Any person may surrender to the commissioner the registration certificate and the number plates for any motor vehicle with a commercial registration in the name of such person, if such motor vehicle, prior to the expiration of the term of its registration, has become unfit for use, accompanied by a statement under oath attesting to the unfitness of such vehicle, and the commissioner shall thereupon make application to the Comptroller for the refund to such registrant of such portion of the registration fee for such motor vehicle as is applicable to the number of months between the date of such surrender and the date of the expiration of such registration. The Comptroller, upon such application, shall draw an order on the Treasurer in favor of such registrant for the amount of the refund provided for herein. The commissioner shall retain a record of each such application for a refund and of the action of the Comptroller thereon, and shall not reregister such motor vehicle.
(1949 Rev., S. 2373; P.A. 90-263, S. 5, 74; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-6, S. 10, 85.)
History: P.A. 90-263 substituted motor vehicle with a commercial registration for commercial motor vehicle; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 01-6 deleted former provision which charged the amount of any refund against funds appropriated to the commissioner and made technical changes for purposes of gender neutrality, effective July 1, 2001.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
5
cases, 1991–2018 · leading case:
State v. Lyons, 412 S.E.2d 308 (N.C. 1991).
State v. Lyons, 412 S.E.2d 308 (N.C. 1991).
· cites it 16× “C.G.S. § 14-31 (1986) (emphasis added). If the language of the statute was merely that a person is guilty of this crime if he "maliciously commit[s] an assault and battery upon another," the State might have a stronger argument.”
United States v. Vann, 660 F.3d 771 (4th Cir. 2011).
· cites it 2× “C.G.S. § 14-31 may be proved by showing an assault and battery upon one or more victims.”
Boria v. Comm'r of Corr., 199 A.3d 1127 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
· cites it 2× “2d 1274 (holding that dismissal for lack of due diligence in prosecuting civil case pursuant to Practice Book § 14-31 was legally sufficient ground for dismissal of habeas corpus action and fell under catchall ‘‘other legally sufficient ground’’ provision of Practice Book §…”
State v. Almond, 435 S.E.2d 91 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
· cites it 4× “C.G.S. § 14-31 to show that Diaz was appropriate.”
State v. Lyons, 401 S.E.2d 776 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991).
“C.G.S. § 14-31. Therefore, as in Diaz , the jury’s verdict is fatally ambiguous because it cannot be determined whether all the jurors found defendant assaulted Douglas, all found he assaulted Preston, all found both offenses, or some found one offense while some found the other…”
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