Colorado Revised Statutes

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-42-111 (2026)

Award for permanent total disability

✓ current as of July 2026

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(1) In cases of permanent total disability, the award shall be sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the average weekly wages of the injured employee and shall continue until death of such person so totally disabled but not in excess of the weekly maximum benefits specified in this article for injuries causing temporary total disability.

(2) (Deleted by amendment, L. 91, p. 1313, § 19, effective July 1, 1991.)

(3) A disabled employee capable of rehabilitation which would enable the employee to earn any wages in the same or other employment, who refuses an offer of employment by the same or other employer or an offer of vocational rehabilitation paid for by the employer shall not be awarded permanent total disability.

(4) For injuries occurring on and after July 1, 1991, and before July 1, 1994, the average weekly wage of injured employees used for computing compensation paid for awards pursuant to subsection (1) of this section shall be increased by two percent per year effective July 1 of each year, and such increased compensation shall be payable for the subsequent twelve months.

(5) Repealed.

Source: L. 90: Entire article R&RE, p. 494, § 1, effective July 1. L. 91: (2) and (3) amended and (4) and (5) added, p. 1313, § 19, effective July 1. L. 94: (4) and (5) amended, p. 2002, § 5, effective July 1. L. 2009: (5) repealed, (SB 09-070), ch. 49, p. 175, § 2, effective August 5.

Editor's note: This section is similar to former § 8-51-107 as it existed prior to 1990.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 30 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1991–2021 · leading case: Indus. Claim Appeals Off. v. Romero, 912 P.2d 62 (Colo. 1996).

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Indus. Claim Appeals Off. v. Romero, 912 P.2d 62 (Colo. 1996). · cites it 81× “The ALJ concluded that Jennie would have been awarded permanent total disability benefits pursuant to section 8-42-111(1), 3B C.R.S. (1991 Supp.”

Culver v. Ace Elec., 971 P.2d 641 (Colo. 1999). · cites it 21× “(1998) (PPD); § 8-42-111, 3 C.R.S. (1998) (PTD); see generally, 4 Larson, su pra, § 57.”

Romero v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 902 P.2d 896 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 36× “Section 8-42-111(1), C.R.S. (1994 Cum.Supp.”

Colorado Afl-cio v. Donlon, 914 P.2d 396 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995). · cites it 11× “The "Age Cap" on Permanent Total Disability Benefits Section 8-42-111(5), C.R.S. (1994 Cum.Supp.”

Peo v. Stone, 2020 COA 24 (Colo. Ct. App. 2020). · cites it 2× “Compare § 8-42-105 (temporary total disability), and § 8-42-106 (temporary partial disability), with § 8-42-107 (permanent partial disability), and § 8-42-111, C.R.S. 2019 (permanent total disability).”

Salazar v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off. of Colorado, 10 P.3d 666 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 11× “Section 8-42-111(1) provides that for PTD, "the award shall be sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the average weekly wages of the injured employee .”

Montezuma Well Serv., Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off. of the State, 928 P.2d 796 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996). · cites it 14× “Furthermore, petitioners have failed to show that, without the age cap provision, the remainder of § 8-42-111 could not function as a meaningful legislative enactment.”

Sunny Acres Villa, Inc. v. Cooper, 25 P.3d 44 (Colo. 2001). · cites it 2× “§ 8-42-111(1). [4] Sunny Acres contends that Cooper waived any argument regarding collateral estoppel because she failed to specifically raise it in the proceedings below, having instead raised the "law of the case" doctrine.”

Avalanche Indus., Inc. v. Clark, 198 P.3d 589 (Colo. 2009). · cites it 6× “See § 8-42-105(1); § 8-42-111(1) (establishing the maximum benefit as ninety-one percent of the state average AWW, to be determined and published each year by the Director of the Division of Workers' Compensation pursuant to section 8-42-111(1)).”

