Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-17 (2026)

Defense. Appointment of master or referee

✓ current as of May 2026
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(a) When the plaintiff in any such action has made a prima facie showing that the conduct of the defendant, acting alone, or in combination with others, has, or is reasonably likely unreasonably to pollute, impair or destroy the public trust in the air, water or other natural resources of the state, the defendant may rebut the prima facie showing by the submission of evidence to the contrary. The defendant may also prove, by way of an affirmative defense, that, considering all relevant surrounding circumstances and factors, there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the defendant's conduct and that such conduct is consistent with the reasonable requirements of the public health, safety and welfare. Except as to the aforesaid affirmative defense, nothing in this section shall be construed to affect the principles of burden of proof and weight of the evidence generally applicable in civil actions.

(b) The court before which such action is brought may appoint a master or referee, who shall be a disinterested person and technically qualified, to take testimony and make a report to the court in the action. The costs of such appointment may be apportioned to the parties if the interests of justice require.

(1971, P.A. 96, S. 4.)

Cited. 170 C. 47; 175 C. 483. Because trial court did not apply the statutory burden-shifting test, it did not decide whether plaintiff's prima facie case was sufficiently rebutted; reversal required because court did not follow statute. 184 C. 51. Cited. 192 C. 591; 197 C. 134; 204 C. 38; Id., 212; 212 C. 710; Id., 727; 215 C. 474; 218 C. 580; 220 C. 54; 222 C. 98; 226 C. 205; Id., 579; 234 C. 488; 237 C. 135; 239 C. 786.

Cited. 30 CA 204; 41 CA 89; Id., 120. Plaintiff failed to provide requisite proof that the conduct of defendants, alone or in combination with others, very likely caused not merely a de minimis pollution, impairment or destruction of a natural resource, but an unreasonable one. 140 CA 155.

Cited. 35 CS 145.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 19 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1981–2022 · leading case: Manchester Env't Coalition v. Stockton, 441 A.2d 68 (Conn. 1981).
Manchester Env't Coalition v. Stockton, 441 A.2d 68 (Conn. 1981). · cites it 24× “" General Statutes § 22a-17. [9] Under § 22a-17, the plaintiff must first come forward and show that the defendant has, or is reasonably likely to unreasonably pollute, impair, or destroy a natural resource.”
City of Waterbury v. Town of Washington, 800 A.2d 1102 (Conn. 2002). · cites it 11× “As previously stated, the term “impairment” is undefined in CEPA, as are the express eircum *550 stances in which such impairment may be termed “unreasonable.”
Quarry Knoll II Corp. v. Plan. & Zoning Comm'n, 780 A.2d 1 (Conn. 2001). · cites it 5× “33 In Stockton , however, the plaintiff had brought an injunction action against the defendant under a different statute, General Statutes § 22a-17 (a), 34 which explicitly provides that a defendant “may .”
Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. City of New London, 43 A.3d 679 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012). · cites it 14× “*179 The plaintiff brought this action under the act pursuant to General Statutes § 22a-16. 5 Our Supreme Court has explained that “General Statutes § 22a-17 sets the hurdles one must overcome in order to satisfy the burden of proof requirements set under [the act].”
Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 815 A.2d 1188 (Conn. 2003). · cites it 2× “In that event, General Statutes § 22a-17 (a)—not § 22a-16—provides to the purported polluter “an affirmative defense, that, considering all relevant surrounding circumstances and factors, there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the defendant’s conduct .”
Fish Unlimited v. Ne. Utils. Serv. Co., 756 A.2d 262 (Conn. 2000). · cites it 4× “General Statutes § 22a-17.” 12 Accordingly, the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the restart of unit 2 and to require conversion of the once-through cooling system to a closed cooling system, which they claimed would reduce substantially the occurrence of larval entrainment.”
Keeney v. Town of Old Saybrook, 676 A.2d 795 (Conn. 1996). · cites it 3× “’’In order to establish a prima facie case under § 22a-16, the plaintiff must establish that “the conduct of the defendant, acting alone, or in combination with others, has, or is reasonably likely unreasonably to pollute .”
Samperi v. Inland Wetlands Agency, 628 A.2d 1286 (Conn. 1993). · cites it 2× “That subsection states: “When the plaintiff in any such action has made a prima facie showing that the conduct of the defendant, acting alone, or in combination with others, has, or is reasonably likely unreasonably to pollute, impair or destroy the public trust in the air,…”
Nizzardo v. State Traffic Comm'n, 788 A.2d 1158 (Conn. 2002). · cites it 2× “General Statutes § 22a-16aprovides for alternative judicial remedies in cases brought by the attorney general pursuant to § 22a-16.”
Friends of Animals, Inc. v. United Illuminating Co., 6 A.3d 1180 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010). · cites it 6× “In its articulation, the court stated, in part, that “[w]hat the court found totally lacking was any action by the defendant reasonably likely ‘unreasonably to pollute, *830 impair or destroy the public trust in the air, water or other natural resources of the state’,” quoting…”
Burton v. Com'r of Env. Prot., 970 A.2d 640 (Conn. 2009). · cites it 2× “12 For example, General Statutes § 22a-15 sets forth state policy regarding the preservation of the public trust in the air, water and other natural resources of the state, General Statutes § 22a-16a provides certain remedies in an action brought pursuant to § 22a-16 or other…”
Calabrese v. McHugh, 170 F. Supp. 2d 243 (D. Conn. 2001). “If the defendant is found liable, the court may grant temporary and permanent equitable relief, or may impose such conditions on the defendant as are required to protect the public trust in the air, water and other natural resources from unreasonable pollution. Conn.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-17(a) — 1 case
Calabrese v. McHugh, 170 F. Supp. 2d 243 (D. Conn. 2001). “If the defendant is found liable, the court may grant temporary and permanent equitable relief, or may impose such conditions on the defendant as are required to protect the public trust in the air, water and other natural resources from unreasonable pollution. Conn.”
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