(1) "Accident", "injury", and "occupational disease" shall not be construed to include disability or death caused by or resulting from mental or emotional stress unless it is shown by competent evidence that such mental or emotional stress is proximately caused solely by hazards to which the worker would not have been equally exposed outside the employment.
(2) "Accident", "injury", and "occupational disease" shall not be construed to include disability or death caused by heart attack unless it is shown by competent evidence that such heart attack was proximately caused by an unusual exertion arising out of and within the course of the employment.
Source: L. 90: Entire article R&RE, p. 480, § 1, effective July 1.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 8-41-108 as it existed prior to 1990.
Notes of Decisions
Gen. Cable Co. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 878 P.2d 118 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
· cites it 3× “1993), this court defined the word “primarily,” as used in § 8-41-301(2)(b), by referring to the statute now codified as § 8-41-302(1), .C.R.S. (1993 Cum. Supp.).”
City of Thornton v. Replogle, 888 P.2d 782 (Colo. 1995).
· cites it 2× “On the contrary, section 8-41-302(2)(b) limits mental impairment benefits, both permanent and temporary, to twelve weeks, whereas section 8-42-107(2) unquestionably provides that permanent disability benefits are awarded in addition to any temporary benefits already received.”
Means v. Baltimore Cnty., 689 A.2d 1238 (Md. 1997).
“3 (Deering 1996); Colorado, Colo.Rev.Stat. § 8-41-302(1) (1996); Delaware, State v.”
Young v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off. of Colorado, 860 P.2d 591 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).
· cites it 3× “The first of these is now codified as § 8-41-302(1), C.R.S. (1992 Cum.Supp.). It provides that: ‘Accident’, ‘injury’, and ‘occupational disease’ shall not be construed to include disability or death caused by or resulting *593 from mental or emotional stress unless it is shown…”
Wackenhut Corp. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 975 P.2d 1131 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).
· cites it 5× “At the outset, we note that this case involves the interplay between the so-called “heart attack statute,” § 8-41-302(2), C.R.S. 1997, and the test set forth in Price v.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-302(1) — 4 cases
Gen. Cable Co. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 878 P.2d 118 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
“1993), this court defined the word “primarily,” as used in § 8-41-301(2)(b), by referring to the statute now codified as § 8-41-302(1), .C.R.S. (1993 Cum. Supp.).”
Means v. Baltimore Cnty., 689 A.2d 1238 (Md. 1997).
“3 (Deering 1996); Colorado, Colo.Rev.Stat. § 8-41-302(1) (1996); Delaware, State v.”
Young v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off. of Colorado, 860 P.2d 591 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993).
“The first of these is now codified as § 8-41-302(1), C.R.S. (1992 Cum.Supp.). It provides that: ‘Accident’, ‘injury’, and ‘occupational disease’ shall not be construed to include disability or death caused by or resulting *593 from mental or emotional stress unless it is shown…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-302(2) — 1 case
Wackenhut Corp. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 975 P.2d 1131 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).
“At the outset, we note that this case involves the interplay between the so-called “heart attack statute,” § 8-41-302(2), C.R.S. 1997, and the test set forth in Price v.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-302(2)(b) — 1 case
City of Thornton v. Replogle, 888 P.2d 782 (Colo. 1995).
“On the contrary, section 8-41-302(2)(b) limits mental impairment benefits, both permanent and temporary, to twelve weeks, whereas section 8-42-107(2) unquestionably provides that permanent disability benefits are awarded in addition to any temporary benefits already received.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.