(1) (a) (I) Any person, company, or corporation operating or engaged in or conducting any business by leasing or contracting out any part or all of the work thereof to any lessee, sublessee, contractor, or subcontractor, irrespective of the number of employees engaged in such work, shall be construed to be an employer as defined in articles 40 to 47 of this title and shall be liable as provided in said articles to pay compensation for injury or death resulting therefrom to said lessees, sublessees, contractors, and subcontractors and their employees or employees' dependents, except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) of this section.
(II) Notwithstanding subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (a) and any other provision of law to the contrary, it is presumed that a buyer of goods is not liable as a statutory employer when a lessee, sublessee, contractor, or subcontractor, or their employee who is delivering the goods to the buyer injures himself or herself while not on the buyer's premises. The presumption may be overcome by a showing that the lessee, sublessee, contractor, or subcontractor, or their employee was performing a job function that would normally be performed by an employee of the buyer of the goods being delivered. Nothing in this subparagraph (II) creates a presumption of a statutory employer-employee relationship when an injury occurs on the buyer's premises.
(III) For the purposes of this section, a "statutory employer" is an employer who is responsible to pay workers' compensation benefits pursuant to subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (a). (a.5) The general assembly hereby finds and determines that the decision of the Colorado court of appeals in the case of Newsom v. Frank M. Hall & Co., No. 02CA1375 (February 26, 2004), in which the court held that an independent contractor may be an entity other than a natural person, did not accurately reflect the intent of the general assembly when it passed Senate Bill 93-132 and Senate Bill 95-072. The general assembly hereby declares that the term "individual", as used in this section and in section 8-40-202, means a natural person.
(b) The employer, before commencing said work, shall insure and keep insured against all liability as provided in said articles, and such lessee, sublessee, contractor, or subcontractor, as well as any employee thereof, shall be deemed employees as defined in said articles. The employer shall be entitled to recover the cost of such insurance from said lessee, sublessee, contractor, or subcontractor and may withhold and deduct the same from the contract price or any royalties or other money due, owing, or to become due said lessee, sublessee, contractor, or subcontractor.
(2) If said lessee, sublessee, contractor, or subcontractor is also an employer in the doing of such work and, before commencing such work, insures and keeps insured its liability for compensation as provided in articles 40 to 47 of this title, neither said lessee, sublessee, contractor, or subcontractor, its employees, or its insurer shall have any right of contribution or action of any kind, including actions under section 8-41-203, against the person, company, or corporation operating or engaged in or conducting any business by leasing or contracting out any part or all of the work thereof, or against its employees, servants, or agents.
(3) Notwithstanding any provision of this section or section 8-41-402 to the contrary, any individual who is excluded from the definition of employee pursuant to section 8-40-202 (2), or a working general partner or sole proprietor who is not covered under a policy of workers' compensation insurance, or a corporate officer or member of a limited liability company who executes and files an election to reject coverage under section 8-41-202 (1) shall not have any cause of action of any kind under articles 40 to 47 of this title. Nothing in this section shall be construed to restrict the right of any such individual to elect to proceed against a third party in accordance with the provisions of section 8-41-203. The total amount of damages recoverable pursuant to any cause of action resulting from a work-related injury brought by such individual that would otherwise have been compensable under articles 40 to 47 of this title shall not exceed fifteen thousand dollars, except in any cause of action brought against another not in the same employ.
(4) (a) Notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary, any person, company, or corporation who contracts with a landowner or lessee of a farm or ranch to perform a specified farming or ranching operation shall, prior to entering into such contract, provide for and maintain, for the period of such contract, workers' compensation coverage pursuant to articles 40 to 47 of this title covering all the employees and laborers to be utilized under such contract. Proof of such coverage on forms or certificates issued by the insurer shall be provided to the person, company, or corporation contracting for the labor prior to performing such contract.
(b) Any person, company, or corporation contracting with a landowner or lessee of a farm or ranch to provide a specified farming or ranching operation who fails to provide coverage pursuant to subsection (1) of this section or who fails to maintain such coverage for the term of the contract commits a class 2 misdemeanor.
(c) Notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary, no person, company, or corporation contracting with a landowner or lessee of a farm or ranch operation to perform a specified farming or ranching operation nor any employee of such person, company, or corporation required to be covered by workers' compensation pursuant to this subsection (4) shall have any right of contribution from, or any action of any kind, including actions under section 8-41-203, against, the person, company, or corporation contracting to have such agricultural labor performed.
