As used in this chapter:
(1) “Board” means the Architectural Licensing Board appointed under the provisions of section 20-289;
(2) “Architect” means a person who engages in the practice of architecture;
(3) “The practice of architecture” or “practice architecture” means rendering or offering to render service by consultation, investigation, evaluations, preliminary studies, plans, specifications and coordination of structural factors concerning the aesthetic or structural design and contract administration of building construction or any other service in connection with the designing or contract administration of building construction located within the boundaries of this state, regardless of whether any person performing such duties is performing one or all of such duties or whether such person is performing them in person or as the directing head of an office or organization performing them; and
(4) “Architect Emeritus” means an honorific title granted to a previously licensed architect who has retired from the active practice of architecture.
(1953, S. 2304d; 1971, P.A. 703, S. 1; P.A. 82-419, S. 11, 47; 82-472, S. 86, 183; P.A. 86-159, S. 1; P.A. 98-3, S. 1; P.A. 19-177, S. 13.)
History: 1971 act redefined practice of architecture by making slight wording change and substituting “contract administration of building construction” for “supervision of construction of buildings”; P.A. 82-419 amended section to change architectural registration board to architectural licensing board; P.A. 82-472 subdivided the section; P.A. 86-159 made a technical change in Subdiv. (3); P.A. 98-3 made technical changes in Subdiv. (3); P.A. 19-177 added Subdiv. (4) re definition of “Architect Emeritus”.
Utilization by another, for a sum of money, of plan prepared for plaintiff by an architect and owned by plaintiff, held not to constitute practice of architecture; performance of services by plaintiff for a corporation of which he is a member, held not to constitute rendering of services to a client. 148 C. 121. Cited. 207 C. 496.
Notes of Decisions
Zapata v. Burns, 542 A.2d 700 (Conn. 1988).
· cites it 2× “” General Statutes § 20-288 (2). A professional engineer is one.”
Tulisano v. Schonberger, 810 A.2d 806 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
· cites it 2× “General Statutes § 20-288 (3) provides in relevant part: “ ‘The practice of architecture’ or ‘practice architecture’ means rendering or offering to render service by consultation, investigation, evaluations, preliminary studies, plans, specifications and coordination of…”
George v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 412 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 1992).
· cites it 3× “C.G.S. § 20-288(e). Id. That statute requires motor vehicle dealers like Central Carolina to furnish a corporate surety bond for the protection of consumers.”
Krause v. RK Motors, LLC, 797 S.E.2d 335 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017).
“C.G.S. § 20-288(e). Put simply, Krause alleged that he relied on RK Motors' false representations in deciding to purchase the Nova and that he could not have reasonably discovered the true condition of the Nova before purchasing it.”
Lapuk v. Blount, 198 A.2d 233 (Conn. App. Ct. 1963).
“” Section 20-288 defines the practice of architecture as “the rendering or offering to render of service to clients by consultation, investigation, evaluations, preliminary studies, plans, specifications and coordination of structural factors concerning the aesthetic or…”
Ferris v. Haymore, 967 F.2d 946 (1992).
· cites it 2× “” In the present case, the dealer did not pay the plaintiff’s monthly car payments as required by their agreement.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-288(2) — 1 case
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-288(e) — 4 cases
George v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 412 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 1992).
“C.G.S. § 20-288(e). Id. That statute requires motor vehicle dealers like Central Carolina to furnish a corporate surety bond for the protection of consumers.”
Krause v. RK Motors, LLC, 797 S.E.2d 335 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017).
“C.G.S. § 20-288(e). Put simply, Krause alleged that he relied on RK Motors' false representations in deciding to purchase the Nova and that he could not have reasonably discovered the true condition of the Nova before purchasing it.”
Ferris v. Haymore, 967 F.2d 946 (1992).
“” In the present case, the dealer did not pay the plaintiff’s monthly car payments as required by their agreement.”
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