PDM Molding, Inc. v. Stanberg, 898 P.2d 542 (Colo. 1995). · cites it 4× “Except where vocational rehabilitation is offered and accepted as provided in section 8-42-111(3), temporary total disability payments shall cease upon the occurrence of any of the events enumerated in subsection (3) of this section.”

Leprino Foods Co. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 134 P.3d 475 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 2× “2000)(taken together, §§ 8-42-111(1) and 8-42-105(1), C.R.S.2005, which limit benefits to a percentage of the AWW, "form the benefit cap for [permanent total disability] benefits"); City of Thornton v.”

Benchmark/elite, Inc. v. Simpson, 232 P.3d 777 (Colo. 2010). · cites it 9× “He argued that sections 8-42-111, 8-42-105, and 8-47-106, C.”

Show all 30 citing cases →

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-42-111(1) — 12 cases

Sunny Acres Villa, Inc. v. Cooper, 25 P.3d 44 (Colo. 2001). “§ 8-42-111(1). [4] Sunny Acres contends that Cooper waived any argument regarding collateral estoppel because she failed to specifically raise it in the proceedings below, having instead raised the "law of the case" doctrine.”

Avalanche Indus., Inc. v. Clark, 198 P.3d 589 (Colo. 2009). “See § 8-42-105(1); § 8-42-111(1) (establishing the maximum benefit as ninety-one percent of the state average AWW, to be determined and published each year by the Director of the Division of Workers' Compensation pursuant to section 8-42-111(1)).”

Leprino Foods Co. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 134 P.3d 475 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005). “2000)(taken together, §§ 8-42-111(1) and 8-42-105(1), C.R.S.2005, which limit benefits to a percentage of the AWW, "form the benefit cap for [permanent total disability] benefits"); City of Thornton v.”

Indus. Claim Appeals Off. v. Romero, 912 P.2d 62 (Colo. 1996). “The ALJ concluded that Jennie would have been awarded permanent total disability benefits pursuant to section 8-42-111(1), 3B C.R.S. (1991 Supp.”

Romero v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 902 P.2d 896 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995). “Section 8-42-111(1), C.R.S. (1994 Cum.Supp.”

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-42-111(2) — 1 case

McKinney v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off. of the State of Colorado, 894 P.2d 42 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-42-111(3) — 6 cases

PDM Molding, Inc. v. Stanberg, 898 P.2d 542 (Colo. 1995). “Except where vocational rehabilitation is offered and accepted as provided in section 8-42-111(3), temporary total disability payments shall cease upon the occurrence of any of the events enumerated in subsection (3) of this section.”

Drywall Prods. v. Constuble, 832 P.2d 957 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).

McKinney v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off. of the State of Colorado, 894 P.2d 42 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).

Turner v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off. of Colorado, 111 P.3d 534 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).

Grogan v. Lutheran Med. Ctr., Inc., 950 P.2d 690 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-42-111(4) — 4 cases

Salazar v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off. of Colorado, 10 P.3d 666 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000). “Section 8-42-111(1) provides that for PTD, "the award shall be sixty-six and two-thirds percent of the average weekly wages of the injured employee .”

Montezuma Well Serv., Inc. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off. of the State, 928 P.2d 796 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996). “Furthermore, petitioners have failed to show that, without the age cap provision, the remainder of § 8-42-111 could not function as a meaningful legislative enactment.”

McKinney v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off. of the State of Colorado, 894 P.2d 42 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995).

Simpson v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 219 P.3d 354 (Colo. Ct. App. 2009).

— Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-42-111(5) — 6 cases

Culver v. Ace Elec., 971 P.2d 641 (Colo. 1999). “(1998) (PPD); § 8-42-111, 3 C.R.S. (1998) (PTD); see generally, 4 Larson, su pra, § 57.”

Romero v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 902 P.2d 896 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995). “Section 8-42-111(1), C.R.S. (1994 Cum.Supp.”

Colorado Afl-cio v. Donlon, 914 P.2d 396 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995). “The "Age Cap" on Permanent Total Disability Benefits Section 8-42-111(5), C.R.S. (1994 Cum.Supp.”

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