(d) (I) If any person, company, or corporation contracting to provide labor to perform specified farming or ranching operations and required to provide workers' compensation coverage pursuant to articles 40 to 47 of this title fails to provide such coverage and the person, company, or corporation for whom the labor is provided incurs any liability thereby, the person, company, or corporation providing the labor shall be subject to a cause of action for said liability and for reasonable attorney fees.
(II) If the person, company, or corporation for whom the labor for the performance of a specified farming or ranching operation is provided is sued by the injured employee, said person, company, or corporation may join the person, company, or corporation providing the labor as a third-party defendant in lieu of filing an independent action.
(5) The provisions of this section shall not apply to licensed real estate brokers and licensed real estate sales agents, as regulated in article 10 of title 12, who are excluded from the definition of employee pursuant to section 8-40-301 (2).
(6) Notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary, any person, company, or corporation operating a commercial vehicle as defined in section 42-4-235 (1)(a), C.R.S., who holds oneself or itself out as an independent contractor only to perform for-hire transportation, including loading and unloading, and who contracts to perform a specific transportation job, transportation task, or transportation delivery for another person, company, or corporation is not entering into an employee and employer relationship for purposes of workers' compensation coverage pursuant to articles 40 to 47 of this title. Nothing in this subsection (6) shall be construed to prohibit a determination that an individual is excluded from the definition of employee pursuant to section 8-40-202 (2) if such individual is operating a commercial vehicle as defined in section 42-4-235 (1)(a), C.R.S.
(7) This section shall not apply to any person excluded from the definition of "employee" pursuant to section 8-40-301 (5) or (7).
Source: L. 90: Entire article R&RE, p. 481, § 1, effective July 1. L. 92: (7) added, p. 1798, § 2, effective June 6. L. 93: (3) amended, p. 357, § 3, effective April 12; (6) amended, p. 1861, § 1, effective June 6. L. 94: (6) amended, p. 2544, § 16, effective January 1, 1995. L. 95: (1) and (3) amended, p. 344, § 3, effective July 1. L. 96: (1) and (3) amended, p. 647, § 2, effective May 1. L. 2000: (7) amended, p. 1497, § 2, effective August 2. L. 2004: (1)(a) amended and (1)(a.5) added, p. 1078, § 1, effective May 21. L. 2013: (1)(a) amended, (SB 13- 147), ch. 389, p. 2262, § 1, effective June 5. L. 2019: (5) amended, (HB 19-1172), ch. 136, p. 1647, § 21, effective October 1. L. 2021: (4)(b) amended, (SB 21-271), ch. 462, p. 3142, § 94, effective March 1, 2022.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 8-48-101 as it existed prior to 1990.
8-41-402. Repairs to real property - exception for liability of occupant of residential real property. (1) Every person, company, or corporation owning any real property or improvements thereon and contracting out any work done on and to said property to any contractor, subcontractor, or person who hires or uses employees in the doing of such work shall be deemed to be an employer under the terms of articles 40 to 47 of this title. Every such contractor, subcontractor, or person, as well as such contractor's, subcontractor's, and person's employees, shall be deemed to be an employee, and such employer shall be liable as provided in said articles to pay compensation for injury or death resulting therefrom to said contractor, subcontractor, or person and said employees or employees' dependents and, before commencing said work, shall insure and keep insured all liability as provided in said articles. Such employer shall be entitled to recover the cost of such insurance from said contractor, subcontractor, or person and may withhold and deduct the same from the contract price or any royalties or other money due, owing, or to become due to said contractor, subcontractor, or person. Articles 40 to 47 of this title shall not apply to the owner or occupant, or both, of residential real property which meets the definition of a "qualified residence" under section 163 (h)(4)(A) of the federal "Internal Revenue Code of 1986", as amended, who contracts out any work done to the property, unless the person performing the work is otherwise an employee of the owner or occupant, or both, of the property.
