Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-222 (2026)

Reckless driving

✓ current as of May 2026
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(a) No person shall operate any motor vehicle upon any public highway of the state, or any road of any specially chartered municipal association or of any district organized under the provisions of chapter 105, a purpose of which is the construction and maintenance of roads and sidewalks, or in any parking area for ten cars or more or upon any private road on which a speed limit has been established in accordance with the provisions of section 14-218a or section 14-307a or upon any school property recklessly, having regard to the width, traffic and use of such highway, road, school property or parking area, the intersection of streets and the weather conditions. The operation of a motor vehicle upon any such highway, road or parking area for ten cars or more at such a rate of speed as to endanger the life of any person other than the operator of such motor vehicle, or the operation, downgrade, upon any highway, of any motor vehicle with a commercial registration with the clutch or gears disengaged, or the operation knowingly of a motor vehicle with defective mechanism, shall constitute a violation of the provisions of this section. The operation of a motor vehicle upon any such highway, road or parking area for ten cars or more at a rate of speed greater than eighty-five miles per hour shall constitute a violation of the provisions of this section.

(b) Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars nor more than three hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days or be both fined and imprisoned for the first offense and for each subsequent offense shall be fined not more than six hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned.

(1949 Rev., S. 2408; 1961, P.A. 379, S. 3; 1963, P.A. 290; February, 1965, P.A. 224; 1969, P.A. 450, S. 3; 1971, P.A. 31; P.A. 73-253, S. 2; P.A. 77-340, S. 7; P.A. 81-268, S. 1; P.A. 90-213, S. 8; 90-263, S. 67, 74; P.A. 21-28, S. 10.)

History: 1961 act amended Subsec. (a) to include parking areas for ten or more cars; 1963 act amended Subsec. (a) to include roads of specially chartered municipal associations; 1965 act added district roads to Subsec. (a); 1969 act prohibited operating vehicle recklessly on private roads with established speed limits; 1971 act replaced “occupant” with “operator” in Subsec. (a) provision re endangerment; P.A. 73-253 prohibited operating vehicle recklessly on school property; P.A. 77-340 replaced reference to Sec. 14-219 in Subsec. (a) with reference to Sec. 14-218a; P.A. 81-268 amended Subsec. (b) by establishing a minimum fine of $100 and increasing the maximum fine from $100 to $300 for first offenses, and increasing the maximum fine for subsequent offenses from $200 to $600; P.A. 90-213 amended Subsec. (a) to add provision that operation of a motor vehicle at a rate of speed greater than 85 miles per hour constitutes a violation of the section; P.A. 90-263 amended Subsec. (a) to substitute phrase “motor vehicle with a commercial registration” for “commercial motor vehicle”; P.A. 21-28 amended Subsec. (a) by adding reference to Sec. 14-307a.

See Sec. 14-107 re liability of owner, operator or lessee of vehicle.

See Sec. 14-111(b) re suspension or revocation of operator's license.

See Sec. 14-111g re operator's retraining program.

See Sec. 14-112(a) re proof of financial responsibility.

See Sec. 14-219b re limitation of municipal liability.

