. (1995 Cum.Supp.). We agree with the Panel that, because "authorized medical benefits" refers to the legal authority of a provider to deliver care to a claimant, there was no requirement to mediate the issue.”
Indus. Claim Appeals Off. v. Ray, 145 P.3d 661 (Colo. 2006).
· cites it 4× “" § 8-40-102(1), C.R.S. (2006). Adopting such language avoids the need for the technical line drawing that has resulted in prolonged litigation for Ray and the other claimants now before us.”
Ray v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 124 P.3d 891 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 4× “Finally, I rely upon the legislative declaration in § 8-40-102(1), C.R.S.2004, which states the intent that the Workers' Compensation Act of Colorado be interpreted so as to assure quick and efficient delivery of benefits "at a reasonable cost to employers.”
v. Shelter Mut. Ins., 2021 CO 11 (Colo. 2021).
· cites it 3× “(2020) (recognizing that “the workers’ compensation system in Colorado is based on a mutual renunciation of common law rights and defenses by employers and employees alike”). ¶22 The question now before us is whether the WCA’s co-employee immunity rule bars Ryser from recovering…”
Williams v. Kunau, 147 P.3d 33 (Colo. 2006).
· cites it 3× “§ 8-40-102. The legislature also intended that the DIME provisions would improve and simplify the workers' compensation process.”
Provo v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 66 P.3d 138 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).
· cites it 8× “She specifically asserts that the attorneys may have violated §§ 8-40-102(1), 8-48-402, and 8-48-508(8), C.”
Specialty Restaurants Corp. v. Nelson, 231 P.3d 393 (Colo. 2010).
· cites it 2× “The General Assembly explicitly stated its intent that the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act is to provide an effective remedy for employees injured at work: It is the intent of the general assembly that the "Workers' Compensation Act of Colorado" be interpreted so as to…”
People v. Oliver, 2016 COA 180 (Colo. Ct. App. 2016).
· cites it 2× “§ 8-40-102(1), C.R.S. 2016 (“[T]he workers’ compensation system in Colorado is based on a mutual renunciation of common law rights and defenses by employers and employees alike.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-40-102(1) — 59 cases
Pinnacol Assurance v. Hoff, 2016 CO 53 (Colo. 2016).
“1995); see also § 8-40-102(1). To that end, any “employer” subject to the Act must “secure compensation for all employees” by maintaining workers’ compensation insurance.”
One Hour Cleaners v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 914 P.2d 501 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).
“See § 8-40-102(1), C.R.S. (1995 Cum.Supp.). We agree with the Panel that, because "authorized medical benefits" refers to the legal authority of a provider to deliver care to a claimant, there was no requirement to mediate the issue.”
Indus. Claim Appeals Off. v. Ray, 145 P.3d 661 (Colo. 2006).
“" § 8-40-102(1), C.R.S. (2006). Adopting such language avoids the need for the technical line drawing that has resulted in prolonged litigation for Ray and the other claimants now before us.”
Ray v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 124 P.3d 891 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005).
“Finally, I rely upon the legislative declaration in § 8-40-102(1), C.R.S.2004, which states the intent that the Workers' Compensation Act of Colorado be interpreted so as to assure quick and efficient delivery of benefits "at a reasonable cost to employers.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-40-102(2) — 3 cases
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