(2) If said contractor, subcontractor, or person doing or undertaking to do any work for an owner of property, as provided in subsection (1) of this section, is also an employer in the doing of such work and, before commencing such work, insures and keeps insured all liability for compensation as provided in articles 40 to 47 of this title, neither said contractor, subcontractor, or person nor any employees or insurers thereof shall have any right of contribution or action of any kind, including actions under section 8-41-203, against the person, company, or corporation owning real property and improvements thereon which contracts out work done on said property, or against its employees, servants, or agents.
(3) (Deleted by amendment, L. 91, p. 1295, § 9, effective July 1, 1991.)
Source: L. 90: Entire article R&RE, p. 483, § 1, effective July 1. L. 91: Entire section amended, p. 1295, § 9, effective July 1.
Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 8-48-102 as it existed prior to 1990.
Notes of Decisions
Frank M. Hall & Co. v. Newsom, 125 P.3d 444 (Colo. 2005).
· cites it 36× “The development of what is now codified as section 8-41-401, taken step-by-step, evidences consistent (if not always effective or sufficient) attempts by the general assembly to maintain the liability long-imposed on general contractors for the employees of subcontractors,…”
Cowger v. Henderson Heavy Haul Trucking Inc., 179 P.3d 116 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
· cites it 61× “Section 4-41-203 permits an injured employee to sue a third-party tortfeasor, which Henderson would arguably be if it were not a statutory employer under § 8-41-401(1); and § 8-41-203 also provides the basis upon which the interest of Pinnacol Assurance, the direct employer's…”
Krol v. CF & I Steel, 307 P.3d 1116 (Colo. Ct. App. 2013).
· cites it 22× “2012; and (2) the training was part of CF & I's regular business, such that CF & I ordinarily would have performed that function itself if it had not contracted it out to SKIM, see § 8-41-401, C.R.S.2012. T2 We conclude that the court erred in entering summary judgment for CF &…”
Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ashour, 2017 COA 67 (Colo. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 26× “¶ 38 Several years after Borjas, a division of this court was presented with the novel issue of determining whether an 18 independent contractor subject to capped tort damages from his employer by section 8-41-401(3), C.R.S. 2016, of the Act could recover on his claim for…”
Blood v. Qwest Servs. Corp., 224 P.3d 301 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 6× “See §§ 8-41-401(1)(a), 402(1), C.R.S. 2008. The trial court denied the motion, explaining: The burden to plead and prove the affirmative defense was on defendant Qwest.”
Humphrey v. Whole Foods Mkt. Rocky Mountain/Sw., L.P., 250 P.3d 706 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010).
· cites it 21× “The court found that Whole Foods was Humphrey's statutory employer under section 8-41-401(1)(a), C.R. $.2009, and was thus immune from common law negligence liability for injuries he suffered while performing the services listed above.”
Pulsifer v. Pueblo Prof'l Contractors, Inc., 161 P.3d 656 (Colo. 2007).
· cites it 25× “2 This section limits the total *659 recovery available to plaintiffs who bring a common law action for a work-related injury that would otherwise have been compensable under the WCA. It also excepts from those limits actions against “another not in the same employ.”
Snook v. Joyce Homes, Inc., 215 P.3d 1210 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 20× “" § 8-41-401(1)(a), C.R.S.2008. The general test to determine an entity's status as a statutory employer pursuant to section 8-4-401 "is whether the work contracted out is part of the regular business of the constructive employer.”
Monell v. Cherokee River, Inc., 347 P.3d 1179 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015).
· cites it 12× “*1182 T4 CRI moved to dismiss the claims against it for failure to state a claim, arguing that it was immune from any tort liability because it was Monell's statutory employer under section 8-41-401, C.R.S.2014 (statutory employer immune from tort liability for workplace injury…”
Stampados v. Colorado D & S Enter., Inc., 833 P.2d 815 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
· cites it 21× “) or a statutory employee under § 8-41-401(1), C.R.S. (1991 Cum.Supp.). The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and Panel concluded that Stampados was neither an actual nor a statutory employee, but an independent contractor barred from bringing a workers' compensation claim by the…”
Cont'l Divide Ins. Co. v. Dickinson, 179 P.3d 202 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
· cites it 13× “Dickinson’s opening brief states that he “could not recover more than to [sic] $15,000 from the contractor, UTS and its employee, by operation of law under C.R.S. § 8-41-401(3).” The statute excepts from the $15,000 limitation “any cause of action brought against another not in…”
Evans v. Webster, 832 P.2d 951 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).