Criminal homicide by reckless driving. 82 C. 671; 83 C. 437; 108 C. 212. Former statute applied. 93 C. 254. Violation does not entitle injured person to recover treble damages. Id., 249. Doing any act prohibited by motor vehicle laws is negligence of itself, and is actionable when proximate cause of injury. 98 C. 495; 99 C. 727. Driving down icy hill in high gear. 105 C. 669. Reckless driving does not lie in speed alone, but in that and other circumstances which together show reckless disregard of consequences. 108 C. 214. Contributory negligence, while not a defense to action for reckless misconduct, is a defense to action for negligence consisting in part of violation of statute. 116 C. 475; 123 C. 211. Negligence as a prerequisite for finding statute was violated. 117 C. 616. Cited. 119 C. 314. Where complaint had no allegation of reckless driving, court properly omitted reading portion of statute referring to it. 123 C. 177. Operating recklessly is operating without regard for safety of others. Id., 212. If speed in passing vehicle was not such as to endanger any of its occupants, it did not constitute reckless driving. 124 C. 270. Where jury was cautioned that plaintiff was limited to negligence specified in complaint, it was not prejudicial to read inapplicable portion of statute. 125 C. 512. Violation of statute not necessarily established by fact only that defendant was driving under influence of liquor, or only that car was going at high rate of speed. 132 C. 227. Excessive speed passing trolley car may be reckless driving. Id., 248. Cited. 139 C. 719; 149 C. 385. The allegations of plaintiff's complaint that defendant was negligent because of actions including violations of statute were not sufficient to permit recovery upon the ground of reckless and wanton misconduct by defendant. 159 C. 91. Cited. 162 C. 565. Plaintiff's waiver of representation by counsel at hearing where his license was suspended for contributing to accidental death precludes later claim of denial of procedural due process. 168 C. 94. Cited. 202 C. 629; 203 C. 305; 208 C. 94; 226 C. 191; 230 C. 427; 240 C. 489. Road that was under the control of a political subdivision of the state and open to public travel was a public “highway” as defined in Sec. 14-1. 300 C. 426.

Cited. 9 CA 686; 12 CA 306; 14 CA 347; 27 CA 225; Id., 377; 32 CA 1; 33 CA 49; 36 CA 710; 38 CA 8; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 18; Id., 85; 41 CA 664. Evidence is sufficient to prove defendant operated motor vehicle recklessly or at such a rate of speed as to endanger the life of another when state proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant ignored posted warning signs, drove well in excess of the posted speed limit and operated vehicle in such a reckless manner as to endanger the lives of the passengers. 51 CA 463.

Operating recklessly within the meaning of section requires a conscious choice of action either with knowledge of the serious danger to others involved in it or with knowledge of facts which would disclose this danger to a reasonable man; there must be something more than a failure to use reasonable care, something more than gross negligence. 22 CS 391. Neither speed nor driving under the influence of liquor would alone be sufficient for a conviction for reckless driving, but such circumstances in conjunction with other circumstances can be taken into consideration in determining whether defendant showed a reckless disregard of consequences. Id., 400. Nature of reckless misconduct discussed. 24 CS 108. Cited. Id., 156; 26 CS 184. The misconduct of plaintiff was simple negligence and not the exacerbated type which is reckless misconduct. 31 CS 325. Cited. 37 CS 661; 38 CS 549.

Evidence of injuries received in auto accident relevant in proving offense. 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 446. Reckless driving does not lie in speed alone but in speed and other circumstances which, together, show a reckless disregard of circumstances. Id., 501, 502. Cited. Id., 634. To establish violation of first sentence of statute, reckless or wanton misconduct must be shown. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 25. Guilt might be established under second sentence of statute by evidence which would prove only that life was endangered. Id., 26, 27. Where only evidence relative to defendant's operational conduct is an estimate of his speed at a point 600 feet before accident occurred, evidence held insufficient to warrant conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., 28. Cited. Id., 294, 295. Presumption raised by Sec. 14-107 that proof of registration number of motor vehicle shall be prima facie evidence that owner was operator thereof is not violative of due process since there is a rational and reasonable connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed. Id., 462, 463. Cited. Id., 380; 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 499; Id., 541; 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 298.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 198 C. 43; 236 C. 18.

Cited. 40 CA 643. Conviction of reckless driving not inconsistent with acquittal on charge of risk of injury to a child under Sec. 53-21(a)(1) because each offense contains different elements and a conviction on one is not inconsistent with an acquittal on the other. 122 CA 631. There was insufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the road on which defendant drove recklessly was a municipal road. 126 CA 52; judgment reversed, see 306 C. 426.

