(a) The court may grant temporary and permanent equitable relief, or may impose such conditions on the defendant as are required to protect the public trust in the air, water and other natural resources of the state from unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction.
(b) If administrative, licensing or other such proceedings are required or available to determine the legality of the defendant's conduct, the court in its discretion may remand the parties to such proceedings. In so remanding the parties the court may grant temporary equitable relief where necessary for the protection of the public trust in the air, water and other natural resources of the state from unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction and the court shall retain jurisdiction of the action pending completion of administrative action for the purpose of determining whether adequate consideration by the agency has been given to the protection of the public trust in the air, water or other natural resources of the state from unreasonable pollution, impairment or destruction and whether the agency's decision is supported by competent material and substantial evidence on the whole record.
(c) If the agency's consideration has not been adequate, and notwithstanding that the agency's decision is supported by competent material and substantial evidence on the whole record, the court shall adjudicate the impact of the defendant's conduct on the public trust in the air, water or other natural resources of the state in accordance with sections 22a-14 to 22a-20, inclusive.
(d) Where, as to any administrative, licensing or other proceeding, judicial review thereof is available, the court originally taking jurisdiction shall maintain jurisdiction for purposes of judicial review.
(e) The court may award any person, partnership, corporation, association, organization or other legal entity which maintains an action under section 22a-16 or intervenes as a party in an action for judicial review under section 22a-19, and obtains declaratory or equitable relief against the defendant, its costs, including reasonable costs for witnesses, and a reasonable attorney's fee.
(1971, P.A. 96, S. 5; P.A. 90-222, S. 4.)
History: P.A. 90-222 added Subsec. (e) re award of costs and attorney's fee.
Cited. 170 C. 47; 175 C. 483; 184 C. 51; 192 C. 591; 204 C. 38; Id., 212; 212 C. 710; Id., 727; 215 C. 474; 218 C. 580; 220 C. 54; 222 C. 98; 226 C. 205; Id., 579; 227 C. 175; 234 C. 488; 237 C. 135; 239 C. 786. Environmental Protection Act does not embody the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine as a subject matter jurisdictional limit on court's entertainment of an action under it. 260 C. 506. Subsec. (a) does not give a trial court independent authority to enter an injunction in an administrative appeal involving an intervention under Sec. 22a-19; Subsecs. (b) to (d) do not apply to proceedings with interventions and do not apply to or enlarge the powers of a trial court hearing an action in which intervenor has raised environmental claims pursuant to Sec. 22a-19, but rather only apply to independent actions brought under Sec. 22a-16. 318 C. 431.
Cited. 30 CA 204; 41 CA 89; Id., 120.
Cited. 35 CS 145.
Subsec. (e):
Trial court properly concluded that as used in Subsec., “person” does not include public entities such as commissioner among those entities who may recover costs and reasonable attorney's fees. 286 C. 687.
Notes of Decisions
City of Waterbury v. Town of Washington, 800 A.2d 1102 (Conn. 2002).
· cites it 33× “We disagree with Waterbury’s claim, and conclude that CEPA, as particularly demonstrated by General Statutes § 22a-18, 17 does not embody *529 the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine.”
Comm'r of Env't Prot. v. Mellon, 945 A.2d 464 (Conn. 2008).
· cites it 44× “The sole issue in this appeal 1 is whether the trial court properly determined that the plaintiff, the commissioner of environmental protection (commissioner), 2 was not eligible, under General Statutes § 22a-18 (e), 3 for an award of attorney’s fees and costs after prevailing…”
Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone v. Rocque, 836 A.2d 414 (Conn. 2003).
· cites it 9× “They argue that, pursuant to General Statutes § 22a-18, the court may, but need not, remand the parties to administrative, licensing or other proceedings to determine the legality of the defendants’ conduct.”
Windels v. Env't Prot. Comm'n, 933 A.2d 256 (Conn. 2007).
· cites it 7× “The third amended complaint sought (1) a judgment declaring that, under § 22a-16 and General Statutes § 22a-18, 10 Hart’s work on the north and south lots “has *276 or is likely to cause severe and irreparable harm to the Goodwives River and the surrounding watercourses,” (2) an…”
Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 815 A.2d 1188 (Conn. 2003).
· cites it 4× “We determined, however, on the basis of the plain language and legislative history of the act—in particular, of General Statutes § 22a-18 (b), 10 which allows the trial court to remand an action to an administrative agency that has primary jurisdiction over the environmental…”
Burton v. Com'r of Env. Prot., 970 A.2d 640 (Conn. 2009).
· cites it 7× “In reaching that conclusion, we relied heavily on the language of General Statutes § 22a-18, which provides in relevant part that a trial court has “discretion .”
Nizzardo v. State Traffic Comm'n, 788 A.2d 1158 (Conn. 2002).
· cites it 2× “General Statutes § 22a-16aprovides for alternative judicial remedies in cases brought by the attorney general pursuant to § 22a-16.”
Conservation Comm'n of Fairfield v. Red 11, LLC, 43 A.3d 244 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012).
· cites it 8× “The defendant argues that Wilmington intervened pursuant to § 22a-19 (a) of CEPA and, as such, any attorney’s fees award should have been under General Statutes § 22a-18 (e). The defendant contends that because the court awarded Wilmington attorney’s fees under the wetlands act,…”
Keeney v. Fairfield Resources, Inc., 674 A.2d 1349 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996).
· cites it 3× “The intent to afford the opportunity to any citizen to participate in raising environmental issues, either by way of instituting actions as in § 22a-18 or by intervention in such matters as in § 22a-19 (a), is unmistakable.”
Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Plan. & Zoning Comm'n of New London, 832 A.2d 611 (Conn. 2003).
· cites it 2× “” General Statutes § 22a-18 provides: “(a) The court may grant temporary and permanent equitable relief, or may impose such conditions on the defendant as are required to protect the public trust in the air, water and other natural resources of the state from unreasonable…”
Collins v. Olin Corp., 418 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D. Conn. 2006).
· cites it 3× “Pursuant to the Act’s injunctive relief provisions in § 22a-18, 10 the plaintiffs seek preliminary and permanent injunctions, ordering Ham-den to perform response actions on an expedited basis to protect and restore the land in the Newhall Section.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-18(a) — 2 cases
Collins v. Olin Corp., 418 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D. Conn. 2006).
“Pursuant to the Act’s injunctive relief provisions in § 22a-18, 10 the plaintiffs seek preliminary and permanent injunctions, ordering Ham-den to perform response actions on an expedited basis to protect and restore the land in the Newhall Section.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-18(b) — 1 case
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