· cites it 8× “Plaintiff also argues that the statute now codified as § 8-41-401, C.R.S. (1990 Cum.Supp.) is inapplicable to defendant because defendant was not engaged in a business.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-401(1) — 8 cases
Frank M. Hall & Co. v. Newsom, 125 P.3d 444 (Colo. 2005).
“The development of what is now codified as section 8-41-401, taken step-by-step, evidences consistent (if not always effective or sufficient) attempts by the general assembly to maintain the liability long-imposed on general contractors for the employees of subcontractors,…”
Cowger v. Henderson Heavy Haul Trucking Inc., 179 P.3d 116 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
“Section 4-41-203 permits an injured employee to sue a third-party tortfeasor, which Henderson would arguably be if it were not a statutory employer under § 8-41-401(1); and § 8-41-203 also provides the basis upon which the interest of Pinnacol Assurance, the direct employer's…”
Monell v. Cherokee River, Inc., 347 P.3d 1179 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015).
“*1182 T4 CRI moved to dismiss the claims against it for failure to state a claim, arguing that it was immune from any tort liability because it was Monell's statutory employer under section 8-41-401, C.R.S.2014 (statutory employer immune from tort liability for workplace injury…”
Evans v. Webster, 832 P.2d 951 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).
“Plaintiff also argues that the statute now codified as § 8-41-401, C.R.S. (1990 Cum.Supp.) is inapplicable to defendant because defendant was not engaged in a business.”
Stampados v. Colorado D & S Enter., Inc., 833 P.2d 815 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
“) or a statutory employee under § 8-41-401(1), C.R.S. (1991 Cum.Supp.). The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and Panel concluded that Stampados was neither an actual nor a statutory employee, but an independent contractor barred from bringing a workers' compensation claim by the…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-401(1)(a) — 9 cases
Blood v. Qwest Servs. Corp., 224 P.3d 301 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009).
“See §§ 8-41-401(1)(a), 402(1), C.R.S. 2008. The trial court denied the motion, explaining: The burden to plead and prove the affirmative defense was on defendant Qwest.”
Humphrey v. Whole Foods Mkt. Rocky Mountain/Sw., L.P., 250 P.3d 706 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010).
“The court found that Whole Foods was Humphrey's statutory employer under section 8-41-401(1)(a), C.R. $.2009, and was thus immune from common law negligence liability for injuries he suffered while performing the services listed above.”
Cowger v. Henderson Heavy Haul Trucking Inc., 179 P.3d 116 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
“Section 4-41-203 permits an injured employee to sue a third-party tortfeasor, which Henderson would arguably be if it were not a statutory employer under § 8-41-401(1); and § 8-41-203 also provides the basis upon which the interest of Pinnacol Assurance, the direct employer's…”
Monell v. Cherokee River, Inc., 347 P.3d 1179 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015).
“*1182 T4 CRI moved to dismiss the claims against it for failure to state a claim, arguing that it was immune from any tort liability because it was Monell's statutory employer under section 8-41-401, C.R.S.2014 (statutory employer immune from tort liability for workplace injury…”
Snook v. Joyce Homes, Inc., 215 P.3d 1210 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009).
“" § 8-41-401(1)(a), C.R.S.2008. The general test to determine an entity's status as a statutory employer pursuant to section 8-4-401 "is whether the work contracted out is part of the regular business of the constructive employer.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-401(1)(a)(D) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-401(1)(a)(I) — 2 cases
Monell v. Cherokee River, Inc., 347 P.3d 1179 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015).
“*1182 T4 CRI moved to dismiss the claims against it for failure to state a claim, arguing that it was immune from any tort liability because it was Monell's statutory employer under section 8-41-401, C.R.S.2014 (statutory employer immune from tort liability for workplace injury…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-401(1)(a)(I1) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-401(1)(a)(ID) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-401(1)(b) — 2 cases
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-401(2) — 7 cases
Cowger v. Henderson Heavy Haul Trucking Inc., 179 P.3d 116 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
“Section 4-41-203 permits an injured employee to sue a third-party tortfeasor, which Henderson would arguably be if it were not a statutory employer under § 8-41-401(1); and § 8-41-203 also provides the basis upon which the interest of Pinnacol Assurance, the direct employer's…”
Humphrey v. Whole Foods Mkt. Rocky Mountain/Sw., L.P., 250 P.3d 706 (Colo. Ct. App. 2010).