Defendant who, following another car, bumped it from the rear more than once could reasonably be found guilty of reckless driving under section. 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 509, 510.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 122 cases (10 in the last 5 years), 1961–2026 · leading case: Shore v. Town of Stonington, 444 A.2d 1379 (Conn. 1982).
Shore v. Town of Stonington, 444 A.2d 1379 (Conn. 1982). · cites it 12× “Sylvia had authorization to enforce General Statutes §§ 14-222 and 14-227a which gave him the discretion to warn Cugini or to remove him from the road as the situation appeared to require.”
State v. Fagan, 905 A.2d 1101 (Conn. 2006). · cites it 10× “The defendant, Damon Fagan, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of one count of criminal violation of a protective order in violation of General Statutes § 53a-223, [1] one count of reckless driving in violation of General Statutes § 14-222, [2]…”
Bicio v. Brewer, 884 A.2d 12 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005). · cites it 13× “” General Statutes § 14-222 (a) provides in relevant part: “No person shall operate any motor vehicle upon any public highway of the state, or any road of any specially chartered municipal association or of any district organized under the provisions of chapter 105, a purpose of…”
Rubel v. Wainwright, 862 A.2d 863 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005). · cites it 15× “” 8 General Statutes § 14-222 (a) provides in relevant part: “No person shall operate any motor vehicle upon any public highway .”
McCoy v. Comm'r of Pub. Saf., 12 A.3d 948 (Conn. 2011). · cites it 4× “For instance, General Statutes § 14-215 (operating while registration or license is refused, suspended or revoked), General Statutes § 14-222 (reckless driving), General Statutes § 14-223a (striking officer with motor vehicle), General Statutes § 14-224 (evading responsibility…”
State v. Wilkins, 692 A.2d 1233 (Conn. 1997). · cites it 5× “11 *498 It is undisputed that Ciesinski had observed the defendant drive recklessly, that reckless driving is a misdemeanor that carries a maximum possible penalty for a first offense of thirty days imprisonment and a fine of three hundred dollars; General Statutes § 14-222 (b);…”
State v. Christian, 841 A.2d 1158 (Conn. 2004). · cites it 5× “99-255, § 1, of the 1999 Public Acts, 8 and reckless driving in violation of General Statutes § 14-222 (a). 3 4 The defendant claims that the trial court improperly: (1) permitted the defendant’s wife, Joan Christian, to testily, over the defendant’s objection, regarding his…”
Izzo v. Colonial Penn Ins., 524 A.2d 641 (Conn. 1987). · cites it 3× “These statutes are §§ 14-222 (reckless driving), 14-224 (evasion of responsibility in operation of a motor vehicle and rac *316 ing) and 14-227a (a) (operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs).”
State v. Davis, 155 A.3d 221 (Conn. 2017). · cites it 2× “to 2011) § 29-36, unlawfully carrying a weapon in a vehicle in violation of § 29-38, criminal attempt to assault a police officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-49 (a) (2), reckless endangerment in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-63, interfering…”
State v. Luzietti, 646 A.2d 85 (Conn. 1994). · cites it 4× “On March 31, 1992, the defendant, Dennis Luzietti, was convicted, after a jury trial, of reckless driving in violation of General Statutes § 14-222, 1 and operating a *429 motor vehicle while his license was under suspension in violation of General Statutes § 14-215 (c).”
State v. Taylor, 10 A.3d 1062 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011). · cites it 42× “The defendant, Christopher Taylor, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 14-224 (b) and reckless driving in violation of General Statutes § 14-222…”
State v. Beckenbach, 501 A.2d 752 (Conn. 1985). · cites it 3× “The jury found the defendant not guilty of reckless driving, General Statutes § 14-222 (a); and not guilty of the lesser included offense of speeding.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-222(a) — 3 cases
State v. Fagan, 905 A.2d 1101 (Conn. 2006). “The defendant, Damon Fagan, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of one count of criminal violation of a protective order in violation of General Statutes § 53a-223, [1] one count of reckless driving in violation of General Statutes § 14-222, [2]…”
State v. Taylor, 10 A.3d 1062 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011). “The defendant, Christopher Taylor, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of evasion of responsibility in the operation of a motor vehicle in violation of General Statutes § 14-224 (b) and reckless driving in violation of General Statutes § 14-222…”
Christman v. Kick, 342 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D. Conn. 2004).
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-222(z) — 1 case
Wahatalo v. Begley (D. Conn. 2024).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.