“The court found that Whole Foods was Humphrey's statutory employer under section 8-41-401(1)(a), C.R. $.2009, and was thus immune from common law negligence liability for injuries he suffered while performing the services listed above.”
Frank M. Hall & Co. v. Newsom, 125 P.3d 444 (Colo. 2005).
“The development of what is now codified as section 8-41-401, taken step-by-step, evidences consistent (if not always effective or sufficient) attempts by the general assembly to maintain the liability long-imposed on general contractors for the employees of subcontractors,…”
Evans v. Webster, 832 P.2d 951 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).
“Plaintiff also argues that the statute now codified as § 8-41-401, C.R.S. (1990 Cum.Supp.) is inapplicable to defendant because defendant was not engaged in a business.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-401(3) — 11 cases
Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ashour, 2017 COA 67 (Colo. Ct. App. 2017).
“¶ 38 Several years after Borjas, a division of this court was presented with the novel issue of determining whether an 18 independent contractor subject to capped tort damages from his employer by section 8-41-401(3), C.R.S. 2016, of the Act could recover on his claim for…”
Pulsifer v. Pueblo Prof'l Contractors, Inc., 161 P.3d 656 (Colo. 2007).
“2 This section limits the total *659 recovery available to plaintiffs who bring a common law action for a work-related injury that would otherwise have been compensable under the WCA. It also excepts from those limits actions against “another not in the same employ.”
Cont'l Divide Ins. Co. v. Dickinson, 179 P.3d 202 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
“Dickinson’s opening brief states that he “could not recover more than to [sic] $15,000 from the contractor, UTS and its employee, by operation of law under C.R.S. § 8-41-401(3).” The statute excepts from the $15,000 limitation “any cause of action brought against another not in…”
Stampados v. Colorado D & S Enter., Inc., 833 P.2d 815 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
“) or a statutory employee under § 8-41-401(1), C.R.S. (1991 Cum.Supp.). The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and Panel concluded that Stampados was neither an actual nor a statutory employee, but an independent contractor barred from bringing a workers' compensation claim by the…”
Frank M. Hall & Co. v. Newsom, 125 P.3d 444 (Colo. 2005).
“The development of what is now codified as section 8-41-401, taken step-by-step, evidences consistent (if not always effective or sufficient) attempts by the general assembly to maintain the liability long-imposed on general contractors for the employees of subcontractors,…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-401(4)(c) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-401(6) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-401(7) — 1 case
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-401(8) — 1 case
Snook v. Joyce Homes, Inc., 215 P.3d 1210 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009).
“" § 8-41-401(1)(a), C.R.S.2008. The general test to determine an entity's status as a statutory employer pursuant to section 8-4-401 "is whether the work contracted out is part of the regular business of the constructive employer.”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-401(l)(a) — 7 cases
Frank M. Hall & Co. v. Newsom, 125 P.3d 444 (Colo. 2005).
“The development of what is now codified as section 8-41-401, taken step-by-step, evidences consistent (if not always effective or sufficient) attempts by the general assembly to maintain the liability long-imposed on general contractors for the employees of subcontractors,…”
Cowger v. Henderson Heavy Haul Trucking Inc., 179 P.3d 116 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).
“Section 4-41-203 permits an injured employee to sue a third-party tortfeasor, which Henderson would arguably be if it were not a statutory employer under § 8-41-401(1); and § 8-41-203 also provides the basis upon which the interest of Pinnacol Assurance, the direct employer's…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-401(l)(a)(I) — 1 case
Frank M. Hall & Co. v. Newsom, 125 P.3d 444 (Colo. 2005).
“The development of what is now codified as section 8-41-401, taken step-by-step, evidences consistent (if not always effective or sufficient) attempts by the general assembly to maintain the liability long-imposed on general contractors for the employees of subcontractors,…”
— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-41-401(l)(b) — 4 cases
Frank M. Hall & Co. v. Newsom, 125 P.3d 444 (Colo. 2005).
“The development of what is now codified as section 8-41-401, taken step-by-step, evidences consistent (if not always effective or sufficient) attempts by the general assembly to maintain the liability long-imposed on general contractors for the employees of subcontractors,…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.